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FOREWORD
What follows is another attempt to explicate the 
treacherous notion of social change. This is a specific 
type of change which rests on several assumptions that some 
students are not willing to accept. In broad terms, every­
thing changes. The sociologist comes to his study of social 
interaction with this major assumption. But he must make a 
leap from this assumption to the next; and that is; some 
things change more than others (cryptically, some things 
change and some things don't . . . sometimes). From these 
assumptions he then arrives at the point where sociology is 
the study of social similiarities and social differences.^ 
That change is problematic to the sociologist is 
axiomatic. But in like manner, no change and order are also 
problematic. Such are our difficulties. F. S. C. Northrop's 
essential premise that inquiry starts with a problem and not 
with a method is the model for the inquiry to follow. 
Following Northrop further, I accept his distinctions between 
problems of fact and problems of value as well as the funda­
mental differences between factual theories and normative 
theories.^ I will not be so bold as to say I have reduced 
normativity to facticity by the methodology employed— but 
that I have tried to get at the problem in spite of 
Northrop's logic.
iii
Accepting Horowitz's comment that we live:
. . .  in an age in which instrumental theories of 
knowledge, indeterminist attitudes in the physical 
sciences, voluntarist notions of historical change, 
pluralistic theories of culture, and existentialist 
accounts of the human abyss have become standard 
currency in western intellectual exchange. . . ,3
Then I have chosen the problem of socio-political order and 
change— more specifically, the topic of national "form" 
(ideology) and the political men who act within it and on it. 
Thus, at once, the grand problem takes in the problems of 
fact and of value in addition to factual theory and normative 
theory. For reasons of parsimony, my perspective is from 
that of a political sociology. The perspective of my 
political sociology includes the analysis of the reciprocal 
relations between the political and the social— entailing 
the coercive and the public.4 Such a definition of intel­
lectual perspective allows the study of a wide range of 
actions. If we proceed by the process of exclusion, then we 
must get things manageable before we can get things meaning­
ful.
Most globally, I am concerned with social inequalities 
among men and how these inequalities are mediated (or even 
obliterated) through the possibility of planned nonviolent 
social change. The emergence of this possibility, at least 
as far as the sociology of knowledge is concerned, is 
directly related to the two different kinds of revolution 
which affect our social structural-order as well as social 
thought. These are the industrial revolution and the French
revolution which are currently viewed as two distinct but 
linked processes or trends— industrialization and democratiz­
ation (or egalitarianization). The possibility of planning 
in the area of social change is being tried at all levels of 
government. The current international ideology or social 
policy is for 'developed' countries to assist 'under­
developed' or Third World countries, and national domestic 
policy includes programs to 'raise the level of living' of 
some or all of the peoples of a given country. Such social 
planning may be a special case of the phenomena that make up 
"social movements."^
The United States Federal legislative or Congressional 
system provides a good socio-political matrix to study the 
effects of industrialization and egalitarianization on the 
possibility of a social movement made up of international 
and national social planning. The Social Security Act of 
1935— its 33 years of socio-political history— gives us an 
empirical wedge, as it were, into the meaning of inequality 
as it has been mediated through legislation. As in all law, 
this law is bounded by time, place, and circumstance and has 
been scrutinized accordingly. When general inferences can 
be drawn, they are drawn boldly for all my readers— esti­
mating the degree of scientific or aesthetic credibility 
being a function of their sceptical and critical vision.
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ABSTRACT
A sociological perspective is offered for the Social 
Security Act of 1935 and its amendments by an analysis of 
political party platform planks (1932-1964) and legislative 
roll calls directly related to the Act (1935-1968). The 
quest for 'social security1 is viewed in theory as an inter­
national social movement which has both less organized and 
more organized components— political parties being the more 
organized of this movement. Within the general framework of 
social change, political parties deal with an attempt to 
change or stop change in the power or income distribution of 
a given domain, and as such, are essential to the discussion 
of'social security' in the United States. Platform planks 
and legislative roll calls are used as empirical indicators 
of party tendencies and longitudinal analyses are made for 
five political administrations which created and amended this 
Act.
Platform planks were selected and analyzed according 
to social security content (old-age insurance, unemployment 
compensation, relief-assistance, and health insurance). 
Legislative roll calls were selected on the basis of their 
direct relationship to the Act— 39 from the House of Repre­
sentatives and 107 from the Senate— and analyzed according
xv
to party voting for and against social security. In addition 
to percentages for the 146 roll calls, the Rice Index of 
Cohesion was used for all the roll calls individually. Both 
an Average Index and a Weighted Index of Cohesion were com­
puted for each chamber in all five presidential periods and 
compared. it was found that when one went beyond the conven­
tional use of simple averages, it was possible to speak not 
only the extent of cohesion but also direction.
Political tendencies observed in the study included:
1. Ideas on social security begin in the more 'radi­
cal' party platform planks? then appear in the Democratic 
platform? then are partially integrated into the Republican 
platform.
2. Both major parties accept the narrow scope of the 
original Social Security Act and both seek to widen this 
scope incrementally through a process of 'liberalization.'
3. There is agreement between what the major parties 
promise in their planks and what they deliver, although they 
do not promise much.
4. Both major parties give more than majority support 
for the final 'clean' bills put before them by Congressional 
Committees.
5. Average party cohesion by presidential periods is 
higher for House Democrats than for Senate Democrats? Repub­
lican average cohesiveness varies inversely— when high in 
the House is low in the Senate.
xvi
6. Weighted party cohesion by presidential periods 
reveals House Democrats to be more cohesive than Senate 
Democrats.
7. Weighted Republican cohesiveness is generally 
lower than for the Democrats on social security legislation.
8. Weighted Republican cohesiveness against social 
security is registered in the Fair Deal years for both 
chambers and in the Cold War and Great Society years for the 
Senate chamber.
9. Regional analysis of cohesiveness revealed no 
observable tendencies.
The two major parties accepted the international idea 
of social security in turn for the parliamentary right to 
structure and limit that idea according to their perception 
of the institutional history of the United States. The 
resulting program has been a bi-partisan coalition for the 
least common denominator of change. Significant social 
security proposals of the 'third' parties are an important 
source of both ideas and criticism but have been restructured 
in a 'conservative' way resulting in complex tokenism and 
postponement of needed social security legislation.
xvii
CHAPTER I
POLITICAL TENDENCIES AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Introductory
One way to ground form and reform is to do so in 
terms of political relations on a given issue. In this way 
the discussion of social change as transformation can be 
taken as an analytical combination of social processes and 
social collectives. This chapter will be an attempt to 
define and relate political tendencies and social security 
as instances of American form and the specific transforma­
tion of reform. The social problem context of concern (the 
time, place and circumstance of the study) is shown to be 
the crucial or axial discussion in relating processes to 
collectives. Following the discussion of political ten­
dencies, there will be an elaboration of the social problem 
context, the political context, and finally the hypothetical 
assumptions of the study.
A General Statement on Political Tendencies
There is little clarity or accuracy to the concepts 
which point to the phenomena ingredient in social change. 
When such terms as process, drift, shift, trend, or tendency
are applied to social change, and they usually are with great 
readiness but with much vagueness, they may or may not 
encompass all levels and degrees of change. Whether there 
is change in parts or wholes of the social fabric, and whether 
the change is in degree or kind is often left up to theoreti­
cal position.-*- The notion of process, which more or less 
encompasses all the other terms as they are used in soci­
ology today, is quite problematic. Max Lerner maintains 
that the history of the social process concept amounts to 
the history of sociology i t s e l f .2 jt can be defined as a 
continual becoming. Subsumed under the concept are terms 
like drift, shift, trend and tendency. Drift refers to some­
thing driven or carried along in a current or by some natural 
agency. Shift means a shift in place or position; while 
trend points to predominant tendencies and a general movement 
in a specific direction. Tendency has the general meaning 
of an inherent impulse in a general direction that would
O
happen if there were nothing to prevent it.
When terms of becoming, movement, or change are 
applied to social phenomena, they encompass almost all levels 
and degrees of change imaginable. One writer who has been 
more explicit than others in this regard is political soci­
ologist Rudolf Heberle who sees trends and tendencies as 
processes in contrast to social collectives. To him, social 
trends and tendencies are merely the aggregate of many indi­
vidual actions— such as urbanization and industrialization.^ 
When he discusses political trends or tendencies, which is
the kind of tendency under discussion, he is less explicit. 
The reader must ask himself the question if political ten­
dencies are an aggregate of many political actions? (This 
follows from his definition of social tendencies insofar as 
political actions are subsumed under social.) When dis­
cussing political tendencies he almost equates such ten­
dencies with sectional or regional divisions or 'climates' 
of opinion which seems to contradict the idea that a ten­
dency is an aggregate of individual actions.^ In short, the 
distinction that trends and tendencies deal with individual 
actions and movements deal with collective actions get vague 
in Heberle's general discussion on social movements. We 
thus get no clear idea of what a political process, trend, 
or tendency is.
Perry Howard, a student of Heberle, sees political 
tendencies as cleavages and translations into voting 
'patterns' of nonpolitical populations. Like Heberle, his 
tendencies may follow ecological patterns.^ In political 
science, process, trend and tendency also have reference to 
movement and change where process laws are seen as repeated 
patterns of change and political process is ' p r o c e d u r e ^
In this work, there is a combination of meanings by 
political sociologists and political scientists. Political 
tendencies shall refer to directions of general behavior on 
the part of political men. More specifically, political 
tendencies shall mean what the political parties qua parties, 
did in their party platforms and legislative performance in
Congress over time. Such tendencies will be excerpted from 
legislative behavior on socio-economic security legislation. 
(This retains the idea of voting patterns as tendencies for 
Howard, but as we said above, will analyze voting patterns 
among political men rather than among non-political men.)®
The Social Problem Context of Concern
The literature of scholarship is not always clear as
to just exactly how and why certain groups and strata,
individuals and collectives define some part or whole of
their social situation as problematic. Jessie Bernard, for
a recent sociological example, says that the concept of
'social problem' emerged at the end of the eighteenth and
beginning of the nineteenth centuries as a result of four
factors: (1) the stresses that the new urban industrial
order was creating,* (2) a growing humanitarianism; (3)
scientific ideology; and (4) the middle-class reformer 
9attitude. Also, what is a problem for some group xs not 
for another depending on protecting vested interest, etc.’*-® 
Recurrent social problems of recent times have been 'depres­
sions' and 'wars.' Both problems present insecurity in some 
or all of the population. How the insecurity of depression 
is perceived politically, and what is done politically is 
our discussion to follow. Social problems must be defined 
here as a challenge to the polity and the economy as they 
are perceived as forms; or in sociological terms— a challenge 
to social order. The period between the two world wars in
the United States is generally considered to be a time when 
there was serious challenge to all that was part of the 
Great American dream and its particular political and 
economic forms (at least quite a few millions of people were 
thrust into "insecurity" through no fault of their own).
The social problem aggregation is called the Great 
Depression of 1929-1939, or as T. H. Marshall refers to this 
time and circumstance, "The Inter-War Y e a r s . F o r  pur­
poses of graphic clarity, Figure 1 gives our theoretical 
assumption on social change with the added explication of 
our time, place and circumstance:
Social Change
Processes 
Trends and Tendencies
Industrialization
Urbanization
Secularization
Democratization
Politicalization
Social Classes 
Parties
Status Groups 
Ethnic Groups
Pressure Groups
Trans formations
\
Social Problems 
Insecurity
Social Responses
Challenge to the form as 
perceived as defined by 
group or groups: War,
Depression, Civil Disorder, 
etc.) (by the collective.)
Quest for Security (plans, 
legislation, etc.):
Reaction, Relief, Recovery, 
Reconstruction, Rebellion,
Reform, Revolution as logical
possibilities for the col­
lective . I
THE GREAT DEPRESSION THE NEW DEAL
FIGURE 1
SOCIOLOGICAL PICTURE OF THE INTER-WAR YEARS
6Various types of change or transformation might be 
said to be related to the degree of insecurity felt by the 
individuals and groups which make up a society. In other 
terms, social insecurity, either individually or collectively, 
leads to social action, and such action leads to social 
change which varies from degree to kind and from parts to 
wholes. Karl Mannheim, for example, develops different 
forms of insecurity in terms of whether or not it is 
organized or unorganized insecurity. The.stage of unorgan­
ized insecurity (unemployment being the main symptom in the 
twentieth century) leads to psychological and emotional 
experimentation as well as sociological conditions in which 
ideologies are unmasked and the validity of established 
principles and values come to be doubted:
This is the moment of skepticism, hard for the indi­
vidual yet productive for science, as it destroys 
the petrified habits of thought of the past. In this 
general experimentation, the individual who cannot 
reorganize himself may perish, but for the social 
body it means the possibility of a selection of new 
models of behavior and of new representative 
dominant types.3-2
Through stages, the collectivity goes from unorganized to 
organized insecurity— through gesture, utopia, and militarist 
pattern.3-3 social control comes about as the society tries 
to limit the variability of situations, because as Mannheim 
asserts, society cannot tolerate the unpredictable in the 
long run. It uses every means in its power to ensure that 
its economic and political foundations are as firm as pos­
s i b l e . - ^  Thus the impetus to change something to some extent
occurs to individuals, groups, and in general the collec­
tivities of a society. Of the degrees and levels of change 
open to a society when it faces insecurity, we will limit 
ourselves to the discussion of reform below.^
The Inter-War Years
There is an on-going debate among historians as to 
whether or not the Great Depression of 1929 is a "watershed1 
in history or not. Kirkendall asks the question if this 
depression was in fact another watershed or turning point in 
American history and concludes that such an interpretation 
should be avoided because the Great Depression and the New 
Deal had both continuity and change within them.
The question of whether or not the Great Depression 
is axial is not one to be answered here. It was a so-called 
economic (perhaps political-economic) trend that led to 
certain identified social problems. From these emergent 
problems came several different modes of collective action 
with attendant socio-political problems and tendencies. In 
short, it must be kept in historical context— there were 
similarities to previous economic crises but there were also 
differences. The same goes for the responses to the Great 
Depression.
Romasco's The Poverty of Abundance, as an example, 
deals with several consequences of the depression during the 
Hoover Administration.I7 He maintains that the depression 
was a new problem and the poverty associated with it was
also new because in the past very little positive action had 
been taken to overcome a national economic crisis. To busi­
ness leaders the depression was a natural phenomenon; the 
people were urged to continue to work hard. Romasco says 
this poverty was the result of an unmanageable surplus with 
underconsumption. The capitalist system of laissez-faire 
was not on trial so much as the men in power— both public 
and private— including the presidency.^8 Romasco asserts 
that it was unemployment which hit Americans most forcefully
The problem of unemployment in all its forms—  
seasonal, technological, cyclical— was not new 
on the American scene. In one aspect or another 
it was a perennial concern. Now, however, it was 
present in all three of its forms combined so that 
its impact was more extensive, severe, and press­
ing than ever before.19
Traditional defenses against unemployment were already
developed; private industry, labor unions, and charity with
cities and States backing them up. Hoover said the defenses
were sufficient as bread lines and soup kitchens began to be
formed and social workers began to articulate for the
u n e m p l o y e d . 20 cities turned to the States and the States
turned to the Federal government.
The war metaphor appeared under Hoover as "A War 
against Depression" according to Romasco. The 20's were the 
New Era and Hoover called his slogan the New Day vowing that 
poverty would be wiped from the land. Hoover's greatest 
achievement, says Romasco, was his use of the national 
government to deal with the violent fluctuations of the 
economy when he set up the Reconstruction Finance
9Corporation in January 1932.^1
Transformation, social change, and reform begins 
somewhere analytically and the question is where we shall 
'break history into its joints 1 to get at reform. The issue 
of reform in the United States is being commented on exten­
sively. 22 Answers to the questions of what was reformed, 
who did the reforming, and how reform took place as well as 
when the reform started and ended seems still to be a matter 
of one's discipline and periodization scheme. Of all the 
approaches, Greer's seems most appropriate since he views 
social reform as a movement which has some pattern since the 
close of the Civil War. His definitional statement says that 
social action in all forms is constantly taking place; 
therefore changes take place:
. . . institutions must be adjusted to protect the 
individual and society. Affected groups organize 
to meet the problem; they seek relief through 
direct action or legislation. The resultant adapta­
tion is called social reform, and the efforts to 
achieve it are social reform movements.23
Greer tries to establish the pattern of reform in America
since 1865. He says that economic distress gave rise to
most of the reform movements although prosperity may be a
factor also. He maintains there has been a shift in the
nature of reform objectives since 1865. Earlier movements
were utopian, the later ones being more practical. Failure
of the broad efforts led to this stance. The form or makeup
went from diverse groups to limited integrated membership.
Finally, early reform movements were largely ignorant of
10
methods and could not use legislation or the existent poli­
tical parties for their goals.24 These inter-war years 
showed a considerable amount of sophistication on the part 
of groups in the use of political parties and legislation; 
therefore, the political context of these years follows.
The Political Context
The so-called Roaring Twenties led to the Sobering 
Thirties. The roar was overridden by the sobriety of the 
depression. The Republican Party lost power and the new 
Democratic president told the nation what many already knew: 
that one-third of the nation was ill-fed, ill-housed, and 
ill-clothed. Of course, some had to be told this news and 
others did not. During the summer of 1932, most everyone 
began to view times as bad ones, even though some became 
profiteers.
The Democratic Party told the people that it could
get the system going again. Roosevelt's New Deal attempted
to prime the pump of U. S. 'form'; that is, to shore up the
capitalist system. One critic, Thomas, in his survey of the
New Deal in early 1934 says:
You can't prime the capitalist pump, because it is 
rapidly wearing out. Socialization and planned 
production for use, not a reformist stabilization 
or attempted stabilization is the solution.25
This interventionary priming took on many labels of change, 
such as reconstruction, relief, recovery, and reform.^6 The 
various recovery and relief programs were 'emergency' mea­
sures and in a way, short-term dramatic political responses
11
to the deteriorated state of economic affairs. The First
New Deal, as it has come to be called, dealt with recovery
and relief. The Second New Deal purportedly dealt with
97'reconstruction' and 'reform. ' * '  One law which grew out of 
this latter "deal" was the Social Security Act of 1935.^®
All laws and legislative history is intricate and 
interwoven. The history of the Social Security Act of 1935 
can start most any place— in Elizabeth's England, Bismarck's 
Germany, or Roosevelt's America. In any case it is the 
culmination, at least in the United States, or a lot of 
soul-searching on how to handle 'poverty' in general, and 
dependency and economic insecurity in the specific. It was 
the first package deal given to the economically disen­
franchised of several categories. As mentioned above, the 
20's and 30's threw capitalism and the political parties 
operating within it into a grand dilemma. The dilemma was 
how to use the existing socio-economic and socio-political 
forms to move from mass insecurity to mass security. The 
Social Security Act is a positive instance of rights 
guaranteed by the constitution (as a social platform) and 
delivered or articulated by the existing political parties 
in the United States from 1935 to the present. Such a 
package deal did not come automatically, however. Its justi­
fication comes from the broadly interpreted statement in the 
Constitution pertaining to the obligation of the government 
in power to promote the general welfare. The law was 
sustained by the U. S. Supreme Court on these grounds when
12
its constitutionality was questioned. More will be said on 
this in Chapter IV when The Roosevelt New Deal and War Deal 
Years are discussed.
There has been a hint above that the Depression of 
1929 hit the Republican Party hard. Hoover was unable to 
'rethink' the situation when natural recovery did not occur. 
There was some degree of social unrest which was channeled 
into the elections of 1930 and 1932 and the Democratic Party 
made gains. There was at least some awareness of the fact
that economic crisis must be stemmed before it became poli­
tical crisis. Recovery and relief was provided by the newly 
elected government. But Roosevelt in his special message of 
June 8, 1934, put forward the thesis that reconstruction and
O Q
recovery must go hand xn hand. ^
It is obvious that Americans "recovered" from the 
depression; that is, it passed from the American experience. 
Also, that "relief" in its many forms was provided through­
out the crisis. The Federal government had to 'take the 
bull by the horns' so to speak and play a much larger leader­
ship role than before the depression. It had to opt for the 
"analogue of war" as William Leuchtenberg calls it. Mobili­
zation during war time provided the model for mobilization 
during depression time.30 The myths such as the best govern­
ment is the one which governs least, and if we pursue busi­
ness as usual, everything will work out naturally, do not
work during war time. The First World War called to 
question these two myths. It is generally believed that
13
there was 'recovery' through government intervention into 
the economy. Alas, the alternative hypothesis of non­
intervention, that is, there would have been 'recovery' if 
we let nature (or economic laws, etc.) take its course was 
not tested; therefore, we do not know its validity. The 
fact is group action, government, did not wait. Perhaps 
there is a law that says that bread lines and soup kitchens 
could lead to barricades. What this means in less spec­
tacular language is 'reconstruction,' 'recovery,' 'relief,' 
and 'reform' often forestall 'revolution. '3
The legislative and social history of the Social 
Security Act and its amendments to date may provide an index 
as to how the 30's were 'reconstructed' and the social and 
economic security of the people 'reformed' since that time. 
Perhaps the role of the national political body in the 
guarantees which were setup will be clarified in the analysis 
to follow. Policy was formulated, programs were put into 
action, and millions were effected by the Act.
All that remains before the methodology of the study 
is presented in an overview of the general political picture 
of the U. S. Congress since the depression on the basis of 
party membership; and a few comments on the development and 
formative years of the Social Security Act.
The general legislative picture over the 33 years of 
this study vascillated between Democrats and Republicans—  
not necessarily coinciding with the President's Party in 
control of the Executive Branch. Figures 2 and 3 show that
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the Democrats gained seats in both houses in the 1930 elec­
tion, and continued to gain them up until 1936; then losing 
seats up until 1946; maintained relative stability until 
1956 and then up through 1964; after 1964 certain strengths 
for the Republican Party begin to appear— almost as if a new 
cycle is to begin where Republicans will gain majorities in 
both houses in 1972 or 1974.
Against this legislative membership by party goes the 
history of the Social Security Act. That it was a Democratic 
Party accomplishment, if that is what it is, goes without 
much saying. Edwin Witte, an important figure in the 
framing of the Act has summarized the actions leading to the 
development of the act, as a memorandum on the history of 
the Committee on Economic S e c u r i t y . ^2 He shows the develop­
ment of the act as being directly along the lines of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's philosophy but a function 
of differing points of view. Arthur Altmeyer, in his book, 
The Formative Years of Social Security, takes us beyond the 
development of the act itself up to 1954.*^ Both Witte and 
Altmeyer direct their attention to the political matters 
underlying this piece of legislation. Witte and Altmeyer 
provide specific comments which will be 'broken out' in the 
historical chapters to follow. For historical perspective 
selected provisions of other laws relating to the Social 
Security Act are given in Appendix C. Appendix D is a list 
of public laws amending the Social Security Act. These two 
tables contain the laws relating and amending the act over
17
the 33 years of its history.
Summary and Hypothetical Considerations
In the period beginning between the two world wars 
and extending up to the present, the United States took on 
two descriptive, imprecise labels of the affluent society 
and the welfare state. These slogans were arrived at, at 
least in part, by political programs which took on slogans 
like the New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier and the Great 
Society. Comments continue to be put forth regarding the 
accuracy of such labels and slogans as time puts them into 
better perspective. It is safe to assume at this point that 
the time between the wars— especially the 30 ' s— had both 
similarities and differences to previous decades. Insofar 
as the Great Depression years were similar, we refer to them 
as the 'old order' or the 'old regime' or in the manner of 
this study, the 'form.'' Insofar as there appear to be dif­
ferences are the result of collective social action in the 
form of legislation framed to bring about a certain kind of 
change— they can be referred to as 'reform.' The 30's were 
similar to previous decades insofar as legislators had to 
respond to the executive branch of the Federal government 
during insecurity of the First World War period. They were 
different insofar as the 'war' model and metaphor were 
applied to the peacetime insecurity of First World Depression 
which followed the First World War. The model and metaphor 
was applied by the Executive branch and the legislators
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responded. War was declared on depression, as it were, and 
descriptive terms for the nature of the tactics and strategy 
ranged from relief to recovery to reconstruction to reform.
(This is not to say that 'reform' legislation was something 
new to the American politician. Populism and Progressivism 
added to the 'form' and 'reform' of the nation form about 
1890 to the 1930's.) As international insecurity increased 
in the late 30's, domestic insecurity 'decreased.' The 
Second World War was followed by ^recessions rather than 
depressions— which descriptively points to a lower level of 
insecurity. The Cold War of the late 40's, 50's, and 60's 
resulted in continuous debate over guns versus butter, or 
more currently, missiles versus margarine, or said in less 
dramatic terms, what will get top priority: abatement of
international 'insecurity' or domestic 'insecurity'? (The 
period under study ends with a "War on Poverty" which as is 
noted above began with a "War on Depression.")
Just as there is difficulty in establishing periods 
for 'reform' in the United States, it is problematic to say 
when a concern for 'poverty, ' unemployment, '•'■‘nomic and 
social security occurred. The shift in thinking from private 
to public concern, the shift from small political units to 
larger ones (county concern to State and national concern) 
has been occurring at least since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Appendix A summarizes the shift in 
terms of thought concerning the 'poor' in the nineteenth 
century. In general, the shift can be centered around the
French and Industrial Revolutions and the effects of these 
two continuous events on social relations, prevailing con­
ceptual attitudes, responsibilities and causes, and the 
so-called 'cures' proposed by different social groups and 
units. Samuel Mencher, for example, in a book on economic 
security policy in Britain and the United States, shows the 
growth of 'welfare policy' from the sixteenth century in 
terms of the shift from status to contract relations.34 
Roy Lubove's work, The Struggle for Social Security; 1900- 
1935 concerns itself with the evolution of the social 
security concept, as such, up to the New Deal. The work 
puts voluntarism into a better perspective for the student 
of social security. Of importance to this study is his 
exposure of what we could call the Rubinow-Epstein criticism 
of the Social Security Act of 1935. This criticism says 
that income was not redistributed and there was no health
provision.35
Having discussed our time, place and circumstance as 
well as the political context of the Social Security Act as 
an instance of social policy, hypothetical assumptions can 
now be considered. Social security in the United States may 
be taken as part of an international social movement on the 
part of national governments to guarantee its citizens some 
measure of economic security. The role of political parties 
in this world-wide movement is considered central. What the 
American parties say they will do in their platforms and 
what they actually do over time may give us insight into the
20
type of social movement that the Social Security Act has 
been said to perpetrate. Assuming there was a shift in 
governmental responsibility for social security after the 
Great Depression, we may inquire into the role of the 
parties in this shift. If we can expose political tenden­
cies underlying party actions on social security legisla­
tion, insight into American socio-political form and reform 
may occur.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER I
This means that one's theoretical position about the 
nature of social relations can and does effect the theoreti­
cian's position on change. What is reform at one level of 
change may be reaction at another level. More specifically, 
if one is a conflict oriented sociologist, change refers to 
changes in stratification; whereas, to the consensus soci­
ologist change in one's income may constitute significant 
change. For the differences between conflict and consensus 
sociology positioning on the issue of poverty-reduction see 
Robert M. Kloss, "The Concept of 'Poverty' in Sociology: A
Profile of Poverty in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana" 
(unpublished Master's thesis, Louisiana State University, 
Baton Rouge, 1967).
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Social Sciences, eds., Edwin R. A. Seligman and Alvin 
Johnson, Vol. XIV (New York: MacMillan Company, 1951), pp.
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3Henry P. Fairchild (ed.), Dictionary of Sociology 
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to Political Sociology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc., 1951), pp. 8-9.
5Ibid., p. 219.
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York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. x.
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Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1937), pp. 93-98. How this 
fourth factor, the middle-class reformer attitude, arose is 
not clear. There are various levels of explanation which 
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situation on the part of the middle class was their adoption
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Reason and Revolution (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1960),
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Social Thought from Lore to Science (New York: Dover Pub­
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23Norman Thomas, "Surveying the New Deal," The World 
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an example of their usage see William E. Leuchtenberg, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York: Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1963).
97Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York: Har-
court, Brace and World, Inc., 1966). Roosevelt's attempts 
at reform or reconstruction led to the development of a 
'conservative coalition' as a sort of counter-tendency. See 
James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New 
Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress,
1933-1939 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967).
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War," in Braeman, et al., pp. 81-143.
31Heberle, op,, cit., p. 4.
24
32Edwin E. Witte, The Development of the Social 
Security Act (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press,
1 9 6 3 ) .
^ ^ A l t m e y e r ,  l o c . c i t .
•^Samuel Mencher, Poor Law to Poverty Program: 
Economic Security Policy in Britain and the United States 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1 9 6 7 )  .
•^Roy Lubove, The Struggle for Social Security: 
1 9 0 0 - 1 9 3 5  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1 9 6 8 ) ,  p p .  1 7 5 - 8 0 .
CHAPTER II
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL INDICATORS 
INTRODUCTORY
Before expanding the study design, a few remarks are 
in order concerning how the methodological move from the 
discussion of political tendencies to the socio-political 
indicators can be accomplished conceptually. For this move, 
we shall again turn to Heberle and his ideas on the com­
ponents of a social movement. For him there are three 
basic parts and these are adapted and diagrammed in Figure 
4 below. Heberle is concerned with the relationship between 
social classes, parties, and movements. The figure shows 
the ways in which this relationship can be viewed as causal; 
e.g., conflict between socio-economic classes may lead to 
conflict between parties— or correlational; e.g.. where you 
find movements, you also find parties and classes. The 
development of such a set of relationships proceeds from an 
assertion made by Heberle that social movements are made up 
of both organized and unorganized groups.
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FIGURE 4
MOVEMENT, PARTY AND CLASS RELATIONSHIP
Political parties, according to Heberle, are an 
example of organized groups dealing with an attempt to 
change or stop change either in the power or income distribu- 
tion of a given domain. Social classes may be defined as 
they are related to economic production and c o n s u m p t i o n .^
This study focuses on the political parties side of 
Figure 4 above. Moreover, we will accept the Heberle defini­
tion of party for the analysis. Given such a definition, 
the selective concern of the analysis will be the constitu­
tive idea of party platform plank and party roll-call 
voting behavior on the issue of social security. The 
analysis is longitudinal.
Now, Heberle1s definition of political party as an 
organized group which attempts to change or stop change in 
power and income distribution may be considered to be
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directly related to the degree to which the political party, 
qua party, is unified in its tactics and strategy as well as 
its constitutive ideas. If what they attempt to accomplish 
(as stated, for example, in the party platform plank on 
social security) can be compared with the degree of party 
cohesion (let us say on their observable legislative roll- 
call behavior on the issue of social security), inferences 
can be drawn to both political tendency and social movement 
aspects of the quest for social security in America. The 
specific procedure follows according to a study design in 
four parts: time span, objects of analysis, methods of
analysis, and units of analysis.^
Time Span
The general time period covered in this work ranges 
from the beginning of the New Deal under President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt through the end of the Great Society leader­
ship of President Lyndon Baines Johnson. The thirty-three 
years of political history can be broken up in smaller time 
units according to the five presidents who held the power of 
the office: (1) The New Deal (Franklin D. Roosevelt) from
1 9 3 3  to 1 9 4 5 ;  (2 )  The Fair Deal (Harry S .  Truman) from 1 9 4 5
to 1 9 5 2 ;  (3)  The Cold War Years (labeled this for lack of a
program slogan during Dwight D. Eisenhower's tenure) from 
1 9 5 3  to 1 9 6 0 ;  (4)  The New Frontier (John F. Kennedy) from
1 9 6 1  to 1 9 6 3 ?  and (5) The Great Society (Lyndon B. Johnson)
from 1 9 6 3  to 1 9 6 8 .  These five periods are explicated in
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Chapters III through VII below. Chapter VIII summarizes the 
results of the five sub-periods and generalizations for the 
thirty-three years are presented.
Objects of Analysis
C
Social indicators3 are many, so many, in fact, that 
only the most basic indicators have been developed. Socio­
political indicators used in this study can be arrayed 
according to the level of indication. What is meant by this 
is that, for example, the Social Security Act may be con­
sidered an indicator of the consideration and care given to 
the "weakest members" (or the "insecure") of the American 
society. The political party platform (social security 
planks) and legislative roll calls by party on social 
security are political indications of party concern for 
social security. So, in the general sense the object of 
analysis is social security in the United States; but in the 
more specific sense the objects of analysis are political 
party conduct or behavior in platform statements and roll 
calls in the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Methods and Units of Analysis
Just as socio-political indicators can be considered 
or viewed at different levels, so can the methods of 
analysis. The meaning here is that, for example, the method 
chosen for selection of the topic of social security was not 
accomplished by some random sampling of socio-political con­
cern. The method chosen for the American concern for social
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security is in terms of its political context. Within such 
a broad context, political party platform planks and roll- 
calls were felt to be adequate, although certainly not 
exclusive or exhaustive indicators of the political contest 
of concern for social security. Thus, having made this 
choice of indicators, a comparative content analysis of the 
political party platform planks is applied. Then party per­
centages and the Rice Index of Cohesion are applied to the 
social security roll-calls selected.
a. Political party platforms and social security 
planks.— Insofar as political parties continue to be the 
vehicle of legitimate expression and action, the struggle 
for power among them is important. This struggle takes many 
forms— one of which is the party platform. These platforms 
may be used as a socio-political indicator of both intra­
party conflict and consensus as well as inter-party conflict 
and consensus. The significance of party platforms as indi­
cators is polemical and some comment is in order. Walter 
Weyl says of them:
The broad outlines of the democracy's industrial 
program, so far as they have reached the general 
consciousness, are to be found in the promises and 
declamations of the platforms of our political 
parties. These platforms are for the most part 
insincere, but it is exactly their insincerity 
which gives them their evidential value. A platform 
does not show what the politician wants, but does 
show what that astute person believes that the 
people want.6
Porter and Johnson carefully say: "They are often
silent on matters of vital concern to the nation, not binding 
on the candidates, and forgotten by the party leaders."?
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Going on, the charges are made that there is little dif­
ference between Republican and Democratic Party platforms, 
that they are mere 'catch-alls, ' and that planks are often 
repudiated or ignored. Despite all this, many individuals 
become greatly concerned over them, and party platforms may 
be said to fulfill the following functions on the American 
political scene according to Porter and Johnson:
1. Platforms are the official party principles and 
policies.
2. Platforms pay homage to those able to incorporate
their ideas into the planks.
3. Platforms often reflect political trends such
that new economic, social and political movements 
may be observed.
4. Minor party platform declarations are occasion­
ally adopted by major parties at a later date.
5. Platforms cite weaknesses in the programs of 
the opposing parties.
6. Platforms serve as a criterion of party success
and failure.
7. The platform of the party in power frequently 
illustrates the desires, achievements and thoughts of 
the president.
8. Platforms are used as propaganda for party 
activities.
9. Platforms serve as a catalyst for party factions 
and voters represented by these factions.
10. Platforms are instruments of parties attempting 
to gain control of the government.
11. Platforms are an indication of the predominant 
forces in operation during any election year, thus
one barometer of opinion in American political history.
12. Upon examination, many party pledges are often 
carried out, refuting arguments against platforms.8
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Accepting the above limitations and functions, we shall 'rip' 
out, as it were, the planks dealing with social security for 
those parties which ran presidential candidates for our time 
span. We will compare and contrast them for the ten presi­
dential or platform years from 1932 to 1968. These planks 
will then be compared with the legislative outcome or per­
formance. To the latter we can turn.
b. Legislative roll-calls and social security.—  
Political parties in both houses of the American Congress 
attempt to 'ground' their good intentions, political debts, 
and general political responsibility in their varied 
activities. One way in which they make decisions is in 
voting. There are three categories of voting: (1) closed
or secret voting; (2) semi-open or anonymous voting; and 
(3) open or public voting. The most common type of public 
voting is the roll call and it is this form which serves as 
one of our indicators.9 Methodologically, legislative roll 
calls have several advantages and limitations which are sum­
marized below:
Advantages
1. Legislators are members of the political elite 
and to study their behavior is to study behavior related 
to policy formulation.
2. Voting is an index of behavior of individuals 
in political roles.
3. Roll-call voting makes empirical analysis com­
paratively easier (roll-call votes are both hard and 
public data).
4. Roll-call voting provides the means for describing
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and measuring variations in the voting behavior of 
(a) individual legislators; (b) groups of legis­
lators; and (c) among the roll calls themselves.
Disadvantages
1. Roll call analysis techniques do not explain 
to the researcher the patterns he may discern in 
voting. They help to discern and measure patterns 
of variation, but do not explain or account for 
these variations.
2. Inference from information about voting 
behavior to the behavior of legislators in other 
phases of the legislative process must be made with 
caution.10
Taking the above advantages and disadvantages as they come, 
roll calls were selected on the issue of social security.
The specific procedure for the selection follows.
From a total list of all the roll calls brought to 
both houses of Congress from 1935 to 1968, 146 roll calls 
were selected on the basis that they relate to the central 
issue of social security. The several measures of social 
security in the broad sense that are tengentially related 
were not considered. These include railroad retirement bene' 
fits and the social security measures voted on in behalf of 
the armed forces and government employees— which all deal 
with specific populations. The thousands of roll calls thus 
narrowed down to just those dealing with the Social Security 
Act and its major amendments over its 33-year history. This 
is not to say that there are no minor amendments in other 
bills, as riders for example, which do not affect social 
security policy and programming; rather it is to say that to 
include other related legislation not dealing specifically
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with social security would 'contaminate' the sample to such 
an extent that there would be too many issues to consider. 
Said another way, there is a greater degree of certainty 
that what these Senators and Congressmen were voting on over 
these years was the issue of social security rather than 
something else. If there is one constant that has to be 
assumed in the study, it is this.
The list of particular roll calls on the Social 
Security Act of 1935 and its major amendments to 1968 was 
drawn from a consideration of several sources.^ The roll 
calls include all the amendments from the floor, final pas­
sage, and the conference report on the original bill and all 
subsequent amendments to it. The 146 roll calls— 107 for 
the Senate and 39 for the House— are listed in Appendices E 
and F. Specific analyses by period are to be seen in the 
five chapters to follow. It should be noted that there are 
other ways that decisions are made on social security besides 
the public roll call. For example, a very important piece of 
legislation came to the floor and was passed with no record 
of how individual members voted: that was the Social
Security Amendments of 1946.
After the selection was made on the issue criterion 
of social security in terms of the one law, frequencies and 
percentages were run on each roll call, each cluster of roll 
calls in each presidential period, and for the total roll 
calls by chamber. ^  The Inter-University Consortium for 
Political Research provided the data and code books.^ The
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major variables included time period, chamber, party and 
region.
Assuming that roll calls are advantageous to the 
study of political tendencies, there are numerous ways or 
methods in which these roll calls can be analyzed and a 
given study executed. After considering the heated debate 
surrounding roll call analysis, it was decided to limit the 
index or measure applied to the data to the Rice Index of 
Cohesion.1^ This Index was first proposed by Stuart A. Rice 
and focuses on the concept of party cohesion as it could be 
detected in categorically defined subgroups within a legis­
lature. -*-5 Cohesion is the extent to which the distribution 
of votes on a roll call deviates from the distribution that 
would be expected if all influences operated in a random 
fashion. Minimum cohesion is assigned an index value of 
zero (votes on an issue are split 5 0 - 5 0  for and against); 
and, maximum cohesion is the case where all members vote on 
the same side of an issue which is complete cohesion and has 
an index value of 1 0 0 . A  Rice Index was computed for each 
of the 1 4 6  roll calls; for the set of roll calls by chamber 
in each period; and for all the roll calls in each chamber; 
as well as by regional breakdown for the latter two cases.^ 
Comparisons were then made for trends over the five periods 
by party, chamber and region. Intra-party and inter-party 
cohesiveness on the issue of social security can then be 
discerned over time and can hopefully permit inferences as 
far as political tendencies are concerned.
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One final remark is required before moving on to the 
historical analyses and results. This is to reiterate that 
this study differs from most other studies which use roll 
calls as part of their analysis. Political scientists of 
the 'behavioristic' persuasion concentrate mostly on indi­
vidual congresses and usually just one chamber with outcomes 
that seem to be dealing with methodological problems at the 
expense of historical and theoretical problems. Historians, 
on the other extreme, apply this analytic technique in a 
longitudinal manner thus overcoming the ahistoricity of the 
political scientists. By analyzing one specific issue over 
many years on the socio-political indicators of political 
party platform planks and roll calls, it is hoped that a 
broader political sociology perspective can be gained in 
both theoretical and methodological areas.
SUMMARY
The socio-political indicators of social relations are 
important to the political sociologist— especially in a 
longitudinal study such as this one. A study design skeleton 
was presented containing the objects, methods and units of 
analysis as well as the time span covered. "Planks” from 
political party platforms and legislative roll-calls were 
viewed as indicators in terms of their advantages and dis­
advantages to the researcher. How the policy, planks and 
roll-calls were selected and categorized was put into 
methodological perspective.
36
On the basis of the general theoretical discussion in 
Chapter I and the specific methodological remarks in this 
chapter, the processes of inclusion and exclusion should be 
clear enough for the study to turn to the five historical 
chapters (Chapters III through VII). Chapter VIII will con­
stitute the summary of the theoretical, methodological and 
historical analyses.
Methodological Note
As Hayward Alker concisely points out (Mathematics 
and Politics) there is a long history of attempts to bring 
order to political activity through the use of mathematics. 
The same applies to economics and to sociology. The dilemma 
comes about when the researcher must pit varying degrees of 
order, consistency, reproducibility, neatness and consistency 
against the severe problems of inference and the informative 
value.
What shall be the methodological decision amidst the 
dilemma for the discussion of political tendencies and social 
security? In regards political party platform planks. as 
indicators, the technique of content analysis in the broad 
historical sense offers high informative value but rather low 
precision as well as the usual inferential problems. Legis­
lative roll call behavior, as pointed out above, gives us 
the observable facts that can be manipulated to a certain 
extent with the possibility of establishing verifiable rela­
tionships or tendencies. Comparing what the parties said
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they were going to do, and what they did as a party presents 
the problem of general comparability without even getting to 
the possibility of some mathematical applications. Yet we 
must accept the severities and consider the possibility of 
high informative value as well as accurate, consistent 
measurement.20
38
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER II
"^Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements: An Introduction
to Political Sociology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc., 1951), pp. 150-91.
^Ibid., p. 152. He says: “Conflicts between politi­
cal parties which are apparently caused by disagreement on 
problems of constitutional law or on political theory are 
most likely in reality conflicts over the redistribution of 
political power between social classes. Conflicts between 
political parties over principles of taxation, wage policy, 
labor legislation, foreign trade, social security (under­
lined provided), and other public policies and expenditures 
are really conflicts between classes over the redistribution 
of societal income."
3Ibid., pp. 152-57.
^ h e  notion of a 1 study design skeleton' was taken 
from Aage Richard Clausen,"Policy Dimensions in Congres­
sional Roll Calls: A Longitudinal Analysis" (unpublished
Doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
1964), pp. 22-23.
3The choice of "indicator" as a concept is preferred 
over the idea of "variable." This is more in keeping with 
the current state of quantification in the social sciences, 
at least to this writer. For a statement on indicators, 
see Social Indicators. edited by Raymond A. Bauer (Cambridge, 
Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1955).
^Walter Weyl, The New Democracy: An Essay on Certain
Political and Economic Tendencies in the United States (New 
York: Harper and Row "torchbook," 1964), p. 277.
7Kirk H. Porter, and Donald B. Johnson, National 
Party Platforms: 1840-1964 (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1966), p. vi.
8ibid., pp. vi-vii.
9Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. 
Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 3-4.
10Ibid.. pp. 7-11. There are many studies and critical 
remarks of this technique. A partial list can be found in 
the selected bibliography under articles.
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^Laws Related to Social Security and Unemployment 
Compensation. compiled by Gilman G. Udell, u. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1967. Compilation of the Social Security 
Laws, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, 
Document Number 266. U. S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, 1968. 2 Volumes. Congressional Quarterly
Service including the Conoressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol­
umes I-XXIV (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly,
Inc.). Arthur J. Altmeyer, The Formative Years of Social 
Security (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968).
Gilbert Y. Steiner, Social Insecurity: The Politics of
Welfare (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966).
l^The direction of a roll call is important in any 
analysis but presents some rather severe methodological 
problems. How will the analyst decide what the direction of 
a given vote is? In this case, the decision was made to 
consider 'yeas' either for or against social security. A 
'yea' for social security is a vote for the maximum estab­
lishment, expansion and/or extension of income, services, or 
participation to more citizens. A 'yea' against social 
security would be the opposite. (Maximum establishment 
means that when two bills are being considered at the same 
time, the one that is most for expansion and extension of 
benefits is chosen.) On this criterion, 29 votes have been 
redirected or switched so that the direction of the vote is 
uniform throughout the study; that is, everytime a 'yea' is 
tabulated in the computer it is for social security. A 
list of these switched votes is included in Appendix G. 
Finally, the direction of a vote does not necessarily re­
flect the President's position on a given bill; e.g.. the 
President may be against the expansion of social security.
13iphe congressional roll call data utilized in this 
study were made available by the Inter-University Consortium 
for Political Research. The data were supplied in partially 
proofed form and the Consortium bears no responsibility for 
either the analysis or interpretations presented here.
l^See Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Poli­
tics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928). This measure of
cohesion was chosen because it is the best known and most 
widely used. In addition to this general criterion for 
selection as a possible tool in this study, it was con­
sidered to be the most parsimonious insofar as it allows 
inferences about party behavior to get at political ten­
dencies. (Other measures or techniques are, of course, open 
to the researcher: for some of the possibilities see
Anderson, 0£. cit., pp. 29-58.) Because roll call analysis 
itself has some inferential restrictions, it was felt that 
other measures— included those which are more complex and 
thus demand further restrictions— would be out of the 
context of rigor.
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1 RInsofar as this study is concerned with party as a 
meaningful category, the Rice Index facilitates the descrip­
tion of legislative behavior at the roll call voting stage.
Its peculiar characteristic is that it measures cohesion as 
a function of aggregate group action on single roll calls.
See Anderson, op.. cit., pp. 32, 43.
•^This index is computed as follows: the number of
'yeas' and 'nays' are converted into percentages of the 
total number of legislators voting. The Rice Index is an 
expression of the absolute differences between these two 
percentages. For example: Democrats voted 48 for and eight
against a measure (total, 56):
Democrats:
Percent for = 48/56 x 100 =85.7
Percent Against = 8/56 x 100 = 14.3
Rice Index = 85.7 - 14.3 = 71.4
See Rice, 0£. cit., pp. 207-27, and Anderson, ojd. cit., p. 33. 
A critical issue that presents itself within the context of 
rigor mentioned above is that of the isomorphism between our 
observations and the measurements of the Rice Index— this 
issue is that of the theories associated with the level of 
measurement of our index. If we consider our Index on the 
basis of its use of 'yeas' and 'nays' then it is at the 
classificatory or nominal level; but when we combine these 
responses into percentages then we are operating at the 
interval level. See Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics 
for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 21-30.
l^No statistical test of significance has been devised 
to determine if the probability of group cohesion may be due 
to chance. Anderson, loc. cit., suggests supplementary data 
and/or many roll calls. We have tried to do both in this 
study by using political party platform planks and having 146 
roll calls.
18See Thomas B. Patterson, Sectional Stress and Party 
Strength (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967);
James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New 
Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress,
1933-1939 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967);
Joel H. Silbey, The Shrine of Party: Congressional Voting
Behavior 1841-1852 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1967); also, Clausen, loc. cit.
l9Hayward R. Alker, Mathematics and Politics (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1965). See especially the chapter
on politics and its measurement, pp. 13-28.
20The issue of data which gives high probability 
values but low informative content is discussed by Erik 
Allardt, "Aggregate Analysis: The Problem of its Informa­
tive Value," Research Report N: 72, 1966. Institute of 
Sociology, University of Helsinki, Finland.
CHAPTER III
THE NEW DEAL AND WAR DEAL YEARS
Introductory
The scholarly analyses for this period of American 
history (1932 to 1945) are already extensive and growing.
The period covers the responses on the part of the United 
States to a world depression and a warId war. If there is 
one thing agreed upon by the scholars of the period it is 
that Franklin Delano Roosevelt, thrice elected president, 
responded to these two tremendous social problems with great 
urgency.
When the U. S. economy had its great fall in 1929, 
the Republican Party and its backers were taken at a loss on 
how to pick it up again. In short, their perception of the 
problem and the social policy instituted to solve it were 
short of the mark— thus they came under attack through the 
vehicles of the Communist, Socialist, and Democratic parties, 
as well as labor and intellectuals.^ True to the two-party 
tradition, the Democrats picked up seats in both the House 
and the Senate in the election of 1930. After they got 
their presidential candidate elected in 1932, a program and 
a schedule evolved in an attempt to 'prime the economic 
pump.1 Democratic majorities were seated in both Houses of
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the Congress after the election of 1932. The New Deal was 
born during these hard times through the effective relation­
ship between the Democratically controlled Executive and 
Legislative branches of the government.
The New Deal was called a pragmatic blending of the 
previous political slogans offered by Teddy Roosevelt (the 
Square Deal) and Woodrow Wilson's (New Freedom).^ This is 
not to say that the New Deal, as it has come to be known, is 
a blending of these two prior presidents' policies. Its 
degree of pragmatism, experimentalism, and sheer political 
exigency and compromise are still "up for grabs"? moreover, 
the continuity with, and divergence from, the past is an
O
issue still being clarified. That the perception of social 
problems (in this case depression) and their solutions are 
rooted in the past is a sociological truism. What is of 
concern and therefore controversy is the depth and spread of 
the roots. Said another way, how great was the challenge 
and how sharp was the response on the part of the Democratic 
Party and its supporters?
Leuchtenburg, from a historical perspective, says:
No event in the twentieth century has had so great 
an impact on American society as the Great Depression.
It struck precisely at the point when the old order 
of individualism and business leadership was scoring 
its greatest successes . . . some critics thought the 
New Deal was impairing traditional American values, 
while others believed that the administration was not 
going far enough. Yet even the critics could agree 
that the changes wrought in the 30' s— the growth of 
power of the national government, the advance toward 
a welfare state, the unionization of industrial 
America, the subsidization of the American farmer,
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the Supreme Court 'revolution,' the upheaval in 
political alignments— make the decade one of the 
most significant periods in American history.4
The New Deal has several components which evolved labeled as 
relief, recovery, or to some, reconstruction and reform. 
These labels refer to legislative action that became law.
It is not our task to delve into these programs— the tempo­
rary recovery and relief programs of the "First New Deal" 
and the "One-hundred Days."® They may be considered to be 
short-lived policy-wise, accomplishing their task. Once the 
capitalist pump was primed— which means that national confi­
dence was being restored in economic relations— longer range 
policy could be considered. Roosevelt's idea was to combine 
recovery and reconstruction. He said in his June 8, 1934 
message to Congress: "It is childish to speak of recovery
first and reconstruction afterward. In the very nature of 
the processes of recovery we must avoid the destructive 
influence of the past."® Roosevelt, as we shall see, tried 
to push such an idea— but as this tendency toward recon­
struction and reform began to take shape, certain counter- 
tendencies began to occur. '
The decision of Roosevelt in 1934 to create a Com­
mittee on Economic Security was one significant instance of 
his wish to 'reconstruct' the American economic system as he 
saw it. From this committee came the Administration's 
legislative proposal which culminated in the Social Security 
Act of 1935, which purportedly had both 'relief' and 'pre­
ventive' or 'reconstructive' aspects.® The President
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instructed that the committee shall study problems related 
to the economic security of individuals and report its 
recommendations no later than December 1, 1934 concerning 
proposals which in its judgment will promote greater economic 
security.^
The report of this committee was transmitted to the 
President on January 17, 1935.-*-0 It contained seven major 
recommendations dealing with: (1) employment assurance; (2)
unemployment compensation; (3) old-age security; (4) security 
for children; (5) risks arising out of ill health; (6) 
residual relief; and (7) administration. At the same time a 
draft for the economic security bill was sent to the Presi­
dent.^ -^ * From these two documents the president sent a 
special message to both Houses on January 17, 1935, calling
*1 p
for prompt enactment. The usual legislatxve process was 
then followed and it became law on August 14, 1935. in 
the course of this process there was opposition to the 
original proposal resulting in a new or 'clean' bill which 
shifted its title from economic security to social 
security.14
The report of this committee needs to be commented 
upon before the several political and legislative tendencies 
are analyzed. This is so because it contains some state­
ments which have been signally neglected by scholars and 
politicans of American social security policy. For example, 
under the fourth recommendation above it states that:
It must not for a moment be forgotten that the core
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of any social plan must be for the child. Every 
proposition we make must adhere to this core.
Old-age pensions are in a real sense measures in 
behalf of children. They shift the retroactive 
burdens to shoulders which can bear them with less 
human cost, and young parents thus released can 
put at the disposal of the new member of society 
those family resources he must be permitted to 
enjoy if he is to become a strong person, unburden- 
some to the State. Health measures that protect 
his family from sickness and remove the menacing 
apprehension of debt, always present in the mind of 
the breadwinner, are child-welfare measures. Like­
wise, unemployment compensation is a measure in 
behalf of children in that it protects the home.
Most important of all, public job assurance which 
can hold the family together is a measure for 
children in that it assures them a childhood rather 
than the premature strains of the would-be child 
breadwinner.15
A second example is the fifth recommendation cited above con­
cerning risks arising out of ill health:
Insurance against the costs of sickness is neither 
new nor novel. In the United States we have had a 
long experience with sickness insurance both on a 
non-profit and commercial basis. Both forms have 
been inadequate in respect to the protection they 
furnish, and the latter— commercial insurance— has 
in addition been too expensive for people of small 
means. Voluntary insurance holds no promise of 
being much more effective in the near future than 
it has been in the past. Our only form of compulsory 
insurance has been that which is provided against 
industrial accidents and occupational diseases under 
the workmen's compensation laws. In contrast other 
countries have had experience with compulsory health 
or sickness insurance applied to over a hundred 
million persons over a period of more than fifty 
years. Nearly every large and industrial country of 
the world except the United States has applied the 
principle of insurance to the economic risks of 
illness.15
That the core of the social security measure put forth by 
this committee were based on measures in behalf of the child 
has been lost in the historical shuffle. On the matter of 
health risks, it seems that this particular recommendation
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was lost in the political hassle surrounding the original 
1 7act. it was not until thirty years later (see Chapter VI) 
that these suggestions came to some fruition after many 
years of parliamentarianism. It is also notable that even 
though the report mentioned the success with which other 
countries had with health or sickness insurance, they did 
not include any statistics in the Report Supplement to this 
effect. Elaboration statistics are provided, however, for 
unemployment compensation and old-age pensions.^8
Political Considerations
The legislative history of this initial blanket plan 
for socio-economic security is fairly clear from the politi­
cal point of view. To radicals of the time it went nowhere, 
to liberals it was good, and to conservatives it went too 
far. It was neither a change in degree or kind, nor in the 
part or whole of the existing institutional arrangements for 
the communist and socialist frame of mind? for the 'liberal' 
Democratic Party and its supporters it was a change in degree 
and a change in part of the existing system; for the Republi­
can Party with its status quo or reactionary supporters it 
was a dramatic change in the whole and in kind to the point 
of being unconstitutional and even Hitlerian.
Recalling the discussion on the political context in 
Chapter I above, we see a dramatic shift in Senate and House 
membership with the Democrats clearly in power— both in the 
executive and legislative branches— in the Spring and Summer
of 1935. Table I shows the figures:
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TABLE I
PARTY REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW DEAL 
AND WAR DEAL YEARS*
Year
Democrats Increments Republicans Other
House Sen. House Sen. House Sen. House Sen.
1928 163 39 -32 8 267 56 1 1
1930 216 47 +53 + 8 218 48 1 1
1932 313 59 +97 +12 117 36 5 1
1934 322 69 + 9 +10 103 25 10 2
1936 333 75 +11 + 6 89 17 13 4
1938 262 69 -71 - 6 169 23 4 4
1940 243 66 + 5 - 3 162 28 6 2
1942 57 -45 - 9 209 38 4 1
1944 57 +21 0 190 38 2 1
*See Appendix B.
Thus in the lengthy legislative process which preceeds the 
making of law in the United States, the Democrats were in 
control in the mid-thirties. Beginning in 1930, they gained 
53 seats in the House and 8 in the Senate— within a few 
seats of a slim majority. In 1932 they got their majority 
in both cases, picking up as additional 97 seats in the 
House and 12 in the Senate. In 1934, 9 seats in the Hoxise 
and 10 in the senate. Roosevelt had a party in his command.
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One example of what he did with such an environment is 
exemplified by the omnibus Social Security Act of 1935.
Social Security Platform Planks
Looking at the social security platform planks in 
terms of parties, they can be arrayed from the more radical 
positions to the center or liberal positions and finally to 
the right or conservative positions in terms of the American 
form. (As seen in the tabular summary in Figure 5 below, we 
have considered four major areas under social security: 
old-age insurance, unemployment insurance, assistance, and 
health insurance in terms of the political parties who ran 
presidential candidates and published platforms. For full 
explication see Appendix G.)^
On the 'radical' extreme we find the Socialist 
Laborites who claimed throughout these years that capitalism 
was failing and that any reform granted by this system is 
really disguised reaction. No specific mention is made of 
social security in the earlier years. In 1944 they said 
that what the New Deal failed to do to get the country going 
was accomplished by the war. They do mention the extension 
of social security after the war as an appeasement move on 
the part of the capitalist class.
The Communist Party platform advocated unemployment 
and social insurance for all from 1928 onward. In 1936 they 
became critical of the New Deal for not going far enough and 
in 1940 said that the Wall Street economic royalists want
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1932* 1936* 1940*
Old-Age
Insurance
Local
State
Federal-
State
National
REP.
DEM.
F-L, Com., 
Soc.
Com., Soc, 
DEM., REP, 
Union
Com., Soc., 
DEM., REP.
Unemployment 
Insurance 
Local 
State
Federal-
state
National
REP.
REP.
DEM.
F-L 
Soc.
DEM.
Com., Soc,
DEM., REP. 
DEM.
Com., Soc.
Assistance-
Relief
Local REP.
State REP.
Federal- 
State 
National Soc. Com. (?)
Health 
Insurance 
Private 
Private- 
Public 
National Soc. Com., Soc,
REP.
DEM.
Soc
*See Appendix G
Key: Com. = Communist
Soc. = Socialist
F-L = Farmer-Labor
DEM. = Democratic
REP. = Republican
Proh. = Prohibition
FIGURE 5
POLITICAL PARTY "SOCIAL SECURITY" PLANKS 
DURING THE NEW DEAL AND WAR DEAL
1944*
Proh.
REP.
REP.
REP.
REP.
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war and are subordinating domestic programs to it. The 
Socialist Party planks of the New Deal and War Deal period 
are the prototype for the Democratic Patty in later years.
In 1932, they call for everything which was forwarded in the 
report to the President by the Committee on Economic 
Security which was mentioned above. In 1936 the Socialist 
platform lumped Old Deal failings of 1928 with New Deal 
failings of 1932. The social security plank called for more 
Federal appropriations for the unemployed; a Federal system 
of pensions for all over 60 as well as a program for medical 
care as a social duty and not as charity. In 1940 the 
Socialists say that the best of the New Deal was taken or 
co-opted from them. What the New Deal did accomplish, said 
the Socialists, was never accepted by the Democratic Party 
and those accomplishments are now being abandoned for war 
economics. In 1944 the Socialist Party mentions for the 
first time on the part of any party that economic security 
must be provided with liberty. They call for democracy and 
not bureaucracy in planning for plenty.
Maintaining the unemployed at subsistence levels is 
the economic program of the New Deal. The Democratic Party 
in its platform of 1932, ironically, had very little to say 
about socio-economic security, per se, except that they 
advocated old-age and unemployment insurance under State 
laws. (Part of this advocation was fulfilled in that the 
unemployment insurance component of the Social Security Act 
was to come under State jurisdiction and control.) In 1936,
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however, this party pointed with pride to the social security
package advanced by them in 1935. (The Communist and
Socialist planks of earlier times were 'co-opted' so to speak,
by the Democrats in regards to certain aspects of social
security. This lack of mention of social security by the 
Democrats in 1932 reinforces the position that there was a 
considerable amount of political pressure and experimenta­
tion once the New Deal got going.) No mention is made of 
health insurance in the platform. In 1940, war planks are 
dominant, but there is a call for more adequate and uniform 
benefits in both unemployment and old-age insurance. The 
war continues to preoccupy the party in power in 1944-but it 
does point to the fact that it saved the American system of 
free enterprise both after depression and during war. There 
is no specific social security plank. The Union Party social 
security plank called for security in the broad sense of the 
aged. The Republican Party, in a 'conservative' posture, 
rested on American traditions and principles of government 
in 1932 by leaving 'relief' to the States and smaller politi­
cal units. In 1936, they calimed to be the first party to 
declare for old-age pensions; but shift to 'government' in 
general as being responsible for handicaps (advanced ag-e) 
and unemployment. They react to the Democratic New Deal as 
endangering social security; but, seem to accept the social 
security package deal of the Democrats and merely differ on 
particulars which, as we shall see, is the rule for the 
next 30 years. Perhaps this is a function of the two-party
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system and its legislative outcome which has a tendency to 
the 'middle.' In 1940 they gave special attention to the 
fact that the New Deal has undermined the public's confidence 
in private insurance institutions. In the war year of 1944, 
the Republicans, in contrast to the Democrats, have a long 
social security plank concerned with the extension of unem­
ployment and old-age insurance, the return of the U. S. 
Employment Service to the States, which were federalized 
during the war, and their plans to conduct a careful study 
of existing assistance programs. (The last point is the 
first mention of the assistance part of the Social Security 
Act of 1935 by any party— that this part of the Act should 
be studied, is also a Republican first.)
Social Security Roll Calls
During the New Deal and War Deal years of Roosevelt 
there was the initial framing and passage of the Social 
Security Act in 1935 and one major amendment in 1939. The 
outcome of the many bills proposed, hearings held, com­
mittee decisions made, was three roll calls in the House and
12 roll calls in the Senate for the entire 12 years of legis- 
20lation. w The roll calls are shown in Tables II and III 
giving the Congress, Bill number, date of the roll call, and 
a brief description.
The final roll calls listed in these tables reflect 
the last logical stage in the American legislative process. 
The many decisions that have to be made regarding social
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TABLE II
HOUSE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE NEW DEAL AND WAR DEAL
Roll
Call Bill Date Description
1 HR 7260 4-19-35 Treadway Motion: S. S. Act of 1935
2 HR 7260 4-19-35 Passage: S. S. Act of 1935
3 HR 6635 6-10-39 Passage: S. S. Act Amendment of 1939
TABLE III
SENATE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE NEW DEAL AND WAR DEAL
Roll
Call Bill Date Description
1 HR 7260 6-19-35 Clark Amendment: S. S. Act of 1935
2 HR 7260 6-19-35 Borah Amendment: S. S. Act of 1935
3 HR 7260 6-19-35 Hastings Amendment: S. S. Act of 1935
4 HR 7260 6-19-35 Passage: S. S. Act of 1935
5 HR 6635 7-11-39 Civil Service Amendment: S. S. Act of
6 HR 6635 7-11-39 Appropriations: S. S. Act of 1939
7 HR 6635 7-11-39 Appropriations: S. S. Act of 1939
8 HR 6635 7-12-39 Connelly Amendment: S. S. Act of 1939
9 HR 6635 7-12-39 Lee Amendment: S. S. Act of 1939
10 HR 6635 7-13-39 Downey Motion: S. S. Act of 1939
11 HR 6635 7-13-39 Johnson Amendment: S. S. Act of 1939
12 HR 6635 7-13-39 Passage: S. S. Act of 1939
Cn
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policy were, to be sure, all presented, debated and compro­
mised. The compromises began in the political platform com­
mittee, in the many bills presented, in the Congressional 
hearings, in the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate 
Finance Committee and ended in the various floor amendments 
and conference report exchanges between the two chambers.
(This is to be the case for all the following amendments 
through 1968.)^
The three House roll call votes have been analyzed by 
computing frequencies and percentages. The Rice Index of 
Cohesion was used to measure the extent of party cohesion 
according to party and region for the period. It will be 
recalled that the Rice Index of Cohesion measures cohesion 
in categorically defined subgroups within a legislature—  
cohesion being the extent to which the distribution of votes 
on a roll call deviates from the distribution that would be 
expected if all influences operated in a random fashion. 
Minimum cohesion is assigned as index value of zero and 
maximum cohesion a value of 100. The percentage of congress­
men for and against the social security measure on the floor 
and the Rice Index of Cohesion value are presented in Tables 
IV and V.
On roll call number one, sizable majorities of both 
parties oppose each other. Some 84 percent of the Democrats 
are for social security as against the Republicans 2.1 per­
cent. Testing these percentages in terms of party cohesion 
shows the Republicans to be much more cohesive as a party.
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TABLE IV
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE 
HOUSE FOR THE NEW DEAL AND WAR DEAL YEARS
Roll Demo. Percentage Rice Rep. Percentages Rice
Call For Against Index For Against Index
1 84.2 15.8 68.5 2.1 97.9 95.8
2 95.7 4.3 91.4 80.2 19.8 60.4
3 100.0 0.0 
Average
100.0
86.6
98.7 1.3
Average
97.4
84.6
Weighted 85.5* Weighted 33.5
*See Appendix H.
TABLE V
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE 
SENATE FOR THE NEW DEAL AND WAR DEAL YEARS
Roll Demo. Percentage Rice Rep. Percentage Rice
Call For Against Index For Against Index
1 47.1 52.9 5.9 14.3 85.7 71.4
2 80.6 19.4 61.3 63.2 36.8 26.3
3 95.2 4.8 90.3 36.8 63.2 26.3
4 95.5 4.5 91.0 76.2 23.8 52.4
5 96.2 3.8 92.3 100.0 0.0 100.0
6 87.0 13.0 74.1 47.1 52.9 5.9
7 97.8 2.2 95.6 82.4 17.6 64.7
8 69.8 30.2 39.7 9.1 90.9 81.8
9 27.3 72.7 45.5 5.3 94.7 89.5
10 86.0 14.0 72.0 21.1 78.9 57.9
11 36.0 64.0 28.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
12 95.1 4.9
Average
90.2
65.5
63.2 36.8
Average
26.3
58.5
Weighted 52.1 Weighted 1.3
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(Note: Rep. Allen Treadway, Republican of Mass., motioned
to recommit HR 7260, strike out the old-age insurance system 
and raise charity payments thus a "yea" for the measure 
would be against social security.) ^ 3 on the passage vote of 
the original bill, roll call number 2, both Democrats and 
Republicans favored passage. Some 95 percent of the Demo­
crats and 80 percent of the Republicans being in favor of 
the Act. Looking at these percentages in depth for party 
cohesiveness, it is seen that more of these Democrats voting 
were for the bill as measured by the Rice Index of Cohesion 
of 91.4. This means that there is cohesion within the party. 
The Republicans also were somewhat cohesive— thus indicating 
agreement between parties as well as within parties. The 
significance of these indexes on roll calls 1 and 2 is that 
Republicans were more cohesive as a party on the recommital 
motion than on passage. The opposite is the case for the 
Democrats. On roll call number three, the passage of the 
Social Security Amendments of 1939, yields almost maximum 
percentages and cohesiveness for both parties. One might 
infer that these amendments had the lowest amount of change 
or reform ingredient in them. More will be said about this 
in the next section on performance where planks are compared 
with the roll calls.
Shifting over to the Senate Chamber there are a total 
of 12 roll calls. Table VI gives the percentage of Senators 
voting for and against social security on all the roll calls 
during the New Deal and War Deal years. Rice Indices for
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TABLE VI
HOUSE AND SENATE AVERAGE COHESION BY PARTY AND REGION 
FOR THE NEW DEAL AND WAR DEAL YEARS
Region
Democratic Average 
Cohe s ivenes s
House Senate
Republican Average 
Cohesiveness
House Senate
New England
Mid-Atlantic
East-North
Central
West-North
Central
South
Border
Mountain
Pacific
Other
The Nation
89.7
93.6
89.3
84.0
91.4 
89.9
66.7
56.7
86.6
90.3 
75.0
81.6
65.3
71.2
64.4
61.2 
88.9
65.5
89.7
71.7
88.7
91.1
0.0
100.0
33.3
100.0
84.6
63.2
87.5
88.9
60.6 
0.0 
0.0
66.7
75.0
58.5
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each vote as well as an Average and Weighted Rice index is 
also shown. Roll call number 4, the passage of the Social 
Security bill in the Senate, shows a percentage difference 
with 95 percent of the Democrats and 52 percent of the Repub­
licans voting for the measure. Applying the Rice Index to 
the percentages: score of 91 versus 52. Both indexes regis­
tering a considerable amount of agreement between parties.
Regarding the bill (HR 6675) to amend the Social Secu­
rity Act by the 76th Senate there were eight roll calls (roll 
call numbers 5-12). The vote on passage, roll call number 12, 
as in the passage of the original act in 1935, shows a major­
ity of both parties for the measure. The Democrats and Repub­
licans both having relatively high indices, but not as high 
in the House. The same applies for the Average Rice index 
and the Weighted Rice Index, meaning that there is less co­
hesiveness in the Senate than in the House on social security 
legislation for the period under discussion.
Percentages and Indices of Cohesion were computed for 
regions of the country as set up by the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political Research. Table VI shows the 
cohesiveness measure for the House and Senate by region for 
the period. For the House, both parties showed cohesion on 
a regional basis with the Border and Pacific Republicans 
being more cohesive. The Mountain Democrats were more co­
hesive than the Republicans from this region. For the Senate, 
the New England region shows the greatest difference between 
parties. Some difference prevails in the Mid-Atlantic and
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Pacific regions where the Republicans show greater intra­
party unity in the former whereas the Democrats show it in 
the latter.
Social Security Performance
How did the majority Democrats and the minority Repub­
licans perform in terms of their promises made in these 
crisis years? Franklin Delano Roosevelt knew his politics 
and his possibilities as evidenced by his popularity and 
staying power in office. Of concern to us is his relation­
ship to his Congresses. How was Roosevelt to grant the 
promises of his party's platform of 1932? Roosevelt's new 
73rd Congress of 1933 has been dubbed a 'tractable' one.
From an evenly divided lame duck session of anger, turbulence, 
and ineffectiveness came a willing, voluminous and productive 
1933 session leading to Roosevelt's "100 Days." Majority 
Democrats and minority Republicans were split.2^ The 
Democrats came up with an overwhelming victory in 1934 which 
was only the second time in American history that an Adminis­
tration increased its strength in an off-year election.2^ 
Supreme Court decisions against Roosevelt's New Deal followed 
in the Spring of 1935. This was in turn followed by the 
Second New Deal in the long, hot summer of 1935.27 (It must 
be interjected here that outside of the historians arguments 
over the differences between the first and second New Deals, 
the second one led to the collapse of further deals of any 
kind.) James Patterson in his discussion of conservatism in
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the New Deal says that the record shows Roosevelt's opposi­
tion gaining in strength;
In the last analysis the fundamental reason for the 
growth of Congressional conservatism in 1935 was not 
presidential failure but the instinctive feeling 
among basically conservative congressmen that the New 
Deal had gone far enough— or too far. These men had 
not become more conservative; from the start they 
had supported the New Deal because it had seemed a 
conservative way to deal with a revolutionary impasse.
But once the emergency seemed to be diminishing, they 
began to express their thought openly.28
Out of this came the Social Security Act of 1935. One 
might say that the outcome or performance when compared to 
the platform plank is one of great accomplishment. It was a 
piece of seemingly long-range legislation which may have 
been spurred by two "Movements" (or "panaceas" as one admin­
istrator says) which came about after the 1932 platform and 
the first New Deal. These were the Townsend Movement and 
Huey Long's "Share the Wealth" M o v e m e n t . T h u s  the Demo­
cratic Party was under pressure to come up with a compre­
hensive program of pension and relief. Hearings and roll 
calls show the pressures operating in the legislative process 
leading to the passage of the Act in 1935.30
Nine of the ten programs in the Act called for Federal- 
State partnership and were a tremendous effort to use the 
Federal system to a d v a n t a g e . 21 Arthur Altmeyer says: "The
President's desire to rely upon the States as much as pos­
sible was based on his lifelong belief in our federal form, 
rather than a national form, of government."22 From the 
majority Congress, from the pressures of outside 'movements,'
and from the President's Federal-State philosophy— what was 
the result of all the parliamentarianism during the Roose­
velt period? Did Roosevelt set up some kind of image that 
the American Congress with its two parties were truly imple­
menting the constitutive ideas of an international social 
security movement? In the broad sense, an omnibus social 
security measure got passed and amended once from 1932 to 
1945— from the 73rd to the 79th Congresses. What did each 
one of them do to alter conditions for the American people 
on the street?
Many commentators, including Roosevelt himself, felt 
the Social Security Act to be extremely important and even 
the cornerstone of the whole New Deal. Why was this 
believed to be so at that time and why is it still the case 
after 33 years of historical retrospect? The result was a 
kind of catch-all law which brought together three areas of 
income support policy: (1) old-age and surviver's insur­
ance; (2) unemployment compensation; and (3) assistance or 
charity programs to the blind, dependent children and old- 
agers plus several minor Titles. In this great political 
compromise, bare subsistence levels of income support were 
provided for those covered by the law. The amounts autho­
rized then and in following years did not and do not raise 
the people out of poverty and deprivation! Perhaps the 
point was and still is as Barnes comments:
More important than any relief aid— indeed more 
important than the Social Security Act— has been 
the social philosophy which the New Deal introduced:
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that the government will not stand idly by and allow 
the poor to starve and rot. Public responsibility 
for a minimum of public weal was probably the most 
important single contribution made to American life 
by the Roosevelt Administration. No longer would it 
be more difficult to secure public aid for a man 
than a mule.33
This is in keeping with what Roosevelt said himself as he
signed the Act on August 14, 1935. It bears quoting:
This social security measure gives at least some 
protection to 30 millions of our citizens who will 
reap direct benefits through it, though old-age 
pensions and through increased services for the 
protection of children and the prevention of ill 
health.
We can never insure one hundred per cent of the 
population against one hundred per cent of the 
hazards and vissitudes of life, but we tried to 
frame a law which will give some measure of protec­
tion to the average citizen and to his family 
against the loss of a job and against poverty- 
ridden old-age. This law, too, represents a 
cornerstone in a structure which is being built 
but is by no means complete. It is a structure 
intended to lessen the force of possible future 
depressions. It will act as a protection to future 
administrations against the necessity of going deeply 
into debt to furnish relief for the needy. The law 
will flatten out the peaks and valleys of deflation 
and of inflation. It is, in short, a law that will 
take care of human needs and at the same time pro­
vide for the United States an economic structure of 
vastly greater soundness. . . .
If the Senate and the House of Representatives in 
this long and arduous session had done nothing more 
than pass this bill, the session would be regarded 
as historic for all time.34
In terms of the laissez-faire American traditions in which
Roosevelt grew up, this bill was indeed historic; that is,
when compared to itself, the American legislature passed a
good bill; when compared to other industrial nations and to
the many millions who did without it in the first third of
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this century, it was too little, too late.
The five "income replacement" programs (old-age 
insurance, unemployment insurance, and three welfare cate­
gories, Old-Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to 
Dependent Children) of the Act brought national coordinated 
order and minimal protection to the people who were driven 
to the floor, as it were, of the distribution of goods and 
services of the nation. The Federal emergency relief pro­
grams of the previous years grew into a "crazy quilt" in 
terms of distributive mechanisms. Roosevelt's compromise 
brought about a law to (1) protect only against major 
hazards like old-age and unemployment ignoring things like 
medical care; (2) only a moderate, if that, level of bene­
fits came about; (3) direct administration and decisions 
were left to the States (as before the national economic 
crisis) with the exception of old-age insurance; and (4) 
the only national program— old-age insurance— was self- 
financed through regressive taxation falling on low-income 
worker's payrolls. By not fiddling with the existing tax 
structure and business taxes, the President's proposals, as 
we saw in the roll call votes above, were met with very 
little opposition during these hard times.35
The only amendment to this Act during this period was 
in 1939. Many proposed bills were piling up in the House 
Ways and Means Committee and the Townsendites were still 
clammering for their program to become law. This amendment 
did little but to extend slightly the various coverages. It
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seems that the politicians, as well as their supporters, 
were satisfied with the way in which the Social Security Act 
came out. The platform planks of the later years (1940 and 
1944) speak for themselves in terms of the actual political 
party perception of the performance. (For details see 
Appendix G.)
Summary
This chapter has attempted to provide a historical 
and sociological discussion of the New Deal and War Deal 
from the standpoint of social security measures enacted. 
Political party platform planks on social security were 
analyzed for their social security content from the more 
radical parties to the more conservative. The Democratic 
Party might be said to be the compromise party during the 
crisis as they were able to at least give the appearance to 
the radicals that something meaningful was being done to put 
the country back on its feet and not go too far so that the 
conservatives would go along. It was pointed out, however, 
that die conservative coalition won out, legislatively, as 
the Second World War approached.
If we were to sum up the several tendencies and 
changes wrought by the political parties in the socio­
economic security posture of the nation, we would conclude 
that the nation's social philosophy was shored up with a 
kind of experimental optimism. This optimism was a 'spin­
off1 from a belief that government and law can accomplish
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relief, recovery, reconstruction, and reform. We would con­
clude that during this period— as a continuation of the 
social crisis of World War One— the transition from a more 
local responsibility to a more national responsibility 
occurred rapidly. This transition can best be summarized as 
an increase in 'political scale.' The tendency toward this 
greater political scale showed itself in the Social Security 
Act of 1935 in the Title on Old-Age and Disability Insurance. 
The status quo or counter-tendency was the case in the other 
nine titles of the Act which clung to a Federal-State 
participation model with Federal controls. The fact that 
the national system of old-age security was self financed 
through regressive payroll taxation makes it but a slight 
advancement toward 'socialism.' If this law was the corner­
stone of the New Deal, as Roosevelt said it was, then we 
must conclude that the Republican and Democratic parties 
formed a coalition to do as little as possible in terms of 
the international trend toward comprehensive social security 
and as much as possible to keep the American idea of social 
security intact.
If reform of any kind occurred, it meant economic 
reform in the narrow s e n s e . ^6 The businessman was shored up 
just as much if not more than the poverty-ridden and stricken. 
The Democratic Party showed— both in its platform planks and 
parliamentarianism— that it could compromise the past with 
the present and perhaps the future with a law such as the 
Social Security Act of 1935. In terms of social change,
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there was little institutional change or changes in existing 
inequalities as a result of legislative action on social 
security. The inequalities that existed before the Great 
Depression were not reduced during the New Deal part of our 
period of study in this chapter. Only during the "War Years" 
or the War Deal did unemployment, as an example, become less 
than an army.^7
The data above on platform planks and roll call per­
formance shows the two major parties sticking fairly close 
to their promises in the area of social security. The 
Democrats, when expedient to do so, drawing from the more 
radical planks of the Communists and Socialists; and then the 
Republicans drawing from the Democrats what will advance 
them politically. The Social Security Act seems to have 
become the 'organizing principle' of all the parties once it 
became law as indicated by the platforms. (This we shall 
see to be the case in the following four presidential 
periods.) After a great amount of parliamentarianism 
characteristic of most laws made in America, the public 
political decision in the form of the roll call showed high 
support in both parties. The House Ways and Means Committee 
acted as the 'gatekeeper1 between the hundreds of bills 
submitted and the few which reach the floors of the two 
chambers.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER III
Extensive lists could be compiled for the autobio­
graphical, biographical, political, historical, journalistic 
and general literary sources on who and what was responsible 
for the Great Depression of 1929-1939.
^The term New Deal was coined by the President,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt in his speech to the Democratic 
national convention in June, 1932. It was picked up by a 
cartoonist and thenceforth became the slogan of the Roosevelt 
program. See William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and the New Deal; 1932-1940 (New York; Harper and Row, 
Publishers, 1963), p. 8.
O , ,
This is precisely the historian's or the historical 
sociologist's difficulty— where to break history or social 
action into 'joints.1 For a summary of this period see 
Chancre and Continuity in Twentieth Century America, edited 
by John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner and Everett Walters (New 
York; Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964).
^William E. Leuchtenburg, "Introduction," The New 
Deal; A Documentary History, edited by William E. Leuchten­
burg (Columbia; University of South Carolina Press, 1968), 
p. xiii.
5
The First New Deal and the One Hundred Days is sum­
marized in Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New 
Deal, loc. cit., where excellent bibliography is provided.
^As quoted by Arthur J. Altmeyer, The Formative Years 
of Social Security (Madison; The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1968), p. 9.
^Although counter-tendencies are not the concern of 
this study, they must not be considered to be of minor import. 
It must be assumed that for every political tendency there 
are one or more counter-tendencies; e.g., revolution breeds 
counter-revolution and reform breeds counter-reform.
8This is implied, for example, in Altmeyer' s remarks 
concerning the enactment of the Social Security Law. See 
Altmeyer, ibid., pp. 3-42.
^Executive Order Number 6757, June 29, 1934 of Presi­
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt.
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The letter of transmittal is dated January 15, 1935 
but according to Edwin E. Witte, Executive Director of the 
Committee, it was not filed in final form until January 17th. 
See his Development of the Social Security Act (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), p. 75.
•^ Report to the President of the Committee on Eco­
nomic Security. United States Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D. C., 1935. For a running commentary on the 
Report see Witte, loc. cit.
Altmeyer, op. ext.. p. 29; Witte, pp. cit., p. 75.
•^This is not to deal with the 'usual legislative 
process' between intent and outcome lightly. The amount of 
parliamentarianism involved is staggering but difficult to 
rigorously analyze because so much of it is behind closed 
doors in smoke-filled rooms and over the telephone.
l^itte, ibid., pp. 96-97.
^Report to the President of the Committee on Eco­
nomic Security, pp. cit.. p. 35.
l^Ibid.. p. 41. The report at this point states that 
the Committee recognizes that the operation of any plan 
depends on the "provision of sound relations between the 
insured population and the professional practitioners or 
institutions furnishing medical services under the plan. We 
have accordingly submitted this tentative plan to our 
several professional advisory groups organized for this pur­
pose. These advisory groups have requested an extension of 
time for the further consideration of these tentative pro­
posals." P. 41. Altmeyer, in the work cited above, however, 
says that the Committee decided at the beginning that it 
would not include any recommendations regarding health 
insurance in its report to the President, but did include 
statements to the effect of saying that insurance should be 
applied to ill health (p. 27) . If one reads the Report he 
will see why it raised such a furor by the American Medical 
Association, particularly in its statement excluding com­
mercial or other intermediary agents between the insured 
population and the professional agencies which serve them. 
Whatever happened to the report from the medical advisory 
groups which was due on March 1, 1935, I have not been able 
to trace. Altmeyer does say that the President asked the 
Committee on Economic Security, in June, 1935, to submit its 
health program which included health insurance. Does this 
mean that the medical people did not give its recommenda­
tions to the Committee on March 1st? Accordingly, says 
Altmeyer, a report was submitted on June 15, 1935, while the 
social security bill was pending. Despite the controversial 
nature of compulsory health insurance, the report advises
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such a program. The outcome was to drop the health issue 
and research it further (pp. 57-58). We can, perhaps, con­
clude from this that it would have been a bad political move 
to push this health insurance matter in 1935. Said another 
way, perhaps the lines of battle were drawn between Roose­
velt's "brains-trusters" (Ph.D's, etc.) and the M.D.'s.
l^The problem of health risks in the American popula­
tion is clouded. The state of aggregate sickness and general 
health in the American population as compared with other 
industrial countries has not received adequate study. It 
might be said that medical care in America is considered a 
privilege and not a right as in many other industrial 
countries.
•^Report to the President, loc. cit.
^ T h e  source for political party platforms and social 
security planks is Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson, 
National Party Platforms; 1940-1964 (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1966).
^°An elaboration of every roll call is beyond the 
scope of this study as there are a total of 146 calls con­
sidered. The Congress, Bill Number and Date and a brief 
description is given for the interested reader to check into 
the many sources. The Congressional Record is the best 
source before 1945. This source can be supplemented by the 
Congressional Quarterly Service after 1945.
21-The total sample of roll calls may be seen in 
Appendices E and F.
^Altmeyer, loc. cit., provides a summary of the 
government publications related to the Social Security Act.
^The criteria for switching a vote is seen in Foot­
note 12 at the end of Chapter II above, p. 39.
24rhe Consortium breakdown is as follows:
New England: Conn., Maine, Mass., N. H., R. I., Vt. 
Mid-Atlantic: Del., N. J., N. Y., Pa.
East-North Central: 111., Ind., Mich., Ohio, Wise.
West-North Central: Iowa, Kan., Minn., Mo., Neb., N. Dak.,
S. Dak.
South: Va., Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., La., Miss., N. C., S. C.,
Tex.
Border: Ky., Md., Okla., Tenn., W. Va.
Mountain: Ariz., Colo., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N. M., Utah,
Wyo.
Pacific: Calif., Ore., Wash.
Other: Alaska, Hawaii.
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James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and 
the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in
Congress: 1933-1939 (Lexington: University of Kentucky
Press, 1967), pp. 1-11.
26Ibid., p. 32.
2^Ibid., pp. 72-75.
Ibid., p . 75.
Altmeyer, op. cit.. p. 10.
•^ibid. Altmeyer details some of these considerations.
3^ -Ibid.. pp. 53-54.
■^Ibid., p. 11.
22Harry Elmer Barnes, Society in Transition (2nd ed.; 
New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 588.
2^As reprinted in Leuchtenburg, The New Deal: A
Documentary History, op. cit., pp. 324-25.
^Roosevelt and tax reform in the 1930's is a subject 
all by itself because tax reform is at the very nerve of the 
various inequalities and inequities in the American experi­
ence. Patterson points out that this issue disturbed 
Republicans and split Democratic ranks wide open. In his 
June 19, 1935 message Roosevelt called for sweeping tax 
reforms— simultaneously with Huey P. Long's campaign for 
sharing wealth, making men kings and redistributing income. 
Patterson, ojd. cit., pp. 38-59.
■^Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New 
Deal, op. cit., p. 339.
37lbid., pp. 346-47. Leuchtenburg's final chapter, 
"Roosevelt Reconstruction: Retrospect," could be quoted in
its entirety here. He says, for example: "Under the New
Deal, new groups took their place in the sun. It was not 
merely that they received benefits they had not had before, 
but that they were 'recognized' as having a place in the 
commonwealth”' (p. 332). His very last remarks come back to 
the same observation: "The New Deal achieved a more just
society by recognizing groups which were largely unrepre­
sented— staple farmers, industrial workers, particular ethnic 
groups, and the new intellectual-administrative class. Yet 
this was still a half-way revolution; it swelled the ranks 
of the bourgeoisie but left many Americans— share-croppers,
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slum-dwellers, most Negroes— outside of the new equilibrium" 
(p. 347). More will be said of the quality and quantity of 
this enfranchisement in later chapters.
CHAPTER IV
THE FAIR DEAL YEARS
Introductory
The roaring twenties had its "Old Deal"; the sobering 
thirties its "New Deal"; and the war-torn forties the "War 
Deal." The last half of the forties came up with the "Fair 
Deal" of the man from Missouri, President Harry S. Truman. 
Inheriting all these deals, along with many of the problems 
glossed over by these slogans, President Truman had the 
immediate problem of ending the war and preparing the public 
for demobilization and relative peace-time. In contrast to 
the New Deal, not much has been written yet about the domes­
tic policies of the Fair Deal. The period covers approxi­
mately seven years— 1945-1952— and, in general, the national 
responses to demobilization at home (reconversion) and 
reconstruction of Europe and the Orient. The effect of 
particular responses is still reverberating through all the 
American institutions.
The matter of demobilization or reconversion was 
thought about before the war ended as planners and policy­
makers were looking ahead to handle the problems and 
potentials of post-war life. For example, Roosevelt, in his 
budget message to the Congress on January 10, 1944, wished
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to extend social security benefits to veterans and others. 
Also, in his State of the Union Message he included what he 
called a "Second Bill of Rights." This policy statement may 
be called the keynote of Roosevelt's postwar plans to raise 
the American standard of living.1 Such was the role and 
style of politics that Truman inherited to handle the major 
postwar problem of employment and unemployment. President 
Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945; the war in Europe ended on 
May 8, 1945; and on May 2 8 ,  1945 President Truman sent a 
special message to Congress pointing out the failure of the 
unemployment insurance system in both coverage and benefits. 
On September 6, 1945 (marking the beginning of the Fair 
Deal) he repeated remarks about the inadequacy of unemploy­
ment insurance along with his intent to extend, expand, and 
improve social security. On November 19, 1945 he outlined 
his idea of a national health program. What follows in this 
chapter may be considered a response to these few ideas in 
the years to follow.
The Fair Deal was more (or less) of the New Deal as 
far as social security was concerned. The platforms of the 
period indicate this to be the case. Insofar as the Demo­
cratic Party failed to continue the New Deal after the war, 
it can be asserted that the Republicans tried to dismantle 
that part of the New Deal philosophy not to their liking. 
Third parties seem to be less of a force on domestic policy 
after the war than before it. The question asked for the 
earlier period applies here for this period: how great was
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the challenge and how sharp was the response on the part of 
the legislature in regards social security?
Before outlining some political considerations, we 
can, as an example of what was actually done during this 
period, look at a report of the Senate Committee on Finance. 
It was ordered on July 27, 1947 and transmitted by the 
Advisory Council on Social Security to the Committee on 
Finance on December 31, 1948. It recommended that existing 
gaps in old-age and survivor's insurance be filled to cover 
more workers and give greater benefits to keep up with the 
standard of living; recommended that there be a social 
insurance method of handling disability; recommended in­
creased benefits for the welfare categories such as federal 
grants for General Assistance (locally financed throughout 
the nation) and extend medical care payments as well as 
abolish residence requirements; and lastly, recommended that 
unemployment insurance be extended and increased as well as 
a plan for unemployment insurance supplement to handle 
periods of severe unemployment. Typical of the period, 
action taken on these recommendations were delayed or 
ignored. As a matter of record, coverage was narrowed down 
and the definition of 'employee' was scaled down. This was 
the result of the "terrible 80th Congress" so dubbed by 
President Truman and a major issue in the 1948 campaign.^
Political Considerations
The legislative history of the omnibus Social Security 
Act of 1935 and its one major amendment in 1939 discussed in 
Chapter IV revealed a parliamentarianism more in thought 
than in deed. With the law on the books, amending it gets 
intricate, it being very much a function of the party makeup 
of the Congress and its committees, not to mention the involve­
ment of an expanding Executive branch and social security 
administrators.
Following the discussion of the political context 
outlined in Chapter I, we see a different profile for the 
middle-forties than was seen in the middle-thirties. With 
the elections of 1945, the Republicans gain control of both 
Houses. Table VII shows the figures for this tendency. The 
election of 1948 shows a reversal of what occurred in 1946 
in both Houses. In 1950 and 1952 the Democrats lose members 
in the House whereas the Senate membership remains somewhat 
stable. Truman's Fair Deal program thus did not have the 
same kind of Congressional makeup that Roosevelt enjoyed 
during his New Deal. As any analyst could predict this 
caused President Truman some problems with his deal.
Social Security Platform Planks
Looking at the social security platform planks of 
this period for the parties running presidential candidates, 
it is observed that the Democratic Party Platform came under 
attack in 1948 as several Southern States 'bolted' from the
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TABLE VII
PARTY REPRESENTATION IN THE FAIR DEAL YEARS*
Democrats-- — Increments Republicans Other
House Senate House Senate House Senate House Senate
1944 243 57 +21 0 190 38 2 1
1946 188 45 -55 -12 246 51 1
1948 263 54 +75 + 9 171 42 1
1950 234 48 -29 - 6 199 47 2 1
1952 213 47 -21 - 1 221 48 1 1
*See Appendix B.
convention protesting the 'strong' civil rights plank in the 
platform. These 'bolters were called States' Righters or 
Dixiecrats. The Dixiecrats maintained "that a platform of 
principles is a solemn covenant with the people and with the 
members of the party. . . . "  They felt that they were on 
solid ground by splitting off on the issue of civil rights. 
They pointed out that their wishes should be complied with 
on the basis of past loyalty to the party as they (the South) 
had furnished approximately 50 percent of the votes necessary 
to nominate a president every four years for nearly a 
c e n t u r y . ^ Even the platform of the Democratic Party showed 
disunity on the direction of domestic policy after the war. 
Figure 6 summarizes the several party planks on the issues
1944* 1948*
Old-Age Insurance 
Local 
State
Federal-State
National Proh. Com.,
Prog., 
REP.,
Unemployment Insurance 
Local
State REP. DEM.
Federal-State
National Com.,
Soc.,
Assistance-Relief
Local
State
Federal-State
National Prog.,
Health Insurance 
Private
Private-Public REP.
National Prog.,
Soc.
*See Appendix G.
s-w. = Socialist-Workers
Com. = Communists
DEM. = Democrats
REP. = Republicans
Proh. = Prohibition
Prog. = Progressive
C-N = Christian-Nationalists
Soc. = Socialists
FIGURE 6
POLITICAL PARTY "SOCIAL SECURITY" PLANKS 
DURING THE FAIR DEAL YEARS
DEM.
Proh
Soc.
Prog.
S-W.‘
Soc.
DEM.
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of social security during the Fair Deal years.
Reviewing these planks, all the parties seem to 
accept the existing Social Security law as the basic plan 
(the Socialist-Laborites continue to call the capitalist 
reforms of the New Deal and Fair Deal as reactionary, how­
ever) . Moving from more 'radical' positions to the more 
'conservative' shows the range of acceptance. (See, Appendix 
G for details.)
The more 'radical' 1948 platform of the Socialist- 
Laborites still feels that capitalist reforms amount to 
reaction. War, fascism, and poverty amidst plenty (this 
latter phrase used here becomes popular by more liberal 
politicians in the 1960's, as we shall see) are the evil 
brood of capitalists and plutocrats. The Communist Party 
wishes to extend Federal minimum wage and social security 
laws to agricultural workers, including seasonal and 
migratory labor. They throw their support behind the Pro­
gressive Party in that they did not nominate a presidential 
candidate. The Progressive Party polled over one million 
votes attacking big business, they say that since the was 
"Never before have so few owned so much at the expense of so 
many."4 They seek to make Roosevelt's Economic Bill of 
Rights a reality to all claiming that the 'old' parties 
refuse social security protection to millions and allow 
meagre benefits to the rest. Their extensive social security 
plank attacks the current social security program as a bi­
partisan conspiracy. They call for a national old-age
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pension system, maternity benefits and a national health 
system for all. The Socialists. in a more moderate state­
ment as compared to the Progressives, advocate the expansion 
of the existing system through amendment; however, they 
accuse the Democrats and Republicans of forming a reactionary 
coalition insofar as social security is concerned. They 
call for a national contributary system of health insurance.
The Socialist-Workers in their social security plat­
form plank is of note because they demand that an escalator 
clause be tied to wages and included in social security with 
unemployment insurance equal to trade union wages. Demo­
crats wish to extend the Social Security law and favored the 
enactment of a national health program in the 'hedged' form 
calling for expanded medical research, medical education, 
hospitals and clinics. The Republican Party wish to extend 
the old-age title of the Social Security Act and also men­
tion Federal-State programming to improve hospital facili­
ties and foster a healthy America. The Prohibitionists want 
to include all employed persons in the provisions of the 
Social Security Act. On the more conservative side of the 
political continuum, the Christian Nationalist Party plat­
form of 1948 attacked Communists, Jews, Negroes, and aliens. 
Their social security plank was very general in calling for 
a simple but effective system similar to veterans' compensa­
tions. As in the thirties, one can see the germs of ideas 
for the liberal posture in the more radical platforms as far 
as social security is concerned. A  reversal of this is
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observed in that the Socialists say the same thing in their 
1948 platform about voluntary insurance programs that the 
President's Committee on Economic Security said back in 
1935 (noted above on page 46).
Social Security Roll Calls
During the Fair Deal years of Truman there were five 
amendments to the Social Security Act: 1946, 1947, 1948,
1950, and 1952. All were minor except the legislation of 
1950. The 1946 amendment was by voice vote and called for 
extension of social security coverage to veterans and others 
as well as an increase in Federal sharing on the public- 
assistance programs. The 1947 amendments dealt with con­
tribution rates in the old-age title, increased Federal share 
in the assistance titles, and set up a Federal unemployment 
account for the States. The 1948 amendments excluded certain 
workers and redefined 'employee' in the original act. The 
Social Security Amendments of 1950 (HR6000) constituted the 
first major amendment since 1939 and according to adminis­
trator Arthur Altmeyer, 'unquestionably represented a major 
advance in the strengthening of our social security system. 
The final public decisions on social security legislation 
amounts to 11 roll calls in the House of Representatives and 
7 roll calls in the Senate for the seven-year duration of 
the Fair Deal years. These roll calls are shown in Tables 
VIII and IX.
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TABLE VIII
HOUSE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE FAIR DEAL
Roll
Call Bill Date Description
4 HJ 296 2-27-48 Status Quo on Social Security
5 HJ 296 6-14-48 Status Quo on Social Security over Veto
6 HRes372 10- 4-49 HR6000 Resolution: Amendments of 1950
7 HRes372 10- 4-49 Resolution Agreement Amendments of 1950
8 HR6000 10- 5-49 Mason Motion Amendments of 1950
9 HR6000 10- 5-49 Passage Amendments of 1950
10 HR6000 8-16-50 Byrnes Recommital Amendments of 1950
11 HR6000 8-16-50 Conference Report Amendments of 1950
12 HR5118 10- 4-51 Unemployment Condensation Amendments
13 HR7800 5-19-52 Title II Amendment Motion of 1952
14 HR7800 6-17-52 Passage Title II Amendments of 1952
oo
to
TABLE IX
SENATE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE FAIR DEAL
Congress RollCall Bill Date Description
80 13 HJ 296 6- 4-48 McFarland Amendment: Status Quo
80 14 HJ 296 6- 4-48 Passage Status Quo
80 15 HJ 296 6-14-48 Passage over Veto Status Quo
81 16 HR6000 6-20-50 Meyers Amendment: Amendments of 1950
81 17 HR6000 6-20-50 Knowland Amendment Amendments of 1950
81 18 HR6000 6-20-50 Long Amendment Amendments of 1950
81 19 HR6000 6-20-50 Passage Amendments of 1950
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Tables X and XI give the party percentages for and 
against the several measures along with indices of cohesion 
for each and the average and weighted index for each Chamber. 
The House Joint Resolution 296 of the 80th Congress (House 
Roll Calls 4 and 5 and Senate Roll Calls 13, 14, and 15) was 
a vote to maintain the status quo in respect of certain 
employment taxes and social security benefits pending action 
by Congress on extended social security coverage. The mea­
sure was vetoed by President Truman and resubmitted to both 
chambers and again passed by over the required two-thirds 
majority. In the House, Democrats were split almost down the 
middle as the percentages show resulting in a very low index 
of cohesion as a party. But in the Senate Democrats were 
against the resolution in passage but split when voting over 
the Presidential veto. Republicans were almost unanimous in 
their agreement to maintain the status quo, thus showing high 
percentages against social security with high indices of 
cohesion as a party for the resolution votes. The weighted 
index reveals the extent of this in the negative index.
Votes 6 through 11 in the House and 16 through 19 in 
the Senate refer to HR 6000: Amendments of 1950. Again,
we find the Democratic Party consistently more for social 
security in the voting preceding the passage vote. On the 
roll calls for passage, both parties are very much for what 
comes to the final vote. Also, it is to be noted that the 
Democratic Party has less average cohesion on social 
security amendments for this period for both chambers.
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
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TABLE X
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE 
HOUSE FOR THE FAIR DEAL YEARS
Demo. Percentage Rice Rep. Percentage Rice
For Against Index For Against Index
44.2 55.8 11.7 1.9 98.1 96.3
45.1 54.9 9.8 2.2 97.8 95.5
90.9 9.1 81.8 1.2 98.8 97.5
93.9 6.1 87.9 7.6 92.4 84.8
99.5 0.5 99.1 18.6 81.4 62.8
99.0 1.0 98.0 91.0 9.0 81.9
71.3 28.7 42.6 14.7 85.3 70.7
100.0 0.0 100.0 97.9 2.1 95.8
68.0 32.0 36.0 48.5 51.5 3.0
68.8 31.2 37.6 35.3 64.7 29.3
99.0 1.0 98.0 88.4 11.6 76.7
Average 63.9 Average 72.9
Weighted 64.7* Weighted -30.4
*See Appendix H.
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TABLE XI
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE 
SENATE FOR THE FAIR DEAL YEARS
Roll
Call
Demo. Percentacre Rice
Index
Rep. Percentacre Rice
IndexFor Against For Against
13 2.3 9717 95.3 2.0 98.0 96.1
14 11.9 88.1 76.2 3.9 96.1 92.2
15 26.2 73.8 47.6 4.5 95.5 90.9
16 61.2 38.8 22.4 28.9 71.1 42.1
17 73.5 26.5 46.9 13.2 86.8 73.7
18 79.6 20.4 59.2 12.8 87.2 74.4
19 100.0 0.0 100.0 95.1 4.9 90.2
Average 64.0 Average 79.9
Weighted 7.0* Weighted -57.0
*See Appendix H.
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As was done for the New Deal and War Deal Years, roll 
call voting was broken down into the several regions as seen 
in Table XII. Cohesiveness by region reveals the House 
Democrats to be most cohesive in the East-North-Central 
States and least so in the South. Democratic Senators are 
most cohesive in the New England States and least in the 
West-North-Central States. Republicans show the most 
cohesiveness in the Mountain States, and because there were 
no Southern Senators who were Republican, register no 
cohesion. There lowest cohesion is registered in the Border 
States.
Social Security Performance
When comparing party promises made in platforms with 
party performance on final laws passed, we see that the 
Democrats under the leadership of Truman attempted to extend 
and expand the Social Security Act along New Deal lines.
This attempt was frustrated by the Republicans and Southern 
Democrats. Though the constitutionality of the Act was not 
challenged as in the late 1930's, the amendment measures 
which came out of the House Ways and Means Committee were 
reactionary status quo measures by New Deal standards. Other 
measures were buried in this Committee and the Senate Finance 
Committee, as well as the Senate Committee on Education and 
Labor.
The Platform planks of 1948 show the anger by the Demo­
cratic Party toward the Republicans' attack on social security
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TABLE XII
HOUSE AND SENATE AVERAGE COHESION BY PARTY AND 
REGION FOR THE FAIR DEAL YEARS
Region
Democrat Republican
House Senate House Senate
New England 79.2 90.5 82.6 75.5
Mid-Atlantic 90.1 52.4 76.4 78.1
East-North-Central 99.5 71.4 70.4 91.8
West-North-Central 83.3 28.6 81.2 81.3
South 69.7 61.0 0.0 0.0
Border 74.6 74.0 64.8 42.9
Mountain 74.9 79.0 100.0 94.3
Pacific 90.0 100.0 72.1 57.1
Other — — — —
The Nation 63.9 64.0 72.9 79.9
(see Appendix G) and President Truman attacked "the terrible 
80th Congress" in the campaign of 1948. One issue behind 
differences between the parties was over the 'end of the war.' 
Employment and unemployment matters were federalized by 
executive order during the war. For example, governors and 
unemployment compensation administrators said that the 
Employment Service should be returned immediately to the 
States after the war; whereas, Truman and the War Manpower 
Commission said no— a need for federalized service was "just 
as imperative in the change from war to peace as it had been 
in changing from peace to war."8 Another issue which 
reappeared after the war was the one over health insurance.
The "National Health Bill of 1945" calling for sweeping 
reform in health matters went unreported by the Senate Com­
mittee on Education and Labor. President Truman pushed for 
health insurance right after the war. Senators Wagner and 
Murray and Congressman Dingell began introducing bills to 
ground, as it were, the President's wishes but all these 
attempts were shunted by one means or another by Committee 
power.7
Altmeyer considers the years from 1948 to 1952 as the 
"crucial years" for the American social security system.8 
Two political factors brought about a shift in social security 
outcomes in 1948. The first which is observed in Table VII 
above is that the Democrats regained control in both chambers 
in the elections of 1948; the second is the results of the 
Senate report cited above (page 75) calling for extensive
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changes in the Social Security Act. These two factors led 
to HR 6000: the Social Security Amendments of 1950. There
was over- a year and a half of congressional consideration on 
this amendment. It extended coverage to about ten millions, 
increased benefits, broadened Federal matching funds to the 
States, created another welfare category (Aid to Permanently 
and Totally Disabled), and provided some money for medical 
care for those on assistance.
The role of the American Medical Association, as a 
professional association and pressure group, must be com­
mented on because it is related to the performance of the 
legislature on social security matters. The AMA campaign 
against compulsory health insurance programs reached its 
peak in the 1948 to 1952 period as reaction to Truman's pro­
posals. ^  Cries of socialized medicine were loud enough to 
limit the President's proposals to Committee pidgeon-holes 
and to leave out of the Amendment of 1950 the measure to 
provide insurance benefits to the disabled.H
The unemployment insurance title of the Social 
Security Act went untouched during this period, also. The 
assistance and relief titles fell short of the administrative 
recommendations.
Summary
The Fair Deal years, although led by a Democratic 
President, had to contend with a Republican controlled Con­
gress after the war. This led to Joint Resolutions to
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maintain status quo on social security. These resolutions 
resulted in two presidential vetoes which were voted over.
In the election of 1948, of which social security was a 
major issue, the Democrats gained control and were able to 
propose and pass a comprehensive bill (Amendments of 1950) 
despite opposition from Republicans and Southern Democrats 
(Dixiecrats) . But from the standpoint of President Truman 
and his wish to continue the New Deal style with his Fair 
Deal, the Social Security amendments were short of the mark 
because of pressure groups— especially the American Medical 
Association and allied pressure groups. The Amendments of 
1952 liberalized, to some extent, benefits, the retirement 
test (allowing some earnings while drawing old-age benefits), 
and Federal support of public assistance. . This bill brought 
out the medical lobby against disability insurance.^
The data above on platform planks and roll call per­
formance shows both major parties accepting the old-age 
insurance part of the Social Security Act as being the 
definition of social security; the gradual improvement of 
this title being an accepted mode. The other titles like 
unemployment insurance and assistance being unmentionable 
items in their platform planks on social security. Federal 
money and State control over these unmentionable titles seems 
to be the rule. The issue of compulsory health insurance 
pushed by the more 1 radical' platforms in earlier years was 
taken over by President Truman (over and above statements 
made in the Democratic Party platform in some cases) and
advanced by more 'liberal' senators and congressmen with the 
effect of being delayed or shelved because of articulate and 
powerful pressure groups.
93
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER IV
■^Arthur J. Altmeyer, The Formative Years of Social 
Security (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968),
p. 149.
^Ibid., p. 163.
3Kirk H. Porter, and Donald B. Johnson, National 
Party Platforms. 1940-1964 (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1966), pp. 467-68.
4Ibid., p. 436; also see Appendix G.
5Altmeyer, 0£. cit., p. 185.
^Congressional Quarterly. Volume I, p. 614. Congres­
sional Quarterly, Inc., Washington, D. C.
7Altmeyer, o j d . cit., pp. 158-60.
9Ibid., pp. 169-208.
9Ibid., p. 169.
1°V. O. Key, Politics, Parties. and Pressure Groups 
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change.
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sional Quarterly Almanac or the Congressional Quarterly for 
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CHAPTER V
THE COLD WAR YEARS
Introductory
Thus far we have considered two periods in the his­
tory of the Social Security Act which have been controlled, 
at least in terms of political parties, by the Democrats.
With the 'reconversion' period over, the nation elected a 
Republican President, the first in twenty years. President 
Eisenhower did not come to office under the pressure of a 
world depression or a world war but as a popular war hero 
during the time of relative prosperity with only 'police 
action' occurring in Korea. For lack of a better term we 
can call these years the "Cold War Years" as the Republican 
Administration under Eisenhower did not provide any slogan 
for its programs.
These cold war years, especially in the first two 
years, were "uncertain" as far as social security legislation 
is concerned.^ With the Republicans now in control for the 
first time since the enactment of the Social Security Law, 
it was a time when a Republican Administration had to decide 
to continue with the law or try to dismantle it. The 
acceptance of the basic principles by the Republican Party
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may be said to have occurred when the first major amendment 
of the Social Security Act was advanced by them in 1954. 
According to Altmeyer:
. . . the President's recommendations represented a 
complete endorsement of the fundamental principles 
upon which the social insurance and public assistance 
provisions of the Social Security Act were based.
They also represented a continuation of the course of 
development charted by the previous administration.
So it can be said that the Social Security Act for 
the first time became a truly non-partisan feature 
of our American way of life.2
One could advance several hypotheses for this endorse­
ment of the Democratic Party's version of the Social Security 
measures to date. One is the point made that the 'clean' 
bills on social security which came to the final vote were 
acceptable to both parties— even the various wings within 
both parties. Another relates to the fact that it had 
become an American expectation as millions were receiving 
benefits and millions had already contributed to the old-age 
part of the package. In any case, the existing social 
security legislation was acceptable to the Republican Party 
and its supporters. One could infer that this acceptance 
(the course of social security) by the Republican Party is 
because it is actually a conservative measure. An indica­
tion of the possibility of this is given by examining the 
party platform planks of the more 'radical' parties? for 
example, we recall the Socialist attack in 1948 accusing the 
Democrats and Republicans of a reactionary coalition on 
social security, also, the Progressive Party saying that the
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current social security program is a bipartisan conspiracy 
(pp. 79-80 above).
So, the cornerstone or linch-pin of the New Deal of 
twenty years earlier which was attacked by Republicans is 
now accepted. The way the Act gets amended during the Cold 
War years might offer insight into the way American politi­
cians in Congress performed. With a Republican Administra­
tion under President Eisenhower's leadership, the Act was 
amended much like previous amendments with the Amendment of 
1960 adding a measure for delivering medical care to the
aged not on assistance (Medical Aid to the Aged).
Political Considerations
Party makeup over the eight-year period is shown in 
Table XIII. When the Republicans took over in 1952, they 
controlled both chambers of the legislature, but in succes­
sive elections they lose seats. Only in 1960 do they make 
any gains. In contrast to Truman, Eisenhower begins with a 
Congress of his own party and then loses it as the years go 
by. What could he do with such a tendency as far as social 
security is concerned? With no serious depression or reces­
sion facing him in the earlier years it was, at least as far
as social security was concerned, business as usual. What 
is meant by this is that there was no crisis for him to 
either advance another dramatic omnibus bill (like Roosevelt 
did in the New Deal and Johnson did in the Great Society) or 
to dramatically amend the Act. In short, he had to be 
cautious with his cold war Congress.
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TABLE XIII
PARTY REPRESENTATION IN THE COLD WAR YEARS*
Democrats Increments Republicans Other
House Senate House Senate House Senate House Senate
1952 213 47 -21 - 1 221 48 1 1
1954 232 48 +19 + 1 203 47 1
1956 234 49 + 2 + 1 201 47
1958 283 66 +49 +17 154 34
I960 263 64 -20 - 2 174 36
*See Appendix B.
Social Security Platform Planks
Platform planks on social security continue to follow 
past formats. The more radical statements call for a 
national emphasis and the more liberal or conservative com­
ments call for a continuation of what is now on the books 
with slight incremental revision. Figure 7 shows the 
acceptance by everyone of the old-age insurance title of the 
original social security measures. Only scattered mention 
is made of the other major parts of the American social 
security program in the party platforms.
A closer inspection of the platforms reveals a con­
tinuation of previous statements on social security. The 
Socialist Labor Party seem to implicitly grant that the 
Democrats and Republican parties have brought about reform
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1952* 1955*
Old-Age Insurance 
Federal-State
National Prog., S-W., S-W., Soc.,
Soc. DEM., REP., Proh.
REP., Proh.
Unemployment Insurance 
State
Federal-State DEM. DEM. REP.
National Prog. S-W., Soc.
Assistance-Relief
State
Federal-State DEM. DEM.
National (Allowances)
Health Insurance
Private REP.
Private-Public
National Prog., S-W. S-W.
*See Appendix G.
S-W = Socialist-Workers
Soc. = Socialists
DEM. = Democrats
REP. = Republicans
Prog. = Progressives
Proh. = Prohibition
FIGURE 7
POLITICAL PARTY "SOCIAL SECURITY" PLANKS 
DURING THE COLD WAR YEARS
DEM. ,
but maintain that to propose reform when social change is 
called for prolongs Capitalism and Fascism: "To reform is
to preserve." (See Appendix G.) They state in their 1956 
platform that socialism is. the answer to all America's prob­
lems. Socialist Workers say in their 1952 promises that 
Truman's Fair Deal has been put in moth balls and taken out 
of storage for the 1952 campaign— the Republicans and Demo­
crats will never enact a genuine public welfare program.
Their specific 1952 proposals call for 20 million low-cost
housing units? a national health service? adequate old-age
»
pension and college education for all youth. Their state­
ments in 1956 attack capitalism (suggesting that economic 
crisis is the only alternative to war under it) and the 
Democratic Party (since the New Deal not one major social 
reform has been introduced). They suggest the same as 
before. The Progressive Party continues to want to make 
Roosevelt's Economic Bill of Rights a reality. Programs 
include radically increased benefits equal to a minimum 
decent standard of living? extending the Social Security Act 
to all workers? family allowances for children because 
virtually every industrial nation has such a program assuring 
a basic minimum standard of living for children? and a 
national health insurance because we are the only industrial 
nation in the world without such a system. There was no 
Progressive Party candidate in 1956. The Socialists in 1952 
seem to see the major issue as one between socialism and 
militarism and assert that American capitalism never
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recovered from the great collapse of the 30's as superficial 
prosperity returned with a war economy. Their social 
security plank calls for extensions and increases as well as 
a family allowance for all. The Democratic Party still 
points with pride to the last 20 years of success in rescuing 
American business from collapse; wage-earners from mass 
employment; and encouraging unionization. Proposals during 
this year advance extension and improvement of the Act and 
end by encouraging private endeavors designed to complement 
the present social security program. In their long platform 
of 1956 they again exalted the Democratic 84th Congress for 
advancing two pioneering social security measures over the 
bitter opposition of the Eisenhower administration. They 
plan to improve the old-age title of the Act and call for an 
improved public assistance program— one of the few times the 
assistance program has been mentioned thus far by any politi­
cal party. Republicans attack the Democrats in their plat­
form of 1952 claiming that the idea of government by consent 
has been destroyed by the last 20 years of Democratic Party 
rule. Inflation has cut into the Federal Old-age and Sur­
vivors system say the Republicans and this must be stopped. 
They call for amendment to the Old-age title as well as a 
study of universal pay-as-we-go pension plans. They are 
opposed to Federal compulsory health insurance with ”its 
crushing cost, wasteful inefficiency, and debased standards 
of medical care.’1 Celebrating its centennial as a party, 
the Republicans cite Lincoln and Eisenhower as the preservers
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of the nation. They list the accomplishment of their past 
four years by saying that social security has been extended 
to an additional 10 million workers and benefits raised for 
six and one-half million and protection of unemployment 
insurance extended to four million additional workers. The 
Prohibition Party deplores the current U. S. trend toward the 
Socialist State but pledge to continue social security with 
the proviso that abuses of its privileges and mal-adminis- 
tration be corrected. The Christian-Nationalists assail 
government expenditure and taxation of the Socialist planners 
seeking to inject a Federal hand into private welfare (see 
Appendix G).
Security Roll Calls
The Cold War period under a Republican Administration 
yielded amendments in 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, and 1960. 
The final roll calls on these are listed in Tables XIV and 
XV. There were ten roll calls in the House and twenty-two 
roll calls in the Senate pertaining to social security (and 
unemployment compensation).3 These roll calls include reso­
lution, amendments, passage, and conference report votes on 
social security for the period.
Roll call numbers 15 and 16 in the House led to pas­
sage of the Social Security Amendments of 1954. Numbers 17 
and 18 refer to the extension of unemployment compensation 
coverage. The Senate passed these two measures by voice vote 
and therefore we have no record of their performance. There
TABLE XIV
HOUSE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE COLD WAR YEARS
Congress
Roll
Call Bill Date Description
83 15 HRes 568 6- 1-54 Resolution for S. S. Amendments of 1954
83 16 HR 9366 6- 1-54 Passage: S. S. Amendments of 1954
83 17 HR 9709 7- 8-54 Forand Motion. Unemployment Compensatioi
83 18 HR 9709 7- 8-54 Passage
84 19 HR 7225 7-18-55 Passage: Amendments of 1956
85 20 HR 12065 6- 1-58 Herlong Amendment. Unemployment Compen­
sation
85 21 HR 12065 6- 1-58 Passage
85 22 HR 13549 7-31-58 Passage: Amendments of 1958
86 23 HR 12580 6-23-60 Passage: Amendments of 1960
86 24 HR 12580 6-23-60 Conference Report: Amendments of 1960
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84
84
84
84
84
84
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
86
86
TABLE XV
SENATE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE COLD WAR YEARS
Roll
Call Bill Date Description
20 HR 7225 7-16^56
21 HR 7225 7-17-56
22 HR 7225 7-17-56
23 HR 7225 7-17-56
24 HR 7225 7-17-56
25 HR 7225 7-17-56
26 HR12065 5-27-58
27 HR12065 5-28-58
28 HR12065 5-28-58
29 HR12065 5-28-58
30 HR12065 5-28-58
31 HR12065 5-28-58
32 HR12065 5-28-58
33 HR13549
34 HR13549 8-16-58
35 HR 5640 3-25-59
36 HR 5640 3-25-59
Amendments of 1956 
Amendments of 1956 
Amendments of 1956 
Amendments of 1956 
Amendments of 1956 
Amendments of 1956 
Temporary Unemploy-
Long Amendment:
George Amendment:
Pastore Amendment:
Kerr Amendment:
Douglas Amendment:
Passage:
Kennedy Amendment: 
ment Compensation 
Kennedy Amendment: Temporary Unemploy­
ment Compensation 
Kennedy Amendment: Temporary Unemploy­
ment Compensation 
Long Amendment: Temporary Unemployment 
Compensation 
Knowland Amendment: Temporary Unemploy­
ment Compensation 
Cooper Amendment: Temporary Unemployment 
Compensation 
Passage: Temporary Unemployment Compen­
sation
Yarborough Amendment: Amendments of 1958 
Passage: Amendments of 1958
Extension (1960) Temporary Unemployment 
Compensation 
Extension (1959) Temporary Unemployment 
Compension
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TABLE XV (CONTINUED)
Congress RollCall Bill Date Description
86 37 HR12580 8-23-60 Javits Substitution: Amendments of 1960
86 38 HR12580 8-23-60 Anderson Amendment: Amendments of 1960
86 39 HR12580 8-23-60 Long Amendment: Amendments of 1960
86 40 HR12580 8-23-60 Passage: Amendments of 1960
86 41 HR12580 8-26-60 Conference Report Amendments of 1960
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was only one vote in the House on the Amendments of 1956 
(this is because of the House Rule closing out amendments 
from the floor and allowing only Ways and Means Committee 
amendments); but, in the Senate this measure goes through 
five votes before final passage. HR 12065, the Temporary 
Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958, relating to social 
security, goes through two votes in the House and seven 
votes in the Senate. HR 5640 went through two votes in the 
Senate and dealt with the extension of the above temporary 
unemployment compensation. The last roll call was HR 12580 
or the Amendments of 1960 with two votes in the House and 
five votes in the Senate.
Percentages of legislators for and against social 
security and the Rice Indices for party cohesion on these 
votes are given in Tables XVI and XVII. Without detailed 
each of the twenty-two roll calls on their registered per­
centages and Rice indices, certain trends can be observed.
In the House only one vote for each party shows a higher 
percentage against social security than for. (Roll call 17 
for the Democrats and roll call 20 for the Republicans.) 
Average cohesion and weighted cohesion for both chambers 
reveals differing tendencies from the two previous periods. 
These data are discussed in Chapter VIII.
A regional breakdown of these roll calls was undertaken 
with the results shown in Table XVIII. Regional cohesiveness 
by party for the House of Representatives is lowest for the
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TABLE XVI
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE 
HOUSE FOR THE COLD WAR YEARS
Roll
Call
Democrat
Rice
Index
Republican
Rice
Index
%
For
%
Against
%
For
%
Against
15 58.6 41.4 17.1 95.6 4.4 91.2
16 95.2 4.8 90.3 96.9 3.1 93.7
17 41.3 58.7 17.5 91.5 8.5 83.1
18 82.1 17.9 64.2 95.7 4.3 91.4
19 96.2 3.8 92.4 88.0 12.0 76.0
20 71.2 28.8 42.3 9.9 90.1 80.1
21 98.5 1.5 97.1 91.9 8.1 83.9
22 100.0 0.0 100.0 98.9 1.1 97.8
23 93.9 6.1 87.7 93.2 6.8 86.5
24 96.3 3.7 92.7 93.1 6.9 86.1
Average 60.1 Average 88.0
Weighted 68.6* Weighted 69.9
*See Appendix H.
Roll
Call
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
TABLE XVII
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN 
THE SENATE FOR THE COLD WAR YEARS
Democrat_____  Republican
%  %  Rice %  %
For Against Index For Against
6.193.9
83.7
93.9
95.9
83.0
100.0
44.2
53.5
68.2
86.7
86.7
48.8
97.8
55.1
100.0
58.7
68.3
0.0
69.2
76.2
98.5
81.3
16.3 
6.1
4.1
17.0
0.0
55.8
46.5
31.8
13.3
13.3
51.2
2.2
44.9 
0.0
41.3
31.7
100.0
30.8
23.8
1.5
18.8
Average
87.8
67.3
87.8
91.8 
66.0
100.0
11.6
7.0
36.4
73.3
73.3
2.3
95.7
10.2
100.0
17.5
36.5
100.0
38.5
52.4
97.0
62.5
5 9 4.8
54.8
17.4
10.9
87.2
41.3
100.0
7.0
21.7
28.3
18.2
17.4
24.4
100.0
18.2
97.7
3.0
28.1
84.8
3.0
25.0
97.0
97.0
45.2
82.6
89.1 
12.8
58.7 
0.0
93.0
78.3
71.7
81.8
82.6
75.6
0.0
81.8
2.3
97.0
71.9
15.2
97.0
75.0
3.0
3.0
Average
Weighted 48.0 Weighted
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TABLE XVIII
HOUSE AND SENATE AVERAGE COHESION BY PARTY AND 
REGION FOR THE COLD WAR YEARS
Region
Democrat Republican
House Senate House Senate
New England 100.0 93.3 94.4 72.4
Mid-Atlantic 99.4 48.5 90.0 66.1
East-North-Central 99.0 78.4 85.3 79.6
West-North-Central 89.1 100.0 83.8 77.3
South 67.4 • 68.3 65.0 0.0
Border 82.0 75.0 100.0 74.7
Mountain 90.5 79.5 81.7 68.8
Pacific 100.0 98.2 83.7 68.2
Other 100.0 100.0 — 57.1
The Nation 60.1 59.8 88.0 68.6
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South (as was the case in the Fair Deal) and highest in the 
East and West. The exception is in the Senate where those 
Senators from the Border States are absolutely cohesive on 
the roll calls considered.
Social Security Performance
If the New Deal saved capitalism and the Social 
Security Act of 1935 was considered to be the cornerstone of 
that Deal, the incoming Republican Administration would have 
found it hard to dismantle the Act after it had been in 
force for over 17 years. In many ways they had helped shape 
the Act itself as well as the amendments prior to coming to 
power in 1953 as our voting data suggests.
Legislative performance by the Democratic and Repub­
lican parties continued to be 'close1 to their platform 
promises. Both parties are promising to expand and extend 
the social security of the people through the Social Security 
Act. Again, the legislation passed was of less controversial 
nature in that no sweeping health measures were suggested by 
the Eisenhower Administration. Unemployment compensation 
aspects of social security became somewhat of an issue in 
the Senate because of the "recession" experienced in the 
American economy in 1958.
Summary
The Cold War years, although led by a Republican 
President, were dominated by a Democratic Congressional 
majority from 1954 onward. This Democratic majority
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contributed if not ensured that the Social Security Act would 
continue to be amended and expanded 'bit-by-bit' during this 
administration. From the profile of social security planks 
and the measures of cohesion we would have to concur with 
Altmeyer that during the Eisenhower administration the Social 
Security Act became a truly non-partisan feature of the 
American way of life. But, the charge by the minority 
parties that this is not non-partisan but is bi-partisan must 
be considered. Because the two major parties accept and 
agree on the Act as set up in 1935 and successively amended 
does not rule out the possibility that these two parties are 
performing in a bi-partisan manner to limit significant 
changes in the Act, as charged by the more radical parties. 
(The Act gets more complex each time it is amended, thus it 
is difficult to see what minor changes will be interpreted 
as major ones in the years to come.) One example of the way 
in which the Act was 'adapted' to the more radical pressures 
was in the 1960 Amendments when Medical Aid to the Aged was 
added to the Act. The Democrats and Republicans finally 
worked out a way to amend Title I of old-age assistance to 
provide medical benefits for aged persons who are not on 
old-age assistance but have a low enough income to qualify 
for medical services. As a result of many years of recom­
mendations from the other parties in the U. S., outside 
groups, as well as Social Security administrators and others, 
this program was finally worked out for old-agers willing to 
go through a means test.4 we will see several changes which
Ill
might be considered more significant in the discussion of 
the New Frontier and Great Society Years.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER V
■^Arthur Altmeyer, The Formative Years of Social 
Security (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968),
pp. 209-25.
^Ibid., p. 239.
^Unemployment compensation is considered a part of 
the Social Security Act of 1935. HR 12065 providing for 
temporary additional unemployment compensation is a separate 
act from the Social Security Act— but is for the relief of 
those who have exhausted their benefit entitlement as pro­
vided under the Social Security Act and State laws.
4The means test idea refers to qualifications neces­
sary to get income or service from a social agency. An 
applicant must legally prove that he is 'poor' enough to get 
such income or service. The test criteria for means varies 
from place to place and from time to time. The Federal MAA 
category was a small step toward some uniformity in helping 
with the costs of being ill as old-age approaches. A 
significant step was to come in the Great Society years which 
will be considered below.
CHAPTER VI
THE NEW FRONTIER YEARS
Introductory
In the close election in 1960, the Democrats managed
to seat their candidate John F. Kennedy. True to Democratic
Party style a slogan was adopted for the time. This was the
"New Frontier.”'*' Between his election and his inauguration,
President Kennedy established a task force on health and
social security which made its recommendations to him on
January 10, 1961.  ^ in his inaugural address on January 20,
1961, he said "For man holds in his mortal hands the power
to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human 
3
life.” And for one of the first times we find a comment on 
"poverty" instead of "security" as in previous years.
The New Frontier was short because of the assassination 
of President Kennedy and can be said to blend into the Great 
Society of his successor Lyndon B. Johnson. Despite this 
blending, it can be considered as a separate period by which 
to consider social security legislation because of the style 
and tone of the years and the consequences of these years 
for the Great Society legislation which followed them.
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Political Considerations
Party makeup during the New Frontier Years is seen in 
Table XIX below.
TABLE XIX 
PARTY REPRESENTATION IN THE
NEW FRONTIER YEARS
Democrats---— Increments Republicans Other
House Senate House Senate House Senate House Senate
1960
1962
263 64 
258 68
-20 - 2 
- 4 + 4
174 36 
176 32
1*
Vacancy*
*See Appendix B.
Even though the Democrats lost twenty years in the House in 
the 1960 election they still possessed a majority. They 
also have a clear majority in the Senate picking up an addi­
tional four seats in the election of 1962. These conditions 
of a Democratic administration and a Democratic legislature 
were last seen in 1950 under Truman. With these conditions, 
there was a possibility that the Democratic Party would amend 
the Social Security Act of 1935 in a somewhat more dramatic 
manner than was seen during the Eisenhower administration. 
Before considering the amendments of the period we turn to 
the political party platform planks on social security.
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Social Security Platform Planks
The planks pertaining to social security for 1960 
continued to contain lengthy statements on social security. 
The Socialists, offering a platform but no candidate for 
1960, once again anticipate or predate what the Democratic 
Party will do in the years to come by having a heading in 
their platform "War on Poverty." In this particular instance 
they were referring to the international poverty situation. 
(See Appendix G.) Focusing on the domestic scene they 
stated:
Since the 19301s the two old parties have produced 
virtually no progressive social legislation. As 
productivity has grown, so have slums; as medical 
research has advanced, the ability of ordinary 
people to pay for medical care has regressed; as 
our standard of living has risen, fifty million 
Americans have continued to dwell in poverty.4
Attempting to expose legislative impasse, they go on:
Our society is deadlocked and frustration is our 
predominant feeling in every area of life; and the 
predominant source of our political frustration is 
a party alignment that cannot reflect the will of 
the people. A coalition of Northern Republicans 
and Southern Democrats thwart the wishes of the 
majority, and will continue to do so until there 
is a political realignment in this c o u n t r y . 5
The Democratic Party rests on Jefferson's principle 
of rights of man and reaffirm Roosevelt's Bill of Rights. 
Employment is the paramount objective of national policy.
The social security plank is very detailed and includes a 
lengthy health plank, old-age plank and 'welfare' plank. A 
statement of things to come is made on both health and wel­
fare. On the health matter:
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Illness is expensive. Many Americans have neither 
incomes nor insurance protection to enable them to 
pay for modern medical care. The problem is par­
ticularly acute with the older citizens, among whom 
serious illness strikes most often.
We shall provide medical care benefits for the 
aged as part of the time-tested Social Security 
insurance system. We reject any proposal which 
would require such citizens to submit to the 
indignity of a means test— a 'pauper's oath.'6
This latter point about a pauper's oath is directed at the 
Republican administration of Eisenhower which was forced, so 
the Democrats say, to propose a cynical sham in the Social 
Security Amendments of 1960 in the form of the Medical 
Assistance to the Aged. In addition to this extended health 
plank, they say under their welfare plank that public 
assistance takes up where social insurance leaves off and 
the Federal government should establish minimum standards 
without regard to residence. The Child Welfare Program 
should be expanded to prevent and control juvenile delin­
quency (see Appendix G). The Republicans have labor, older 
citizens, and health aid planks. The labor plank calls for 
the strengthening and extension of the unemployment insurance 
system. The older citizens’ plank would expand and liberal­
ize 'selected' social security benefits which would maintain 
the fiscal integrity of the system.^ The plank on health aid 
reiterates the Medical Aid to the Aged theme as incorporated 
in the 1960 amendments plus a statement on the option of 
beneficiaries to purchase private health insurance— which 
they consider to distinguish them from the Democratic Party. 
Concluding their platform they say:
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We have no wish to exaggerate differences between 
ourselves and the Democratic Party? nor can we, in 
conscience, obscure the differences that do exist.
We believe that a Republican program is based upon 
a sounder understanding of the action and scope of 
government. There are many things a free government 
cannot do for its people as well as they can do them 
for themselves.8
Even the Republicans have something to say about their lack 
of difference'with the Democratic Party in 1960. The Pro­
hibition Party continues to make the same statement about 
social security as in previous platforms. A plank profile 
for these parties is seen in Figure 8.
Social Security Roll Calls
The short New Frontier of Kennedy produced pieces of 
social security legislation: HR 4806 concerning the tempo­
rary extension of unemployment compensation; the Social 
Security Amendments of 1961? and the Amendments of 1962, HR 
6027 and HR 10606, respectively. This amounted to seven 
roll calls or public decisions in the House and eleven in 
the Senate. These roll calls are listed in Tables XX and 
XXI. The legislation dealing with temporary unemployment 
compensation and its extension became a repetitive matter 
for the Congress after the Temporary Unemployment Compensa­
tion Act of 1958 was instituted to extend this type of 
coverage beyond that provided under the Social Security Act. 
This extension provided for the payment by the Federal 
government to the States for additional benefits to their 
workers who had exhausted their benefit rights under State 
law. The Social Security Amendments of 1961 liberalized
1960*
Old-Age Insurance 
National
Lower age 
Medical care
Unemployment Insurance 
State
Federal-State
National
Assistance Relief 
State
Federal-State 
National (allowances)
Health Insurance 
Private 
Private-Public 
National
Soc., DEM., 
REP.
DEM., REP.
DEM.
REP.
REP.
Soc., DEM.
*See Appendix G.
Key: Soc. = Socialists
DEM. = Democrats 
REP. = Republicans
Proh. = Prohibition
FIGURE 8
POLITICAL PARTY "SOCIAL SECURITY" PLANKS 
OF THE NEW FRONTIER YEARS
TABLE XX
HOUSE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE NEW FRONTIER YEARS
Congress RollCall Bill Date Description
87 25 HR 4806 3- 1-61 Passage Temporary Unemployment Compensa­
tion (1961)
87 26 HR 4806 3-22-61 Conference Report: Temporary Unemploy­
ment Compensation (1961)
87 27 HR 6027 4-20-61 Passage: Amendments 1961
87 28 HR 10606 3-15-62 Byrnes Motion. Welfare Amendments of 
1962
87 29 HR 10606 3-15-62 Passage: Welfare Amendments of 1962
87 30 HR 10606 7-19-62 Conference Report
88 31 HR 8821 10-22-63 Title XII Temporary Unemployment Compen­
sation
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TABLE XXI
SENATE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE NEW FRONTIER YEARS
Roll
DescriptionCongress Call Bill Date
87 42 HR 4806 3-16-61 Finance Committee Amendment: Temporary 
Unemployment Compensation
87 43 HR 4806 3-16-61 Finance Committee Amendment: Temporary 
Unemployment Compensation
87 44 HR 4806 3-16-61 Williams Amendment: Temporary Unemploy­
ment Compensation
87 45 HR 4806 3-16-61 Passage: Temporary Unemployment Compen­
sation
87 46 HR 6027 6-26-61 Hartke Substitution: Amendments of 1961
87 47 HR 6027 6-26-61 Cotton Amendment: Amendments of 1961
87 48 HR 6027 6-26-61 Passage: Amendments of 1961
87 49 HR 10606 7-12-62 Saltenstall Substitution: Public Wel­
fare Amendments of 1962
87 50 HR 10606 7-13-62 Push Substitution: Public Welfare 
Amendments of 1962
87 51 HR 10606 7-17-62 Kerr Tabling: Public Welfare Amendments 
of 1962
87 52 HR 10117 10- 5-62 McCarthy Amendment: Unemployment Compen­
sation
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benefit payments, the retirement test, and eligibility 
requirements. On the matter of retirement age, this par­
ticular amendment permitted a male worker to elect a reduced 
retirement benefit at age 62— thus coming closer to the more 
radical proposals of the 30's, 40's, and 50's of the major 
minority parties. The Welfare Amendments of 1962 were on 
the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act and 
may be considered the first major amendments to these titles 
since the original Act of 1935. More will be said about 
this in the discussion on performance below.
Tables XXII and XXIII give party percentages for and 
against social security plus the computed Rice index of 
party cohesion. Table XXII yields almost unanimous cohesion 
for the Democrats in the House for the measures voted on.
This unanimity is for social security. The House Republicans, 
in contrast, are less cohesive on the legislation to get to 
the floor showing the greatest split in the passage vote 
dealing with the Welfare Amendments of 1962. In the Senate, 
where amendments are allowed on the floor, the Democrats are 
not only more split in terms of party cohesion but some 
members also vote against social security. Average and 
weighted cohesion are given for both parties in both chambers 
for this voting period.
A regional breakdown can be seen in Table XXIV. These 
data reveal tendencies consistent with previous periods for 
the South where for both Democrats and Republicans the lowest 
cohesion is registered in the House. The very high average
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TABLE XXII
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE 
HOUSE FOR THE NEW FRONTIER YEARS
Roll
Call
Democrat
Rice
Index
Republican
Rice
Index
%
For
%
Against
%
For
%
Against
25 99.2 0.8 98.4 83.7 16.3 67.4
26 98.3 1.7 96.6 82.4 17.6 64.8
27 100.0 0.0 100.0 89.9 10.1 79.9
28 94.9 5.1 89.7 10.7 89.3 78.6
29 98.3 1.7 96.5 59.3 40.7 18.5
30 99.6 0.4 99.2 78.5 21.5 57.0
31 99.5 0.5 99.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Average 97.1 Average 66.6
Weighted 97.1* Weighted 42.9
*See Appendix H.
Roll
Call
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
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TABLE XXIII
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE 
SENATE FOR THE NEW FRONTIER YEARS
Democrat______  Republican____
%  %  Rice %  %  Rice
For Against Index For Against Index
26.6 73.4 46.9
54.1 45.9 8.2
73.4 26.6 46.9
96.9 3.1 93.8
100.0 0.0 100.0
100.0 0.0 100.0
100.0 0.0 100.0
12.3 87.7 75.4
3.1 96.9 93.8
67.2 32.8 34.4
77.2 22.8 54.4
Average 68.5
Weighted 29.9*
84.8 15.2 69.7
15.2 84.8 69.7
0.0 100.0 100.0
93.9 6.1 87.9
8.6 91.4 82.9
100.0 0.0 100.0
100.0 0.0 100.0
84.8 15.2 69.7
9.1 90.9 81.8
14.3 85.7 71.4
72.2 27.8 44.4
Average 79.8
Weighted 4.2
*See Appendix H.
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cohesiveness among the House Democrats for the New Frontier 
period is in contrast to previous periods.
TABLE XXIV
HOUSE AND SENATE AVERAGE COHESION BY PARTY AND
REGION FOR THE NEW FRONTIER YEARS
Region Democrat RepublicanHouse Senate House Senate
New England 100.0 89.9 91.8 82.1
Mid-Atlantic 99.3 100.0 75.6 63.6
East-North-Central 99.0 79.2 65.7 100.0
West-North-Central 100.0 100.0 48.8 93.9
South 92.1 69.7 51.5 45.5
Border 99.0 69.7 82.9 90.9
Mountain 100.0 90.5 71.5 86.4
Pacific 100.0 100.0 68.5 100.0
Other 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
The Nation 97.1 68.5 66.6 79.8
Social Security Performance
The 1960 political party platform planks on social 
security pointed up the likenesses and differences between 
the parties that were to follow in the legislative procedures 
dealing with social security matters. This is particularly
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so for the welfare issue. The Democratic Party sought to 
push health and welfare measures associated with the Social 
Security Act and did so in the Amendments of 1951 and 1962. 
Health insurance was stalled in these two major amendments 
to the Act of 1935; but the so-called 'welfare' or assistance 
titles were revised or liberalized in the 1962 amendments.9
The 1961 amendments were to be considered a change in 
degree; whereas, the 1962 welfare amendments were closer to 
a change in kind. On February 1, 1962, President Kennedy 
sent to Congress the first message devoted exclusively to 
public welfare. At the same time the Administration's pro­
posals were sent to Congress. After hearings, the Chairman 
of the House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur D. Mills, 
introduced a 'clean bill': HR 10606. The measure was passed
319 to 69. This Act was considered to be the most far- 
reaching decision on the assistance part of the Social 
Security of 1935 by President Kennedy because he claimed 
that it embodies a new approach, stressing services instead 
of support, rehabilitation instead of relief, and work 
instead of dependency.'*'0
The Democratic Party plank on welfare, it will be 
recalled, called for the abolition of residency requirements 
on assistance categories and that the child welfare program 
should be expanded to prevent and control delinquency. The 
platform also said that public assistance takes up where 
social insurance leaves off. The abolition of residency 
requirements did not occur. What requires some comment is
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the platform statement that assistance takes up where 
insurance leaves off in the American Social Security scheme. 
Gilbert Y. Steiner discusses this philosophy of
I 1
assistance as based on the "withering-away fallacy.1 He 
concludes that social insurance has definitely not replaced 
assistance in the United States; rather the program has 
grown tremendously. The giant reexamination of these welfare 
or assistance categories ordered by President Kennedy dis­
pelled the withering-away assertion made back in the 1930's. 
The notion advanced in the 1960 Democratic Party platform 
that assistance picks up where insurance leaves off repre­
sents a shift in emphasis on social welfare. Kennedy's New 
Frontiersmen recognized that public assistance was not 
residual.-^ Steiner says,
If the curtain had to be lowered on the extend-social- 
insurance-so-that-the-public-assistance-load-will-fall- 
away performance, it also had to be lowered on the 
status quo (on public assistance).13
But the net result of the Welfare Amendments Act of 1962 was
to merely provide rehabilitative services and did not bring
about much of a change in either direction or philosophy
beyond dispelling the withering away philosophy. Steiner
concludes with a sweeping evaluation of this New Frontier
performance:
The dominant philosophy up to 1962 had been a states' 
rights philosophy, a policy of providing federal 
support for categorical programs drawn by and tailored 
to the interests of the individual states with an 
absolute minimum of insistence upon uniformity. The 
1962 amendments change neither the tendency to provide 
generous federal support to state programs nor the 
willingness of Congress to let the states write their
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own programs within the limits of the original 
Social Security Act. The great thrust on behalf 
of prevention and rehabilitation seems more 
gimmicky than substantive.14
This is so because, according to Steiner, rehabilitation 
remains undefined and the goal of reasonable subsistence to 
the people has yet to be a c h i e v e d . i f  this criticism is 
valid, then the earlier assertions by the third parties 
(closer to the 'left') to the effect that the old parties 
are not doing much seems to be sustained. The roll call 
performance that has been considered so far shows consider­
able inter-party agreement on social security amending.
Summary
The New Frontier Years were years when 'poverty' was 
discovered in the midst of plenty in the United States. This 
discovery or rediscovery by the Kennedy Administration led 
to the rethinking of the welfare or assistance aspects of 
the Social Security Act of 1935. Perhaps it must be said 
that there was more rethinking than action during this period, 
as the New Frontier was cut short by the assassination of the 
President. The Democratic majority in both Houses of the 
Congress facilitated the Democratic Administration's social 
security accomplishment of two amendments to the original 
act. Their platform promises were not 'grounded' during 
this period, however. Health insurance for old-agers or 
others was not enacted— despite the fact that the movement 
toward such a measure was afoot. It was welfare measures 
that got the spotlight during the New Frontier in the form
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of an unemployed parent attachment to the Aid to Dependent 
Child assistance category in the 1961 Amendments and the 
'rehabilitation' thrust of the 1962 Amendments. The House 
Democrats were much more cohesive as a party on social 
security matters than their fellow party members in the 
Senate and their opponents in both Houses. If one analyzes 
the roll call voting internally however, it is to be noted 
that the Democratic Senators were 100 percent cohesive for 
the Social Security Amendments of 1961 in contrast to the 
unemployment compensation measures put before them. A. 
closer scrutiny of the Welfare Amendments of 1962 reveals 
that both parties seem to be in agreement on continuing to 
leave the job of public assistance up to the individual 
states. The medical care and health insurance issue was 
left up to the Great Society period to which we can now turn.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER VI
The source of political slogans is sometimes hard to 
get. It it said that the "New Frontier’1 came from Walt 
Rostow, The St acres of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist
Manifesto (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1960).
2Wilbur J. Cohen and William L. Mitchell, ’’Social 
Security Amendments of 1961: Summary and Legislative His­
tory," Social Security Bulletin (September, 1961) Social 
Security Administration, pp. 8-9. Also, Wilbur J. Cohen and 
Robert M. Ball, "Public Welfare Amendments of 1962,” Social 
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CHAPTER VII
THE GREAT SOCIETY YEARS
Introductory
Quite in contrast to the close election of 1960, the 
Democratic Party in 1964, led by Lyndon Baines Johnson, 
polled over 61 percent of the vote which was the largest 
plurality in American history.^ While President Kennedy was 
considered to be young and idealistic as far as American 
political life is concerned, President Johnson was old and 
realistic. Kennedy's attempt to emulate and even surpass 
the twentieth-century standard bearer of the Democratic 
Party, Franklin D. Roosevelt, was continued by Johnson. 
Johnson's slogan became the Great Society.2
As the Social Security Act of 1935 was the linch-pin 
for the New Deal; it might be said that the War on Poverty 
was that pin for the Great Society. The strategy and tactics 
for this 'War' were formulated by Kennedy's New Frontiersmen; 
but it was Johnson who worked out the logistics and the
O
'delivery system.' The War on Poverty and the War in 
Vietnam seemed to eclipse the several amendments to the 
Social Security Act. Even though social security legislation 
may not have been considered a part of the War on Poverty, 
it was definitely a part of Johnson's Great Society vision.
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He was able to deliver a limited 'national' medical care 
program— thirty years after health insurance was recommended 
to the United States Executive branch of the government.
Political Considerations
Even with a majority, President Kennedy did not have 
the numbers in the Congress to get his New Frontier going. 
The loss in the House of twenty seats in 1960 and two seats 
in 1962 is said to have hurt the President's intentions. 
President Johnson inherited this liability as he took over 
the Office. Table XXV shows the Democratic and Republican 
Party membership as well as the gain/loss increments for the 
Democrats.
TABLE XXV 
PARTY REPRESENTATION IN THE
GREAT SOCIETY YEARS*
Democrats------- —  Increments Republicans
House Senate House Senate House Senate
1962 258 68 - 4 +4 176 32
1964 295 67 +38 +2 140 33
1966 248 64 -47 -3 187 36
1968 243 58 - 4 -5 192 42
*See Appendix B.
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The 1964 election changed things however when Johnson was 
given somewhat of a mandate from the people as well as 
picking up seats in both the House and the Senate. The off- 
election year of 1966 and the election year of 1968 showed 
losses for the Democrats. From these statistics one would 
expect that a major piece of social security legislation 
would be put before the Congress. This is exactly what 
occurred. Before getting into this legislation we can look 
at the political party platforms for the period.
Social Security Platform Planks
The Socialist-Labor Party still makes no mention of 
the Social Security program in its platform, but reacts to 
the anti-poverty 'war.' To them this war is phony. They 
repudiate the Republican and Democratic parties and the plat­
forms which consist of measures to reform and patch-up the 
poverty-breeding capitalist system. The Socialist-Workers 
on the other hand continue to call for more adequate social 
security:
Provide the millions of aged people with full disa­
bility benefits, free medical care and hospitaliza­
tion, and adequate pensions. Nationalize the entire 
medical system. As an immediate measure, pass the 
King-Anderson Medicare Bill now bottled up in 
Congress.4
Their platform is directed to the one-fifth of the Nation 
now in poverty according to the State of the Union Message 
of 1964 by President Johnson. The Democrats calling them­
selves the Party of Jefferson discuss social security within 
the framework of their Democracy of Opportunity plank.
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(See Appendix G.) The platform is of considerable import 
because it accounts in a point-by-point manner their per­
formance of the last three and one-half years against their 
platform promises of 1960. For example, they proposed 
medical care benefits for the aged in 1960 and claim to have 
enacted more health legislation since then than during any 
other period in American history (although medical care to 
the aged was stalled). They continue to detail their 
accomplishments with the Amendments of 1961 and 1962 to the 
Social Security Act as well as the related Temporary Extended 
Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961.
The Social Security Act Amendments of 1961 broadened 
benefits to 5.3 million people, including minimum 
benefits for retired workers from $33 to $40 per 
month, permitting men as well as women to begin col­
lecting reduced benefits at age 62.
The Social Security program now provides 1.3 
billion in benefits each month to 19.5 million 
people. One out of every ten Americans receives 
a social security check every month.5
The Republican Party calling themselves the Party of Lincoln
build a platform "For the People." On the attack, they say
the Democrats have failed the poor as the proposed war on
poverty overlaps and contradicts the 42 existing poverty
programs. Their counter-proposal on social security goes as
follows:
Tax credits and other methods of assistance to help 
needy senior citizens meet the costs of medical and 
hospital insurance; a strong sound system of Social 
Security, with improved benefits to all of our people;
. . . revision of the Social Security laws to allow 
higher earnings, without loss of benefits, by our 
elderly people; full coverage of all medical and
1964*
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hospital costs for the needy elderly people, financed 
by general revenues through broader implementation of 
Federal-State plans, rather than the compulsory Demo­
cratic scheme covering only a small percentage of the 
costs, for everyone regardless of need.6
This counter-proposal on social security makes clear the
Republican position to keep the idea of 'needy' people
intact. The Prohibitionists continue with the same social
security rhetoric to the word. As noted above, Lyndon B.
Johnson won the presidency for the Democrats over Republican
Barry Goldwater who made the mistake of speaking against
social security.^
Social Security Roll Calls
President Johnson's Great Society blends into Kennedy's 
New Frontier much like Truman's Fair Deal blended into Roose­
velt 's New Deal. Legislative roll calls in both Houses dealt 
with three amendments to the Social Security Act (1964,
1965, and 1967), and another temporary extension of unemploy­
ment compensation benefits in 1966. As we shall see, the 
matter of unemployment compensation and social security goes 
through many more 'public' votes in the Senate than in the 
House. There are eight roll calls on these four measures in 
the House but fifty-five roll calls in the Senate. This 
difference is a function of the difference in the Rules of 
the House and Senate.8 These roll calls are listed in Tables 
XXVI and XXVII. Tables XXVIII and XXIX give party percent­
ages for and against the final measure as well as the index 
related to these percentages concerning cohesiveness.
TABLE XXVI
HOUSE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE GREAT SOCIETY YEARS
Congress
Roll
Call Bill Date Description
88 32 HR 11865 Closed Rule Amendments of 1964
88 33 HR 11865 7-29-64 Passage: Amendments of 1964
89 34 HR 6675 4- 8-65 Byrnes Motion: Amendments of 1965
89 35 HR 6675 4- 8-65 Passage: Amendments of 1965
89 36 HR 6675 Conference Report: Amendments of 1965
89 37 HR 15119 6-22-66 Passage Extension of Unemployment 
Compensation (1966)
90 38 HR 12080 8-17-67 Passage: Amendments of 1967
90 39 HR 12080 12-13-67 Conference Report: Amendments of 1967
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88
88
88
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
TABLE XXVII
SENATE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE GREAT SOCIETY YEARS
Bill Date Description
53 HR 11865 9- ,2-64 Gore Amendment. Amendments of 1964
54 HR 11865 9- '3-64 Prouty Amendment. Amendments of 1964
55 HR 11865 9- 3-64 Passage: Amendments of 1964
56 HR 6675 7- 7-65 Ribicoff Amendment Amendments of 1965
57 HR 6675 7- 8-65 Miller Amendment. Amendments of 1965
58 HR 6675 7- 8-65 Prouty Amendment. Amendments of 1965
59 HR 6675 7- 8-65 Curtis Amendment. Amendments of 1965
60 HR 6675 7- 9-65 Pastore Motion. Amendments of 1965
61 HR 6675 7- 9-65 Curtis Amendment. Amendments of 1965
62 HR 6675 7- 9-65 Morton Amendment. Amendments of 1965
63 HR 6675 7- 9-65 Smathers Motion. Amendments of 1965
64 HR 6675 7- 9-65 Hartke Amendment. Amendments of 1965
65 HR 6675 7- 9-65 Curtis Amendment. Amendments of 1965
66 HR 6675 7- 9-65 Curtis Motion. Amendments of 1965
67 HR 6675 7- 9-65 Passage: Amendments of 1965
68 HR 6675 7-28-65 Conference Report. Amendments of 1965
69 HR 15119 8- 5-66 Finance Committee Amendment. 'Unemploy-
ment Compensation of 1966
70 HR 15119 8- 5-66 Finance Committee Amendment, iUnemploy-
ment Compensation of 1966
71 HR 15119 8- 5-66 Finance Committee Amendment, iCJnemploy-
ment Compensation of 1966
72 HR 15119 8- 5-66 Long Amendment. Unemployment Compensa­
tion of 1966
73 HR 15119 8- 5-66 Long Motion. Unemployment Compensation
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89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
TABLE XXVII (CONTINUED)
Bill Date Description
74 HR 15119 8- 8-66 Curtis Motion. Unemployment Compensation 
1966
75 HR 15119 8- 8-66 Finance Committee Amendment. Unemployment 
Compensation of 1966
76 HR 15119 8- 8-66 Finance Committee Amendment. Unemployment 
Compensation of 1966
77 HR 15119 8- 8-66 Finance Committee Amendment. Unemployment 
Compensation of 1966
78 HR 15119 8- 8-66 Morton Amendment. Unemployment Compen­
sation of 1966
79 HR 15119 8- 8-66 Long Amendment. Unemployment Compensation 
of 1966
80 HR 15119 8- 8-66 McCarthy Amendment. Unemployment Com­
pensation of 1966
81 HR 15119 8- 8-66 Long Amendment. Unemployment Compensa­
tion of 1966
82 HR 15119 8- 8-66 Passage: Unemployment Compensation of 
1966
83 HR 12080 11-16-67 Dirksen Amendment. Amendments of 1967
84 HR 12080 11-16-67 Hartke Motion. Amendments of 1967
85 HR 12080 11-17-67 Prouty-Cotton Amendment. Amendments of 
1967
86 HR 12080 11-■17-67 Prouty-Cotton Amendment. Amendments of 
1967
87 HR 12080 11-■17-67 Metcalf Amendment. Amendments of 1967
88 HR 12080 11-■20-67 Kuchel Amendment. Amendments of 1967
89 HR 12080 11-■20-67 Javits Amendment. Amendments of 1967
90 HR 12080 11-■20-67 Williams Amendment. Amendments of 1967m
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TABLE XXVII (CONTINUED)
Bill Date Description
91 HR 12080 11-20-67 Harris Amendment. Amendments of 1967
92 HR 12080 11-21-67 Williams Amendment. Amendments of 1967
93 HR 12080 11-21-67 Curtis-Williams Amendment. Amendments
of 1967
94 HR 12080 11-21-67 Ervin Amendment. Amendments of 1967
95 HR 12080 11-21-67 Hartke Motion. Amendments of 1967
96 HR 12080 11-21-67 Long Amendment. Amendments of 1967
97 HR 12080 11-21-67 Kennedy Amendment. Amendments of 1967
98 HR 12080 11-21-67 Hartke-Bayh Amendment.Amendments of 1967
99 HR 12080 11-21-67 Williams Amendment. Amendments of 1967
100 HR 12080 11-21-67 Kennedy Amendment. Amendments of 1967
101 HR 12080 11-21-67 Prouty Amendment. Amendments of 1967
102 HR 12080 11-21-67 Miller Amendment. Amendments of 1967
103 HR 12080 11-21-67 Miller Amendment. Amendments of 1967
104 HR 12080 11-21-67 Prouty Amendment. Amendments of 1967
105 HR 12080 11-21-67 Bayh Amendment. Amendments of 1967
106 HR 12080 11-22-67 Passage: Amendments of 1967
107 HR 12080 12-15-67 Conference Report. Amendments of 1967
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TABLE XXVIII
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE 
HOUSE FOR THE GREAT SOCIETY YEARS
Roll
Call
Democrat
Rice
Index
Republican
Rice
Index
%
For
%
Against
%
For
%
Against
32 96.3 3.7 92.7 86.5 13.5 73.0
33 98.7 1.3 97.4 97.0 3.0 94.0
34 20.0 77.0 54.0 92.6 7.4 85.3
35 84.8 15.2 69.6 47.4 52.6 5.2
36 82.2 17.8 64.5 50.7 49.3 1.5
37 97.3 2.7 94.6 97.5 2.5 95.0
38 99.1 0.9 98.3 99.5 0.5 98.9
39 99.1 0.9 98.2 99.4 0.6 98.8
Average 83.7 Average 70.2
Weighted 42.1* Weighted 51.2
*See Appendix H.
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
TABLE XXIX
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE 
SENATE FOR THE GREAT SOCIETY YEARS
Democrat______  Republican_____
%  %  Rice %  %
For Against Index For Against
71.2 28.8 42.4 15.2 84.8
0.0 100.0 100.0 74.2 25.8
82.8 17.2 65.6 38.7 61.3
45.2 54.8 9.7 55.2 44.8
9.7 90.3 80.6 62.1 37.9
96.8 3.2 93.7 64.5 35.5
27.4 72.6 45.2 83.9 16.1
12.5 87.5 75.0 96.9 3.1
84.1 15.9 68.3 40.6 59.4
68.3 31.7 36.5 25.0 75.0
26.2 73.8 47.5 3.2 96.8
20.6 79.4 58.7 3.1 96.9
74.6 25.4 49.2 15.6 84.4
13.1 86.9 73.8 62.5 37.5
87.7 12.3 75.4 45.5 54.5
88.9 11.1 77.8 45.5 54.5
77.0 23.0 54.1 75.8 24.2
55.0 45.0 10.0 69.7 30.3
56.7 43.3 13.3 78.8 21.2
69.0 31.0 37.9 20.6 79.4
71.7 28.3 43.3 18.2 81.8
40.0 60.0 20.0 82.4 17.6
61.0 39.0 22.0 17.6 82.4
72.4 27.6 44.8 12.1 87.9
36.5 63.5 27.0 81.3 18.8
30.2 69.8 39.7 81.8 18.2
73.0 27.0 46.0 21.2 78.8
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TABLE XXIX (CONTINUED)
Roll
Call
Democrat
Rice
Index
Republican
Rice
Index
%
For
%
Against
%
For
%
Against
80 73.0 27.0 46.0 21.2 78.8 57.6
81 27.0 73.0 46.0 78.8 21.2 57.6
82 73.0 27.0 46.0 30.3 69.7 39.4
83 72.0 28.0 44.0 14.7 85.3 70.6
84 28.6 71.4 42.9 85.3 14.7 70.6
85 16.0 84.0 68.0 15.2 84.8 69.7
86 10.4 89.6 79.2 24.2 75.8 51.5
87 83.3 16.7 66.7 31.3 68.8 37.5
88 64.0 36.0 28.0 71.9 28.1 43.8
89 9.8 90.2 80.4 15.6 84.4 68.8
90 58.0 42.0 16.0 93.8 6.2 87.5
91 62.0 38.0 24.0 32.3 67.7 35.5
92 87.5 12.5 75.0 18.8 81.3 62.5
93 89.5 10.5 78.9 32.4 67.6 35.3
94 94.7 5.3 89.5 84.8 15.2 69.5
95 70.9 29.1 41.8 18.2 81.8 63.6
96 71.4 28.6 42.9 18.2 81.8 63.6
97 66.0 34.0 32.1 27.3 72.7 45.5
98 41.8 58.2 16.4 18.2 81.8 63.6
99 75.0 25.0 50.0 30.3 69.7 39.4
100 54.9 45.1 9.8 19.4 80.6 61.3
101 7.8 92.2 84.3 31.3 68.8 37.5
102 5.9 94.1 88.2 90.6 9.4 81.3
103 90.0 10.0 80.0 26.7 73.3 46.7
104 20.0 80.0 60.0 59.4 40.6 18.8
105 74.0 26.0 48.0 56.3 43.8 12.5
106 96.7 3.3 93.3 85.7 14.3 71.4
107 76.7 23.3 53.3 91.4 8.6 82.9
Average 52.9 Average 53.4
Weighted 11.4* Weighted - 8.3
*See Appendix H.
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Roll Calls 32 and 33 in the House and 53, 54, and 55 
in the Senate are those on the Social Security Amendments of 
1964 passed by the eighty-eighth Congress. Both parties in 
the House almost unanimously approve the measure. The Senate 
in the two amendments and passage vote has different party 
voting. On passage, for example, 82.8 percent of the Demo­
crats and only 38.7 percent of the Republicans were for the 
measure. These Amendments of 1964 included a medical care 
title which died in conference. The Amendments of 1965 go 
through two roll calls in the House and thirteen votes in 
the Senate. These amendments continued the trend of 
'liberalizing' benefits and Federal matching ratios to the 
States. They differed from previous amendments in that pro­
tection against medical costs for those over 65 were finally 
provided in part. On the passage vote (House roll call 
number 35 and Senate number 67), it is seen that Republicans 
were badly split in both Chambers on the measure with a Rice 
Index of Cohesion in the House at 5.2 and 9.1 in the Senate, 
showing that they were not unified as a party on this measure 
dealing with medical care (something they had been.fighting 
many years). The extension of unemployment compensation in 
1966 saw no trouble in the House but was a very controversial 
measure in the Senate, as there were thirteen votes to amend 
the measure. As the Amendments of 1964, it too died in the 
conference committee.
The lowest average cohesion was registered for the 
Southern Democrats in the House on social security roll
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calls in the Great Society period. Senate Democrats from 
the West-North-Central part of the country were the least 
cohesive. House Republicans showed the least average cohe­
siveness in Alaska and Hawaii ("Other" in Table 30). House 
Republicans being least cohesive in the Mid-Atlantic States 
on amendments during these years.
TABLE XXX
HOUSE AND SENATE AVERAGE COHESION BY PARTY AND
REGION FOR THE GREAT SOCIETY YEARS
Region
Democrat Republican
House Senate House Senate
New England 98.1 83.4 94.1 44.2
Mid-Atlantic 100.0 87.9 92.1 39.2
East-North-Central 98.4 62.6 74.5 70.3
West-North-Central 94.2 50.2 85.2 64.2
South 62.7 60.5 74.4 94.5
Border 92.0 70.8 84.4 75.8
Mountain 90.9 72.3 95.8 71.6
Pacific 99.2 94.8 74.5 72.7
Other 100.0 85.5 25.0 65.5
The Nation 83.7 52.9 70.2 53.4
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Social Security Performance
Inheriting a style and a tempo from the New Frontier 
period, the Great Society continued to attempt to legislate 
on behalf of certain ideals. These ideals included civil 
rights and opportunity for all. The politics of the cold war 
was replaced in part by the politics of a poverty war. As 
Herbert Hoover had invoked the war metaphor vowing that 
poverty would be wiped from the land, Lyndon B. Johnson once 
again used war as part of his program slogan. But the con­
ditions were different in that Hoover was in the midst of 
depression and Johnson was in the midst of 'prosperity.'
The statistics and action that led to the Economic Oppor­
tunity Act of 1964 convinced the nation that it had not yet 
achieved affluence— for some maybe, but not for all.9
The Socialist Laborites in their platform attacked 
the War on Poverty as announced in Johnson's State of the 
Union message in early 1964. The Socialist-Workers in a 
less 'radical' platform sound much like the Socialist Party 
of previous years. Democrats said little about future plans 
in 1964 so there is little to compare. One could imagine that 
they would continue with the program begun with the Kennedy 
New Frontier in style. The three legislative roll calls 
considered above show this to be the case. Republicans 
resort to part-techniques in their platform such as tax- 
incentives to help needy old-agers to meet the costs of 
medical care. Seemingly there is a contradiction because 
they also call for full coverage of all medical and hospital
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costs for needy elderly people in addition to tax incentives. 
Tax incentives versus full coverage for the needy and their 
medical coverage puts a burden on the definition of 'needy' 
and results in a needs test— something which the Democrats 
would like to do away with, at least in the old-age category 
of social security.
The discovery or rediscovery of poverty by intellec­
tuals, politicians and scholars in the New Frontier-Great 
Society Period might be considered to be a concrete criticism 
of the nation's social security program. Even though it is 
a different approach it is the same problem: individuals,
aggregates, or groups of people unable to get enough income 
or public services (education included) to keep up with the 
ever-rising American standard of living. For example, in 
the area of old-age and survivor's insurance and old-age 
assistance one would find that the income received under 
these programs puts these pensioners and recipients under 
the 'poverty-line. ' Whereas, in the New Deal one-third of 
the nation was ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed— in 
poverty— in the New Deal-Great Society one-fifth of the 
nation was said to be in the same state of affairs. It is a 
moot point whether or not the Social Security Act has been 
able to keep up with providing security and reducing poverty 
in its thirty-three year history.
In any case, approximately one year after the Office 
of Economic Opportunity was created by law, the Social 
Security Administration was called upon to administer the
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Social Security Amendments of 1965. These amendments had, 
at last, a medical care program— something the liberal wing 
of the Democratic Party had been advocating vociferously 
since the end of World War II. This is not to say that it 
was an omnibus package of medical care for all the American 
people; rather it was limited to those covered under the 
Social Security Act provisions and over 65 and it entailed 
complex provisos and requirements for the aged. This first 
national health insurance program for the American had two 
basic components: (1) a basic plan affording protection
against the costs of hospital and related care, and (2) a 
voluntary supplementary plan covering payments for physician's 
services and other medical and health services. In addition 
to these health provisions these Amendments liberalized 
benefits in many of the Social Security Act titles and at 
the same time increasing the contribution rate schedule.^
The issue of unemployment compensation in 1966 (HR 
15119) considered in roll calls 37 in the House and roll 
calls 69 to 82 was to be one of the most heavily lobbied in 
1966. It died in the conference committee after both Houses 
passed the measure.-*-^ The issue was over Federal-State 
relationship— Federal standards for State uneirployment bene­
fits. The next and last important performance on the issue 
of social security by the government during the Great Society 
Period was the Amendments of 1967.
The passage of the Amendments of 1967 by over ninety- 
nine percent of each party in the House and some ninety-six
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percent of the Senate Democrats and some eighty-five percent 
of the Senate Republicans is an indication of the inter­
party agreement on the provisions of these Amendments. When 
President Johnson signed this bill into law on January 2, 
1968, he said that the bill brought more dollars of insurance 
benefits to Americans than all previous bills since social 
security was launched in 1935.-^ Most of the titles were 
amended in a more 'liberal' direction with increased benefits 
and new eligibility standards; but, at the same time there 
was an increase in the contribution and benefit base for 
financing these provisions. Changes in the welfare and child 
health provisions were varied in that some are 'forward' but 
others are restrictive and controversial.^ President 
Johnson1s Administrative proposals were 'trimmed' by the 
House Ways and Means Committee and he was not altogether 
pleased with the bill as it stood. One almost sees evidence 
of a quid pro quo in the bill: on the one hand benefits
under the old-age insurance title are the greatest in thirty- 
three years; but on the other hand, the child welfare pro­
visions were restrictive. When signing the bill he stated:
The welfare system today pleases no one. It is 
criticized by liberals and conservatives, by the 
poor and the wealthy, by social workers and poli­
ticians, by whites and by Negroes in every area of 
the nation. My recommendations to the Congress 
this year sought to make basic changes in the system.
Some of these recommendations were not adopted by 
the Congress. In their place, the Congress substi­
tuted severe restrictions.15
He concludes this statement with what were his last
on any Social Security Law amendment:
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Over the last third of a century in America we 
have proved that people who earn their living can 
make their lives better and more secure if they 
divert part of their incomes to protect them­
selves from the twists of fortune that face all 
men. Our challenge for the coming years is to 
see if we can extend that same human insurance 
and human dignity to persons who are not able to 
buy their own protection. Our challenge is to 
save children. ^-6
So we come back to the remarks made by President 
Roosevelt's Committee on Economic Security in 1934 which 
stated that the core of any social plan must be for the 
child (pages 45-46 above). These Amendments of 1967 which 
expand social insurance for the aging and restrict welfare 
provisions for the young, do so with near to unanimous 
voting in both Houses by both parties. We will address our­
selves to this observation in the last chapter.
Summary
Part of President Johnson's program for the Great 
Society was the War on Poverty and the Social Security Amend­
ments during his tenure. In a concrete sense they were a 
continuation of John F . Kennedy's intentions according to 
the Democratic Party tradition as set forth by President 
Roosevelt's New Deal back in 1933. These aspects of 
Johnson's Great Society were the result of long debate over 
many years. The Social Security Act underwent continuous 
modification with amendments in 1964, 1965, and 1967. The 
omnibus Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was Johnson's 
counter-part to Roosevelt's Social Security Act. Just as 
the Social Security Act of 1935 was in danger of surviving
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before the Second World War, Johnson's Economic Opportunity 
Act of 1964 is in danger of being dismantled. We may con­
sider the Economic Opportunity Act to be a criticism of the 
social security provisions of this nation. (The Federal 
Census of 1960 showed two things: the first was that many
people still do not have the jobs, income, and standard, of 
living ingredient in an affluent society; and second that 
many of these people are not covered by the provisions of
the Social Security Act; furthermore, those that are covered
1 7are still in poverty.)x/ Even though this Act focused 
explicitly and specifically on the lack of opportunity among 
those in 'poverty,' the reasoning behind the provisions were 
explicitly grounded on the lack of income by these people. 
The Social Security Act is primarily concerned with pro­
viding income to the people. The political party platforms 
recognized this poverty in the midst of plenty and the roll 
calls and performance show the party accomplishments on the 
matter.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER VII
^Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson, National Party 
Platforms: 1840-1964 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1966), p. 641.
A Presidential speech at the University of Michigan 
in Ann Arbor on May 22, 1964.
■^This war was formally declared in President Johnson' s 
first State of the Union message. The issue of whether 
Preside*n±—Johnson or President Kennedy started the war is 
discussed in John C. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty (New 
York: Pegasus, 1967), pp. 17-26.
^Porter and Johnson, op,, cit., p. 698.
^Ibid., p. 662.
^Ibid.. p. 683.
^The Republican candidate in 1964, Barry Goldwater, 
crusaded for an end to compulsory social security as an 
invasion of personal freedom. The reaction to his remarks 
revealed once and for all that it is a mistake for a politi- 
can to talk against a program which has become a part of the 
American way of life.
^We have not commented on the so-called "closed” rule 
of the House of Representatives which does not allow amend­
ments by Congressmen from the floor on bills coming under 
this rule. This gives tremendous power to the Committee on 
Ways and Means which controls social security legislation. 
With this particular rule the Committee can act as a 'gate­
keeper ' on the hundreds of bills it takes into consideration 
each year on social security. It becomes the sole judge of 
what it calls a 'clean' bill. According to Charles Hawkins 
in the Office of Legislative Affairs for the newly-created 
Social and Rehabilitation Service of the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare: "The Committee will not bring a bill
out that's going to leave footprints on the walls of Con­
gress. . . . Committee prestige is at stake." (In a private 
interview with the writer.)
^The documentation— both expository and critical— on 
the War on Poverty and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 
is extensive. One account is in Robert M. Kloss, "The War 
on Poverty in the United States: The War to End All Wars,"
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The Concept of 'Poverty' in Sociology: A Profile of Poverty
in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana (unpublished Master's 
thesis, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 1967), 
pp. 34-57.
•^The writer has never been able to find statistics 
which show the number of people considered to be in a state 
of 'poverty' and receive benefits under the Social Security 
Act.
-^Wilbur J. Cohen and Robert M. Ball, "Social Security 
Amendments of 1965: Summary and Legislative History,” Social
Security Bulletin (September, 1965), pp. 3-21.
12Concrressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XXII (1966), 
published by the Congressional Quarterly Service, Inc., 
Washington, D. C., pp. 831, 966-68, 1294.
13Wilbur J. Cohen and Robert M. Ball, "Social Security 
Amendments of 1967: Summary and Legislative History,"
Social Security Bulletin (February, 1968), pp. 3-19.
^Charles e . Hawkins, "The Social Security Amendments 
of 1967: Legislative History and Summary of Welfare and
Child Health Provisions," Welfare in Review (May-June, 1968),
p. 1.
l^Ibid., p. 20. 
l^Ibid., p. 21.
1 ^ Poverty was hidden to the extent to which the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Social 
Security Administration had no contact or statistics on many 
people with low incomes.
CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY
Considerations
We have considered five periods in the history of the 
Social Security Act of 1935 according to party platforms, 
proposals and roll call performance. These five periods, 
conforming to the tenure of five Presidents and seventeen 
Congressional sessions cover over thirty-three years of 
legislative history on one Act. It is difficult or even 
impossible to detail all the aspects— philosophical, 
theoretical, and humanitarian; financial, administrative, 
social, economic, and political; statistical, actuarial, 
medical, and legal— because it is a controversial and dynamic 
issue with frequent changes at both Federal and State legis­
lative levels.
The role of political parties in the framing and 
amending of this Act has been the general indicator of polit­
ical tendencies. The platform planks and legislative roll 
calls were considered as the more specific indicators of 
party behavior. A  longitudinal analysis of their promises 
and performance was attempted. All the platform planks on 
the issue of social security and all the roll calls on the 
Social Security Act constitute the sample. Planks were
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subjected to a content analysis and roll calls were indi­
vidually analyzed according to the number of legislators for 
and against social security. To see the degree to which the 
parties were unified on these votes, the Rice Index of 
Cohesion was computed on each roll call and on the total 
number of roll calls for each period. In addition a regional 
breakdown of cohesiveness was attempted.
Conclusions
Assuming that political parties are the more organized 
component of the less-organized social movement, it was found 
upon the analysis of political party planks in the United 
States that this issue constituted a major party concern 
over the whole thirty-three-year time period of the study. 
Whereas, all parties accept the idea of social security, 
when they get down to specific proposals upon which to get 
votes they differentiate themselves. True to the American 
two-party tradition, Democrats and Republicans competed for 
power while the several 'third' parties stood in the wings, 
as it were, out of the competition except for a small brief 
success in the thirties.
The Democratic Party, at a height of power in terms 
of numbers in Congress, instrumentalized or effectuated an 
omnibus social security law which purportedly brought a 
comprehensive social security program to the United States. 
Down through the thirty-three-year history, they have claimed 
the program as their own party accomplishment. Republicans
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and in some ,}cases Southern Democrats reluctantly accepted
L
the idea of social security for the parliamentary right to 
structure and limit that idea according to the institutional 
history of the United States.
Figure 10, dealing with party percentages for passage 
on social security in the House for the period of our study, 
reveals that over eighty percent of both Democrats and 
Republicans are for the social security bill in question from 
the 1935 Act to the 1961 Amendments. The Democrats continue 
with over eighty percent of their party supporting these 
bills all the way through the Great Society; but, House 
Republicans drop to less than sixty percent support on 
the 1962 Amendments forty-seven percent for the 1965 Amend­
ments . Figure 11 shows party percentages for the Senate.
The Democratic 'line of support' is consistent throughout 
the thirty-three years with the Republicans diverging in 
1935, 1939, 1964, and 1965. The lowest degree of support 
registered in the Amendments of 1964 and 1965 must be related 
to the medical care components of these bills— an issue 
which seems to divide the parties more than any other. The 
high degree of Senators and Congressmen of both parties for 
these social security measures can be accounted for by the 
nature of the bills presented to the two Chambers for final 
voting. Said another way, the content is set up for passage 
without problems. The consequence of such high agreement is 
a Social Security Act that started out narrow in scope and 
that has only been expanded incrementally— in some measure,
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PARTY PERCENTAGES FOR PASSAGE ON SOCIAL SECURITY: SENATE
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even tokenly— over the last thirty-three years.
Figures 12 and 13 summarize the average party cohe­
sion. Figures 14 and 15 summarize the party cohesion by 
weighting the differing number of legislators present in each 
of the roll calls of each period. These figures reveal a 
different profile than that of the percentages for social 
security considered in Figures 10 and 11. Focusing on the 
Average Index of Cohesion, it is observed that the average 
Democratic Party cohesion is higher in the House than in the 
Senate for the roll call votes considered (with the excep­
tion of the Fair Deal where there is a difference of one- 
tenth of a point). The highest degree of party cohesiveness 
on social security for the House Democrats was during the 
New Frontier years (97.1) with a somewhat lower degree for 
the New Deal and Great Society (86.6 and 83.7, respectively). 
The Republicans of the House exhibited their highest degree 
of cohesiveness during the Cold War period as might be 
expected, but showed almost as much party solidarity, as 
measured by the Index, in the New Deal. Lower cohesiveness 
is seen for the Fair Deal, New Frontier, and Great Society 
periods for the House Republicans. In the Senate there is 
some reversal of average cohesiveness. The lowest degree of 
average cohesiveness is registered for the New Deal and 
Great Society periods for the Republicans, whereas higher 
cohesiveness prevails in the Fair Deal and New Frontier 
years for this party. The Democratic Senators show a rela­
tively stable average cohesiveness through all the periods
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*See Appendix H.
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*See Appendix H.
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with the exception of the Great Society where they go down 
to 52.9.
Focusing on the Weighted Index of Cohesiveness for 
each period, different results appear in Figures 14 and 15 
(see Appendix H). In the House, Figure 14, Democrats regis­
ter the highest weighted cohesiveness in the New Deal and 
New Frontier periods with a low in the Great Society years. 
House Republicans are considerably lower on weighted cohe­
siveness in the New Deal, Fair Deal, and New Frontier, even 
registering a negative weighting in the Fair Deal, meaning 
that they were more against than for the measures during 
this period. The greatest differences in party cohesiveness 
between the parties is seen to be in the New Deal and New 
Frontier periods. In the Senate, Figure 15, Democrats show 
much less weighted cohesiveness than they did as a party in 
the House. Party cohesiveness is highest in the New Deal 
and Cold War and lowest in the Fair Deal and Great Society. 
Republican Senators show a dramatic shift in their weighted 
cohesiveness on these social security measures between the 
New Deal and Fair Deal periods. These Senators go from a 
weighted cohesiveness of 58.5 for social security to 57.0 
against social security. Then they are almost split in half 
in the three following periods on the social security roll 
calls considered. Said another way, weighted Republican 
party cohesion is relatively high in the first two periods 
and almost non-existent in the three latter periods.
A comparison of the Average Rice Index with the
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Weighted Rice index shows the results to be different under 
each manipulation; i.e., they reveal differences in party 
tendencies. Roughly the same profile is evident for both 
Democrats and Republicans in the House for the five periods 
except that Republicans show somewhat less cohesiveness on 
the Weighted index than on the Average index. For example,
New Deal Democrats and Republicans have about the same party 
cohesiveness according to the Average index but are widely 
apart according to the Weighted index. The difference may 
be accounted by the fact that the Weighted Index accounts 
for both the differences in the numbers of Congressmen voting 
and the direction of the vote; whereas, the Average index 
does not. The Weighted index brings out the negative 
reaction of House Republicans of the Fair Deal to the social 
security measures of the New Deal and Democratic Party (the 
negative weighted average shown in Figure 14). It also yields 
a lower degree of cohesiveness in general when compared to 
the Average Index. In the Senate, the comparison of these 
two ways of averaging roll calls for the five periods of the 
study results in a wider difference than in the House. On 
the whole the Weighted index registers lower party cohesion 
in the Senate for both parties. The two profiles in Figures 
13 and 15 are at considerable variance, however. Weighted 
cohesiveness against social security by the Republicans is 
revealed by the negative numbers for the Fair Deal, Cold War 
and Great Society years. Democratic Senators according to 
the Average Party Cohesion profile show stable cohesiveness
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as a party; but, according to the Weighted Index Fair Deal 
Democratic Senators are split. This result more closely 
approximates the split of the Democrats and Dixiecrats 
during the Fair Deal. Finally, Cold War weighted cohesive­
ness on social security legislation in the Senate returns to 
the New Deal level and then begins a tendency downward.
One observation is necessary before listing the polit­
ical tendencies observed in this limited study. Cohesiveness 
varies somewhat with administrations (and major social issues 
in historical setting) in both parties and in both chambers. 
What this cohesiveness, variance, and difference means then 
is subject to a proviso in making inferences from 'party 
cohesiveness1 on any legislation. This proviso is the 
acceptance of a legislator's party as a significant categori­
cal determinant of his voting behavior. This study has 
accepted the idea that party is an important indicator of 
legislative behavior, albeit, not the only indicator. This 
acceptance permitted the use of legislative roll calls and 
party platforms as indicators of political tendencies in the 
general social movement framework suggested in Chapter I.
The following political tendencies have been observed 
in this study:
1. Ideas on social security begin in the more 'radi­
cal ' party platform planks; then appear in the Democratic 
platform; then are partially integrated into the Republican 
platform.
2. Both major parties accept the narrow scope of the
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original Social Security Act and both seek to widen this 
scope incrementally through a process of 'liberalization.'
3. There is agreement between what the major parties 
promise in their planks and what they deliver, although they 
do not promise much.
4. Both major parties give more than majority support 
for the final 'clean' bills put before them by Congressional 
Committees.
5. Average party cohesion by presidential periods is 
higher for House Democrats than for Senate Democrats; Repub­
lican average cohesiveness varies inversely— when high in 
the House is low in the Senate.
6. Weighted party cohesion by presidential periods 
reveals House Democrats to be more cohesive than Senate 
Democrats.
7. Weighted Republican cohesiveness is generally 
lower than for the Democrats on social security legislation.
8. Weighted Republican cohesiveness against social 
security is registered in the Fair Deal years for both 
chambers and in the Cold War and Great Society years for the 
Senate chamber.
9. Regional analysis of cohesiveness revealed no 
observable tendencies.
After all the rhetorical sound and parliamentary fury, 
it must be concluded that the Social Security Act contains a 
minimum amount of 'reform.' The two major parties accepted 
the international idea of social security in turn for the
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parliamentary right to structure and limit that idea accord­
ing to their perception of the institutional history of the 
United States. The resulting program has been a bi-partisan 
coalition for the least common denominator of change. Sig­
nificant social security proposals of the 'third' parties 
are an important source of both ideas and criticism but have 
been restructured in a 'conservative' way resulting in com­
plex tokenism and postponement of needed social security 
legislation.
167
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER VIII
^William Haber and Wilbur J. Cohen, Social Security: 
Programs, Problems. and Policies (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1960), p. v.
- 2In terms of Rudolf Heberle's tripartite division 
between social movement, political party, and social class, 
we have limited the discussion to party and its relationship 
to movement. See Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements: An
Introduction to Political Sociology (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951), pp. 143-91.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF SHIFTS IN SOCIAL THOUGHT CONCERNING THE 
"POOR" IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY*
The Past: Pre- The Present:
French and Post French and
Industrial Industrial
Revolutions Revolutions
Status Contract
Social Gemeinschaft Gessellschaft
Relations Particularistic Universalistic
Subjective Objective (subj.)
Non-problematic Problematic
Prevailing Legitimate Illegitimate
Attitudes Sacred Secular
Unrecognized Recognized
"Paupers" "Poverty"
Inegalitarian Egalitarian
Order Tendencies
Individual Individual and
Causes Social
Fate Society (group)
Natural Functional
Responsibility Local
Community
State
Cures Partial Total
Private Public (priv.)
Charity Relief
Doles Assistance
Institutional Noninstitutional
— Compensation,
““  *■" Pension, In­
surance
— Services
— Guaranteed income
*It should be noted that this table is designed simply 
to indicate which concepts function descriptively in these 
periods of time; i.e., meanings are not precise.
Source: Robert Marsh Kloss, "The Concept of 'Poverty'
in Sociology: A Profile of Poverty in East Baton Rouge
Parish, Louisiana." Unpublished Master's Thesis, Louisiana 
State University, January, 1967, p. 20.
APPENDIX B 
CONGRESS AND PARTY: 1928 TO 1968a
Election
Year
Congress
Elected
House Senate
Members Elected Gains/Losses Members Elected Gains/Losses
Dem. Rep. Misc. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Misc. Dem. Rep.
1928 71st 163 267 1 -32 +30 39 56 1 - 8 + 8
1930 72nd 216 218 1 +53 -49 47 48 1 + 8 - 8
1932 73rd 313 117 5 +97 -101 59 36 1 +12 -12
1934 74th 322 103 10 + 9 -14 69 25 2 +10 -11
1936 75 th 333 89 13 +11 -14 75 17 4 + 6 - 8
1938 76 th 262 169 4 -71 +80 69 23 4 - 6 + 6
1940 77 th 267 162 6 + 5 - 7 66 28 2 - 3 + 5
1942 78 th 222 209 4 -45 +47 57 38 1 - 9 +10
1944 79th 243 190 2 +21 -19 57 38 1 0 0
1946 80th 188 246 1 -55 +56 45 51 -12 +13
1948 81st 263 171 1 +75 -75 54 42 + 9 - 9
1950 82nd 234 199 2 -29 +28 48 47 1 - 6 + 5
1952 83rd 213 221 1 -21 +22 47 48 1 - 1 + 1
1954 84th 232 203 +19 -18 48 47 1 + 1 - 1
1956 85 th 234 201 + 2 - 2 49 47 + 1 0
1958 86th 283 154 +49 -47 66 34 +17 -13
1960 87th 263 174 T_. -20 +20 64 36 - 2 + 2
1962 88th 258 176 lb - 4 + 2 68 32 + 4 - 4
1964 89 th 295 140 +38 -38 67 33 + 2 - 2
1966 90th 248 187 -47 +47 64 36 - 3 + 3
1968 91st 243 192 - 4 + 4 58 42 - 5 + 5
aSource: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, No. 30, Part I, July 26, 1968,
p. 1856.
^Vacancy.
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APPENDIX C
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF OTHER LAWS RELATING TO 
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACTa
Date and Description Content
Act of April 9, 1912 
Trading With the Enemy 
Act of 1917 
Wagner-Peyser Act of 
June 6, 1933 
Railroad Retirement Act 
of 1935 
Railroad Retirement Act 
of 1937 
Railroad Unemployment
Insurance Act of June 25, 
1938
Act of August 11, 1939 
Act of August 13, 1940 
Act of March 24, 1943
Reorganization Plan #2 
1946
Act of May 26, 1948
Reorganization Plan #2
1949
Internal Securities Act
1950
Act of April 19, 1950
Reorganization Plan #19 
1950
Act of October 30, 1951 
Reorganization Plan #1 
1953
Act of September 1, 1954
Vocational Rehabilitation 
Amendments of 1954 
Compensation Act of 1958 
Peace Corps Act, September 
22, 1961 
Manpower Development and 
Training Act of 1962 
Trade Expansion Act of 
1962
Established Children's Bureau 
Amended, relating to business 
employment status 
Established u. S. Employment 
service
Relating to hurricane work 
Relating to coal mining 
Relating to employment for War 
shipping Administration
Amended, Civil Air Patrol 
employment
Selected provisions
State plans for public assis­
tance to Indians
Relating to railroad retirement
As amended, to prohibit pay­
ments to convicted persons 
Amendments, selected provisions
Selected provisions
Selected provisions
aSource: Compilation of the Social Security Laws,
House of Representatives, Document No. 266, Government 
Printing Office, 1968, Vol. II, pp. 705-971.
APPENDIX C (CONTINUED)
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Date and Description______
Farm Labor Contract Registra­
tion Act of 1963 
Civil Rights Act of 1964
Economic Opportunity Act 
of 1964 
Act of October 3, 1965 
Automotive Products Trade 
Act of 1965 
Public Works and Economic 
Development Act of 1965 
Title 5: U. S. Code, 1966
Title 18: U. S. Code
Title 38: U. S. Code
Immigration and Nation­
ality Act 
International Organizations 
Immunities Act
Content
Title VI, nondiscrimination 
in Federally assisted 
programs
Retirement and unemployment 
compensation in the 
government 
Crime and criminal pro­
cedure 
Veteran 1s benefits 
As amended, selected pro­
visions 
Selected provisions
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APPENDIX D
PUBLIC LAWS AMENDING THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACTa
Public
Law
Number
Congress Date
Approved
Short Title
722 75th 6-25-38 Railroad Unemployment Insurance 
Act
36 76th 4-19-39
141 76th 6-20-39
379 76th 8-10-39 Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1939
17 78 th 3-24-43
235 78th 2-25-43 Passed over veto
285 78 th 4- 4-44
410 78th 7- 1-44 Public Health Service Act
458 78 th 10- 3-44 War Mobilization & Reconversion 
Act
201 79 th 10-23-45
291 79 th 12-29-45 International Organizations 
Immunities Act
719 79 th 8-10-46 Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1946
239 80th 7-25-47
379 80th 8- 6-47 Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1947
492 80th 4-20-48 Passed over veto
642 80th 6-14-48 Passed over veto
174 81st 7-16-49
734 81st 8-28-50 Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1950
814 81st 9-23-50 Revenue Act of 1950
78 82nd 7-12-51
420 82nd 6-28-52
590 82nd 7-18-52 Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1952
269 83rd 8-14-53
279 83rd 8-15-53
567 83rd 8- 5-54 Employment Security Administra­
tive Financing Act of 1954
761 83rd 9- 1-54 Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1954
767 83rd 9- 1-54
325 84th 8- 9-55
880 84th 8- 1-56 Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1956
881 84th 8- 1-56 Servicemen1s & Veterans' Sur- 
vivers Benefits Act
26 85th 4-25-57
109 85th 7-15-57
110 85th 7-15-57
aSource: Compilation of the Social Security Laws,
House of Representatives, Document No. 266, Government Print­
ing Office, 1968, Vol. I, pp. 479-80.
226
227
229
238
239
441
785
786
787
798
840
848
857
927
7
70
168
284
346
415
442
507
624
778
6
31
64
256
262
293
543
878
31
48
156
272
345
347
350
382
180
APPENDIX D (CONTINUED)
Congress Date
Approved
Short Title
85th 8-30-57
85 th 8-30-57
85th 8-30-57
85th 8-30-57
85th 8-30-57
85th 6- 4-58
85th 8-27-58
85th 8-27-58
85th 8-27-58
85th 8-28-58
85th 8-28-58
85th 8-28-58
85th 9- 2-58
85th 9- 6-58
86th 3-31-59
86th 6-25-59
86th 8-18-59
86th 9-16-59
86th 9-22-59
86th 4- 8-60
86th 4-22-60
86 th 6-11-60
86th 7-12-60
86th 9-13-60
87th 3-24-61
87th 5- 8-61
87th 6-30-61
87th 9-21-61
87th 9-21-61
87th 9-22-61
87th 7-25-62
87th 10-24-62
88 th 5-29-63
88th 6-49-63
88 th 10-24-63
88th 2-26-64
88th 6-30-64
88th 6-30-64
88th 7- 2-64
88th 7-23-64
Temporary Unemployment Compensa­
tion Act of 1958
Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1958 
Ex-Servicemen's Unemployment 
Compensation Act of 1958
Alaska Omnibus Act 
Farm Credit Act of 1959
Public Health Service Commission 
Corps Personnel Act of 1960
Hawaii Omnibus Act 
Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1960 
Temporary Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Act of 1961
Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1961 
Mutual Educational & Cultural 
Exchange Act of 1961
Peace Corps Act 
Public Welfare Am. of 1962
Maternal & Child Health & Mental 
Retardation Planning Am. of 1963 
Revenue Act of 1964
452
641
650
97
236
253
368
384
713
36
97
248
181
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Congress Date Short Title
_________Approved__________
88th 8-20-64 Economic Opportunity Act of
1964
88th 10-13-64
88th 10-13-64
89 th 7-30-65 Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1965
89 th 10- 3-65
89th 10- 9-65 Economic Opportunity Am. of
1965
89 th 3-15-66 Tax Adjustment Act of 1966
89 th 4- 8-66
89 th 11- 2-66
90th 6-29-67
90th 9-30-67
90th 1- 2-68 Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1967
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
APPENDIX E
SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS IN THE HOUSE: 1935-1968
Yeas Bill Vote
Against Number Date Description
X HR7260 4-19-35 Treadway Motion Social Security Act of 1935
HR7260 4-19-35 Passage
HR6635 6-10-39 Passage. Amendments of 1939
X HJ 296 2-27-48 Passage of Status Quo posture on Social 
Security
X HJ 296 6-14-48 Passage over Veto for Status Quo
HRes372 10- .4-49 Resolution on HR6000: Amendments of 1950
HRes372 10- 4-49 Resolution Agreement: Amendments of 1950
X HR6000 10- 5-49 Mason Motion. Amendments of 1950
HR6000 10- 5-49 Passage. Amendments of 1950
X HR6000 8-16-50 Byrnes Recommital. Amendments of 1950
HR6000 8-16-50 Conference Report. Amendments of 1950
HR5118 10- 4-51 Unemployment Compensation Amendments to 
Social Security
HR7800 5-19-52 Title II Amendment Motion Amendments to 
Social Security
HR7800 6-17-52 Passage of Title II Amendments
HRes568 6- 1-54 Resolution for Social Security Amendments
HR9366 6- 1-54 Passage Social Security Amendments
X HR9709 7- 8-54 Forand Motion. Unemployment Compensation
HR9709 7- 8-54 Passage Unemployment Compensation
HR7225 7-18-55 Passage Amendments of 1956
X HR12065 6- 1-58 Herlong Amendment. Unemployment Compensation
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21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)
Yeas
Against
Bill
Number
Vote
Date Description
X
X
HR12065 6- 1-58
HR13549 7-31-58
HR12580 6-23-60
HR12580 6-23-60
HR 4806 3- 1-61
HR 4806 3-22-61
HR 6027 4-20-61
HR10606 3-15-62
HR10606 3-15-62
HR10606 7-19-62
HR 8821 10-22-63
HR11865 7-29-64
HR11865 7-29-64
HR 6675 4- 8-65
HR 6675 4- 8-65
HR 6675 7-26-65
HR15119 6-22-66
HR12080 8-17-67
HR12080 12-13-67
Passage Unemployment Compensation 
Passage Amendments of 1958 
Passage Amendments of 1960 
Conference Report Amendments of 1960 
Passage Temporary Unemployment Compensation: 
1961
Conference Report Unemployment Compensation: 
1961
Passage Amendments of 1961
Byrnes Motion. Welfare Amendments of 1962
Passage Welfare Amendments of 1962
Conference Report Welfare Amendments of 1962
Title XII Temporary Unemployment Compensation
Closed Rule Amendments of 1964
Passage Amendments of 1964
Byrnes Motion. Amendments of 1965
Passage Amendments of 1965
Conference Report Amendments of 1965
Passage Extension of Unemployment Compensation
Passage Amendments of 1967
Conference Report Amendments of 1967
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Call
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
APPENDIX F
SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS IN THE SENATE: 1935-1968
Yeas Bill Vote
Against Number______Date____________________ Description
X HR7260 6-19-35 Clark Amendment Social Security Act of 1935
X HR7260 6-19-35 Borah Amendment Social Security Act of 1935
X HR7260 6-19-35 Hastings Amendment Social Security Act of 1935
HR7260 6-19-35 Passage Social Security Act of 1935
HR6635 7-11-39 Civil Service Amendment : Amendments of 1939
HR6635 7-11-39 Appropriations Amendments of 1939
HR6635 7-11-39 Appropriations Amendments of 1939
HR6635 7-12-39 Connelly Amendment Amendments of 1939
HR6635 7-12-39 Lee Amendment Amendments of 1939
HR6635 7-13-39 Downey Motion Amendments of 1939
HR6635 7-13-39 Johnson (Colo.) Amendment Amendments of 1939
HR6635 7-13-39 Passage Amendments of 1939
X HJ 296 6- 4-48 McFarland Amendment Status Quo on Social 
Security
X HJ 296 6- 4-48 Passage
X HJ 296 6-14-48 Passage over Veto
HR6000 6-20-50 Meyers Amendment Amendments of 1950
X HR6000 6-20-50 Knowland Amendment Amendments of 1950
HR6000 6-20-50 Long Amendment Amendments of 1950
HR6000 6-20-50 Passage Amendments of 1950
HR7225 7-16-56 Long Amendment Amendments of 1956
HR7225 7-17-56 George Amendment Amendments of 1956
HR7225 7-17-56 Pastore Amendment Amendments of 1956
HR7225 7-17-56 Kerr Amendment Amendments of 1956
HR7225 7-17-56 Douglas Amendment Amendments of 1956
HR7225 7-17-56 Passage Amendments of 1956
HR12065 5-27-58 Kennedy Amendment Temp . Unemp. Conpensation
HR12065 5-28-58 Kennedy Amendment Temp . Unemp. Compensation
HR12065 5-28-58 Kennedy Amendment Temp . Unemp. Compensation
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Call
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
APPENDIX F (CONTINUED)
Yeas
Against
Bill
Number
Vote
Date Description
X
X
X
X
HR12065 5-28-58
HR12065 5-28-58
HR12065 6-28-58
HR12065 6-28-58
HR13549 8-16-58
HR13549 8-16-58
HR 5640 3-25-59
HR 5640 3-25-59
HR12580
HR12580
HR12580
HR12580 8-23-60
HR12580
HR 4806 3-16-61
HR 4806 3-16-61
HR 4806 3-16-61
HR 4806 3-16-61
HR 6027 6-26-61
HR 6027 6-26-61
HR 6027 6-26-61
HR10606 7-12-62
HR10606 7-13-62
HR10606 7-17-62
HR10117 10- 5-62
Long Amendment Temp. Unemp. Compensation 
Knowland Amendment Temp. Unemp. Compensation 
Cooper Amendment Temp. Unemp. Compensation 
Passage Temp. Unemp. Compensation
Yarborough Amendment Amendments of 1958
Passage Amendments of 1958
Extension (1960) Temp. Unemp. Compensation 
Extension (1959) Temp. Unemp. Compensation 
Javits Substitution Amendments of 1960
Anderson Amendment Amendments of 1960
Long Amendment Amendments of 1960
Passage Amendments of 1960
Conference Report Amendments of 1960
Financial Committee Amendment Temporary 
Unemployment Compensation 
Financial Committee Amendment Temporary 
Unemployment Compensation 
Williams Amendment Temp. Unemp. Compensation 
Passage Temp. Unemp. Compensation
Hartke Substitution Amendments of 1961
Cotton Amendment Amendments of 1961
Passage Amendments of 1961
Saltenstall Substitution Public Welfare 
Amendments of 1962 
Push Substitution Public Welfare Amendments 
of 1962
Kerr Tabling Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 
McCarthy Amendment Extend Unemployment Com­
pensation 185
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Call
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
APPENDIX F (CONTINUED)
Yeas
Against
Bill
Number
Vote
Date Description
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
HR11865 
HR11865 
HR11865 
HR 6675 
HR 6675 
HR 6675 
HR 6675 
HR 6675 
HR 6675 
HR 6675 
HR 6675 
HR 6675 
HR 6675 
HR 6675 
HR 6675 
HR 6675 
HR15119
HR15119
HR15119
HR15119
HR15119
HR15119
HR15119
HR15119
9- 2-64 
9- 3-64 
9- 3-64 
7- 7-65 
7- 8-65 
7- 8-65 
7- 8-65 
7- 9-65 
7- 9-65 
7- 9-65 
7- 9-65 
7- 9-65 
7- 9-65 
7- 9-65 
7- 9-65
7-28-65
8- 5-66
8- 5-66
8- 5-66
8- 5-66
8- 5-66 
8-  8-66
8-  8-66
8 -  8-66
Gore Amendment 
Prouty Amendment 
Passage
Ribicoff Amendment 
Miller Amendment 
Prouty Amendment 
Curtis Amendment 
Pastore Motion 
Curtis Amendment 
Morton Amendment 
Smathers Motion 
Hartke Amendment 
Curtis Amendment 
Curtis Motion 
Passage
Conference Report
Amendments of 1964 
Amendments of 1964 
Amendments of 1964 
Amendments of 1965 
Amendments of 1965 
Amendments of 1965 
Amendments of 1965 
Amendments of 1965 
Amendments of 1965 
Amendments of 1965 
Amendments of 1965 
Amendments of 1965 
Amendments of 1965 
Amendments of 1965 
Amendments of 1965 
Amendments of 1965
Finance Committee Amendment Unemployment 
Compensation of 1966 
Finance Committee Amendment Unemployment 
Compensation of 1966 
Finance Committee Amendment Unemployment 
Compensation of 1966 
Long Amendment Unemployment Compensation of 
1966
Long Motion Unemployment Compensation of 1966 
Curtis Motion Unemployment Compensation of 
1966
Finance Committee Amendment Unemployment 
Compensation of 1966 
Finance Committee Amendment Unemployment
Compensation of 1966_________________________
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Roll Yeas Bill Vote
DescriptionCall Against Number Date
77 HR15119 8- 8-66 Finance Committee Amendment Unemployment 
Compensation of 1966
78 X HR15119 8- 8-66 Morton Amendment Unemployment Compensation of 
1966
79 HR15119 8- 8-66 Long Amendment Unemployment Compensation of 
1966
80 HR15119 8- 8-66 McCarthy Amendment Unemployment Compensation 
of 1966
81 HR15119 8- 8-66 Long Amendment Unemployment Compensation of 
1966
82 HR15119 8- 8-66 Passage Unemployment Compensation of 1966
83 X HR12080 11-16-67 Dirksen Amendment Amendments of 1967
84 HR12080 11-16-67 Hartke Motion Amendments of 1967
85 HR12080 11-17-67 Prouty/Cotton Amendment Amendments of 1967
86 HR12080 11-17-67 Prouty/Cotton Amendment Amendments of 1967
87 HR12080 11-17-67 Metcalf Amendment Amendments of 1967
88 X HR12080 11-20-67 Kuchel Amendment Amendments of 1967
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
APPENDIX F (CONTINUED)
Yeas Bill Vote ...
Against Number Date_____________________ Description
HR12080 11-20-67 Javits Amendment Amendments of 1967
HR12080 11-20-67 Williams Amendment Amendments of 1967
HR12080 11-20-67 Harris Amendment Amendments of 1967
X HR12080 11-21-67 Williams Amendment Amendments of 1967
X HR12080 11-21-67 Curtis/Williams Amendment Amendments of 1967
HR12080 11-21-67 Ervin Amendment Amendments of 1967
X HR12080 11-21-67 Hartke Motion Amendments of 1967
HR12080 11-21-67 Long Amendment Amendments of 1967
HR12080 11-21-67 Kennedy Amendment Amendments of 1967
HR12080 11-21-67 Hartke/Bayh Amendment Amendments of 1967
HR12080 11-21-67 Williams Amendment Amendments of 1967
HR12080 11-21-67 Kennedy Amendment Amendments of 1967
HR12080 11-21-67 Prouty Amendment Amendments of 1967
HR12080 11-21-67 Miller Amendment Amendments of 1967
X HR12080 11-21-67 Miller Amendment Amendments of 1967
HR12080 11-21-67 Prouty Amendment Amendments of 1967
HR12080 11-21-67 Rayh Amendment Amendments of 1967
HR12080 11-22-67 Passage Amendments of 1967
HR12080 Conference Report Amendments of 1967
188
189
APPENDIX G
POLITICAL PARTY PLATFORM PLANKS ON 
SOCIAL SECURITY: 1932-1964a
1932
There were seven presidential candidates and platforms 
in the 1932 election. The Communist platform, although 
making no specific reference to social security, per se, 
called for unemployment and social insurance at the expense 
of the State and employers (p. 328); and in general claimed 
that the Republican, Democratic, and Socialist parties all 
served the capitalist cause (p. 329). The Democratic plat­
form had a short statement advocating unemployment and old 
age insurance under state laws (underlining added) ending 
their platform with: "Equal rights to all; special privileges
to none" (pp. 331, 333). The Farmer Labor platform plank on 
the domestic security called for unemployment insurance to 
be provided by the funds from Federal and state governments 
as well as from employers and employees; old age pensions 
for the needy by the Federal and state system (pp. 334, 335).
aSource: Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson,
National Party Platforms: 1840-1964 (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1966). Page numbers in parentheses refer to 
this source.
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The Republican Party stated in its platform that the supreme
problem is to break the back of the Depression and to restore
the economic life of the nation (p. 339). The plank on
unemployment and relief said:
True to American traditions and principles of 
government, the administration has regarded the 
relief problem as one of State and local respon­
sibility (p. 341) .
The Socialist platform stated that the poverty, insecurity,
unemployment, waste, and economic collapse was the fault of
the Capitalist order (p. 351). Their plank on "social
security" (although not called this yet by anyone) came under
the title of unemployment and labor legislation. It called
for increased Federal appropriation for relief; a compulsory
system of unemployment compensation with adequate benefits
based on government and employer contributions; old age
pensions for men and women 60 and over; and, health and
maternity insurance (p. 352). The Socialist-Labor Party
wanted to make clear that the economic and social bonds of
capitalism were snapping— ruling class interests eagerly
offer palliatives and reforms to stave off the doom. Every
reform granted by capitalism is a concealed measure of
reaction. This party offered no programs in the area of
domestic security (p. 355) .
1936
In the 1936 campaign platforms centered around what 
the Democratic party had done in the last four years in
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office. The Communist platform said that the New Deal 
failed to protect and restore living standards. Their 
social security plank sought to provide unemployment insur­
ance, old-age pensions and social security for all. (It 
seems that the term "social security" was accepted once and 
for all.) This platform makes specific mention for all to 
support the Frazier-Lundeen Bill which provides compensation 
to all unemployed? pensions for the aged at 60 with rates 
equal to former earnings? and, also a Federal system of 
maternity and health insurance (p. 357). The Democratic 
Party platform of 1936 in its "old-age and social security" 
plank stated:
We have built foundations for the security of those 
who are faced with the hazards of unemployment and 
old-age? for the orphaned, the crippled and the 
blind. On the foundation of the Social Security Act 
we are determined to erect a structure of economic 
security for all our people, making sure that the 
benefit shall keep step with the ever-increasing 
capacity of America to provide a high standard of 
living for all its citizens (p. 360).
The Republican platform, in contrast to the Democratic,
spelled out the social security issue in some detail. In
the platform Preamble:
Our party was the first party to declare for old-age 
pensions. We acknowledge the responsibility of 
government to adequately care for those handicapped by 
advanced age or other disabilities . . .  we must con­
tinue to accept responsibility for taking care of the 
unemployed until such time as industry is able to 
reemploy them (p. 364).
In detailing the Preamble, they go into "security" at length
claiming the New Deal has endangered social security. Their
plank stated principles which have been battled over since:
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(1) a pay-as-you-go policy for each generation to support 
the aged justly and adequately; (2) all over 65 should get 
supplementary payment to provide minimum income protection 
against want; (3) States and Territories complying with 
minimum standards should get Federal contributions; and (4) 
call for a direct tax widely distributed on the problem of 
unemployment and social security annuities (the reserve fund 
in the Act does not exist) (p. 366-67).
The Socialist platform began by showing the Old Deal
failings of 1928 and the New Deal failings of 1932. Claiming
that under the latter 12 millions are still jobless while big
business was given almost unheard of powers. It stated that
insecurity is logically related to capitalism (militarism
increases under a declining capitalism) (p. 370). As in
their platform of 1932, the Socialists called for more
Federal appropriations for the unemployed; also:
A Federal system of unemployment insurance and of old- 
age pensions for persons 60 years of age and over, with 
contributions for such social insurance systems to be 
raised from taxes on incomes and inheritances, as pro­
vided in the Frazier-Lundeen Bill; and adequate medical 
care of the sick and injured as a social duty, not as 
a private or public charity (p. 372).
Socialist-Labor platform rhetoric continued to call for a
new order by saying that every reform granted by capitalists
is a concealed measure of reaction, exemplified by the NRA,
AAA, TVA, CCC, WPA, etc. The Union Party platform
(receiving nearly 900,000 votes) had a social security plank
seeking to assure reasonable and decent security for the aged
who have been exploited by an unjust economic system (p. 375).
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1940
The Communist Platform of 1940 began by charging Wall 
Street wants war— citing it as the chief supplier of war 
materials and that "all domestic policies defended or pro­
posed are subordinated to the war issue perpetrated by the 
economic royalists" (p. 377). They point out that the New 
Deal gains of the last seven years are being used by Roose­
velt Democrats to retain support (the progressive labor and 
social legislation)— these gains are now under attack, how­
ever (p. 378). In the social security plank, the Communists 
called for: (1) an extension of unemployment compensation
to cover all workers by increasing benefits and maximum 
payments? (2) establish old-age pensions for all over 60 
with 60 dollars a month.
The Democratic Platform of 1940 begins by saying the 
world is undergoing violent change (p. 381) . The impending 
war and how to handle it makes up the major planks. The 
social security plank continues to pledge the extension of 
the Social Security Act by making it more effective and 
covering more millions of people? by more adequate and uni­
form benefits in the unemployment compensation system through 
the Federal equalization fund principles? and, by extending 
and increasing OASI benefits. A health plank pledges to 
expand Federal coordination of health efforts (p. 387). The 
Prohibition Party said that legislation alone— whether Old 
Deal or New Deal— is insufficient. The solution of all
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problems depends on character (p. 389). The Republicans in 
this year go back to the preamble of the Constitution to 
criticize the Roosevelt Administration— asserting that 
nothing has been gained except debt and Federal power. 
Regarding the social security plank, the Republicans favor 
the extension of necessary old-age benefits on an ear-marked 
pay-as-you-go basis (same as in 1936); extension of Unemploy­
ment Compensation provisions in the Social Security Act as 
well as installing experience-rating provisions— the adminis­
tration of which should be left with the States with a 
minimum of Federal control (p. 391). Of note is the 
insurance plank:
We condemn the New Deal attempt to destroy the con­
fidence of our people in private insurance institu­
tions. We favor continuance of regulation of 
insurance by the several States (p. 394).
The Socialist Party platform of 1940 points out that the best 
of what goes by the New Deal name— social insurance, minimum 
wage, etc.— was first demanded by the Socialist Party (p. 394) . 
They go on to say that the Democrats as a party never 
accepted the New Deal and now the New Deal Administration is 
abandoning it for war economics. (It might be noted that 
this platform is strikingly prophetic in raising four issues 
that concern the U. S. in the next 28 years.) The unemploy­
ment and social security plank of this platform proposes 
Federal old-age pensions to be supplemented by an annuity 
system; extend unemployment benefits to all; and desire a 
complete health and disability insurance program for the
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people (p. 395). As in previous election years, the Social­
ist-Labor Party makes no specific reference to constructive 
programs in their platform— rather they continue to believe 
and call for the downfall of capitalism.
1944
During this war year there were five parties who 
offered candidates for election. Of note is the fact that 
the Communist Party dissolved and was replaced by a Com­
munist Political Association— thus no platform. The Demo­
cratic Platform lauded its success in saving the American 
system of free enterprise both after depression and during 
war. As could be expected from the platform of the party in 
power, most of the planks deal with the war and what comes 
next. There is no mention of social security except for the 
general statement: "The enactment of such additional
humanitarian, labor, social and farm legislation as time and 
experience may require," . . .  (p. 403). The Prohibition
Party had a very specific social security plank:
We will extend the Social Security Act so as not to 
exclude any groups from its provisions, and will 
include a system of insurance for all aged persons, 
and administer it so as to preserve the incentives 
of initiative and thrift (p. 405).
The Republican Party platform of this war year, as the
Democratic one, pledged prosecution of the war— stressing
post-war relations and preparedness. Along the way they
criticize the Democratic Party saying that four more years
of Democratic rule would centralize all power in the
president. There is a lengthy "security" plank in the plat­
form (quite in contrast to the Democratic plank) which calls 
for: an extension of old-age and unemployment insurance
systems; returning the U. S. Employment Service to the 
States as soon as possible; a careful study of Federal-State 
programs for maternal and child health, dependent children 
and assistance to the blind, with a view to strengthening 
programs; the continuation and stimulation of Federal aid to 
State plans to make medical and hospital service available 
to those in need without disturbing doctor-patient relation­
ships or socializing medicine; and finally, a stimulation of
State and local plans for low-cost housing (p. 409). The
Socialist platform is almost prophetic in its discussion of 
the four issues facing the American people in the ensuing 
years after 1944. Of relevance to this study is the second
issue which is on the provision of economic security with
liberty (the first time that the notion of liberty has come 
up in any of the social security planks covered in this 
study). In general they call for democracy and not bureau­
cracy in regards to the preservation and increase of liberty:
Planning for plenty is wholly incompatible with a 
return of the control over great productive machinery 
to private owners— very largely absentee owners—  
while the government commits itself to overcome the 
periodic crisis of a scarcity economy by maintaining 
the unemployed at subsistence levels. This has been 
and is the economic program of the New Deal (p. 415).
Socialist-Labor Party comments in 1944 criticized the New
Deal by saying that what the New Deal failed to do, war did.
(This is vague but typical of the platform.) Now, they say,
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the problem is post-war markets:
Anticipating unprecedented postwar unemployment and 
social unrest, the Capitalist class and its reformer 
henchmen advance numerous schemes to appease the 
workers. Foremost among these are a vast postwar 
public works program and the extension of "social 
security"— a patent misnomer under a system which, 
by its very nature, dictates insecurity for useful 
producers (p. 417).
1948
In 1948 Democrats and Republicans received only 92% 
of the electoral votes due to a "bolt" from the Democratic 
National Convention of the delegates from several Southern 
States who protested the strong civil rights plank in the 
platform resulting in the States' Rights Party or "Dixie- 
crats." The new Progressive Party polled over one million 
votes. The Communist Party issued a platform but did not 
nominate a candidate (p. 419).
The Christian Nationalist Party platform of 1948 
claimed that Communist forces have infiltrated "old" politi­
cal parties and government offices thus weakening the U. S. 
government by instituting a program of State socialism 
(p. 420). Others who came under attack in the platform were 
Jews, aliens and Negroes. Their social security plank 
titled "The Aged and the Infirm" referred to the fact that 
the improvement of labor-saving devices has led to earlier 
retirements:
Our senior citizens must be made the benefactors of 
this progress, not the victims. A sin.ple but effective 
system must be provided whereby the children of our 
generation can provide well for those of the passing
198
generation. We favor a pension that will guarantee a 
self-respecting and independent standard of living 
for all regardless of their economic standing, just 
as veterans compensations are paid to all regardless 
of economic standing (p. 424).
The Communist Party still reacting to the war points out
that instead of security and abundance there is sky-rocketing
prices, lowered living standards and the shadow of impending
economic crash with mass unemployment (pp. 425-26). Wall
Street seeks to plunge the nation into Fascism and World War
III- (p. 426). This platform defends the labor movement,
calling for an extension of the Federal minimum wage and
social security laws to agricultural workers, including
seasonal and migratory labor (p. 427). In this platform they
threw their support behind the Progressive Party (see below).
The Democratic Party platform for this election year asserted
a similar statement made in the platform of 1932:
To serve the interests of all and not the few; to 
assure a world in which peace and justice can pre­
vail; to achieve security, full-production and full- 
employment— this is our platform (pp. 430-31).
This platform attacked the Republican 80th Congress specific­
ally for perpetrating inflation and policies imposing hard­
ships and suffering on large numbers of the people. In 
regards the social security plank in the platform there was 
considerable detail of their program:
We favor the extension of the Social Security program 
established under Democratic leadership, to provide 
additional protection against the hazards of old-age, 
disability, disease or death. We believe the program 
should include: increases in OASI benefits by at least
50% and reduction - of the eligibility age for women from 
65 to 60 years; extension of Old-age and Survivors' and 
Unemployment insurance to all workers now not covered;
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insurance against loss of earnings on account of 
illness or disability; improved public assistance 
for the needy. (Also favoring the enactment of a 
national health program for expanded medical 
research, medical education, and hospitals and 
clinics.) (p. 433.)
The Progressive Party platform of 1948 demands some detail­
ing because of their polling over one million of the popular 
votes. This party criticizes the "after-the-war" but busi­
ness control of the economy, government, Democratic and 
Republican parties: "Never before have so few owned so much
at the expense of so many" (p. 436). This new party pledged 
to safeguard the principles in the Declaration of Independence 
and Constitution— being the political heirs of Jefferson, 
Jackson and Lincoln— of Frederick Douglass, Altgeld and 
Debs— of "Fighting Bob" La Follette, George Norris, and 
Franklin Roosevelt (p. 436). Regarding social security, the 
Progressives say that the "old" parties refuse social 
security protection to millions and allow meagre benefits to 
the rest. They block national health legislation while 
millions are without medical care (pp. 437-38). They call 
for the public ownership and control of the main levers of 
our economic system on the basis of their reading of Roose­
velt's Economic Bill of Rights. They have a long Security 
and Health plank which covers almost all the titles in the 
Social Security Act:
The Progressive Party demands the extension of social 
security protection to every man, woman and child in 
the United States. We recognize the service which the 
Townsend Plan has performed in bringing to national 
attention the tragic plight of the senior citizens of 
America, and we condemn the bi-partisan conspiracy in
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Congress over the past ten years against providing 
adequate old-age pensions. We pledge our active sup­
port for a national old-age pension of 100 dollars a 
month to all persons at 60 years of age, based on 
right and not on a pauperized need basis. We call 
for a Federal program of adequate disability and sick­
ness benefits and increased unemployment benefits, 
protecting all workers and their standards of living.
We call for maternity benefits for working mothers for 
13 weeks, including the period before and after child­
birth, and the granting of children's allowances to 
families with children under 18. We favor adequate 
public assistance for all persons in need, with Federal 
grants-in-aid proportionate to the needs and financial 
ability of the State, pending the enactment of a comp- 
prehensive Federal Social Security program. We support 
the right of every American to good health through a 
national system of health insurance, giving freedom of 
choice to patient and practitioner, and providing 
adequate medical and dental care for all (pp. 445-46).
The Prohibition Party also had a social security and old-age
pension plank:
We will extend the Social Security Act so as to include 
all employed persons in its provisions. We will also 
develop a system of annuity insurance for aged persons 
and so administer it as to preserve the incentives of 
initiative and thrift (p. 449).
Republican Party members declared that it was general
principles based on liberty, opportunity and justice for all
that they ran on. They pointed with pride to the Republican
Congress and its recent accomplishments (in spite of the
executive). Their social security plank for this election
year went:
Consistent with the vigorous existence of our competi­
tive economy, we urge: extension of the Federal OASI
program and increase of the benefits to a more 
realistic level; strengthening of Federal-State pro­
grams designed to provide more adequate hospital 
facilities, too [sic] improve methods of treatment for 
the mentally ill, to advance maternal and child 
health and generally to foster a healthy America 
(p. 452) .
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Mankind is haunted by new fears according to the Socialist 
Party platform. People ask themselves if depression can be 
avoided, poverty vanquished and war uprooted. As in plat­
forms past, Socialist demands are many. Under the detailed 
plank titled: "Expand Social Legislation" they advocate the
expansion of unemployment insurance and social security in 
the following way:
. . . millions of workers are as yet uncovered by 
the unemployment and social security provisions.
The present law discriminates against farm labor, 
domestic servants and other working groups despite 
the constitutional guarantee of the "equal pro­
tection of the laws." Even so, the Democratic- 
Republican coalition in Congress has been whittling 
down the number of workers protected by the 
existing law at a time when extension of coverage 
should be the order of the day.
The age at which workers become eligible for old- 
age pensions should be promptly reduced to 60 and 
the system should be financed by net progressive 
income taxation rather than by the regressive payroll 
tax. The benefits— now drastically cut by the cur­
rent inflation— should be raised.
The Social Security law should be amended to 
include family incomes. The proper care of children 
is at least as important as the care of the aged.
In addition to the above, Socialists called for legislation
for comprehensive medical and hospital care, financed by a
national contribution system of health insurance, which has
been blocked by the Democratic-Republic coalition. On the
matter of health insurance they said:
Neither a fee-for-service system nor voluntary pre­
payment plans can bring the benefits of modern 
medical science to all the people, regardless of 
race, color, creed, geography or economic condition 
(p. 456) .
The Socialist-Labor platform of 1948 continued to
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criticize the American plutocracy which is leading the 
United States toward war— asserting there can be no lasting 
peace without socialism; war, fascism, and "poverty amidst 
plenty" are the evil brood of capitalism. As in previous 
platform statements, the Socialist-Laborites feel that 
Capitalist reforms amount to reaction. There is no social 
security plank (p. 462).
Socialist-Workers platform of 1948 said that even 
though the Americans have the essential elements for 
abolishing poverty and creating a rational and harmonious 
society, they view the future with much uncertainty and fear 
because war and depression are in their memory. Their plank 
on labor has a social security position and therefore needs 
to be noted. Discussing labor's standard of living, they 
demand an escalator clause (sliding scale of wages or auto­
matic cost-of-living bonus) to be in all union contracts as 
well as in all government employees' wages, veterans' allot­
ments, old-age allowances, and pensions and social security. 
Finally, unemployment insurance should be equal to trade 
union wages (p. 465).
As we have noted above, the Democratic party split at 
the Party convention over the civil rights plank in the plat­
form (thus incidently bolstering the hypothesis that platforms 
and planks take on political meaning worthy of study).
Several Southern States decided to take a stand on States' 
Rights. These "Dixiecrats," as they were called, maintained: 
"a platform of principles is a solemn covenant with the
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people and with the members of the party . . (p. 466).
They felt that they were on solid ground by splitting off 
on the issue of civil rights. They pointed out that their 
wishes should be complied with on the basis of past loyalty 
to the party (saying that the South had furnished approxi­
mately 50% of the votes necessary to nominate a president 
every four years for nearly a century) (p. 467).
1952
The Republican and Democratic parties received the 
highest popular vote for both winner and loser thus far in 
the history of presidential elections. The States' Rights 
Party dissolved shortly after the 1948 elections and the 
Progressive Party loses much of its support (p. 469).
The Christian Nationalist Party in 1952 kept up the 
same arguments advanced back in 1948. They were still 
seeking a religious base for the government— suggesting that 
government in the United States now differs substantially 
from the design laid down in the Constitution (p. 470). The 
discussion on domestic policy, although there is nothing 
therein on social security, as such, assails government 
expenditure and taxation by saying: "In all areas of private
welfare, the Socialist planners seek to inject the Federal 
hand to produce a progressive weakening of the structure of 
individual character" (p. 470).
Democratic Party positioning pointed with pride to 
the past 20 years of Democratic leadership by reaffirming
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that it was their policies and programs which rescued 
American business from total collapse while rescuing wage- 
earners from mass unemployment and encouraging unionization 
(claiming unemployment now being 3% of the labor force, com­
pared with almost 25% in 1932; trade union membership 
reaching 15 million— more than five times that in 1932). In 
short, the welfare of all economic and social groups has been 
promoted (p. 474). Their social security plank for this year 
suggested, among other things, that the national system of 
Social Security, conceived and developed by the Democratic 
Party, needs to be extended and improved by: (1) benefit
increases, more coverage, and lower retirement age for women 
in OASI; (2) stronger system of unemployment insurance with 
broader coverage and benefits to include a dependent 
allowance as well as improvements in the public assistance 
program; and (3) encourage private endeavors designed to 
complement our present social security program (p. 484).
The Progressive Party in this year considered the cease fire 
in Korea to be the major issue claiming that the old parties 
offer war and the war economy as the only way to have pros­
perity and stave off depression. Despite the war boom, 
these Progressives point out that five and one-half millions 
are on relief. This party still seeks, as in 1948, to make 
Roosevelt's Economic Bill of Rights a reality. In the area 
of social security they call for:
A comprehensive Federal system of old-age, unemploy­
ment and disability insurance, guaranteed to every
American, without discrimination, benefits equal to
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a minimum decent standard of living. For the aged, 
not less than $150 monthly; for the unemployed and 
disabled, not less that $40 weekly, with additional 
dependency allowances. Extend the Social Security 
Act to all workers and all who are self-employed, 
including the farmer.
Provide family allowance of $3 weekly per child. 
Virtually every industrial nation, except ours, pays 
a weekly or monthly grant to the parent of every 
child, to assure a basic minimum standard of living 
for children.
A system of national health insurance, guaran­
teeing to all Americans as a matter of right and 
not as charity, and without discrimination, ade­
quate dental and medical care . . . provide 
dependency benefits to working mothers equal to the 
unemployment compensation. We are now the only 
industrial nation in the world without a system of 
health insurance (p. 492).
The Prohibition Party continues to be strongly opposed to
aetheistic Communism, government extravagance, and alcohol—
deploring, generally, the current United States trend toward
the Socialist State. But in their social security plank they
say:
We endorse the general principle of social security, 
including all employed groups. We deplore, however, 
the widespread current abuses of its privileges and 
maladministration of its provisions for political 
ends, and pledge ourselves to correct these evils 
(pp. 495-95).
This Republican Platform, like previous ones, begins with 
governmental principles. In 1952 they began by stating that 
man was not born to be ruled, but that he consented to be 
governed; but, under the successive Democratic Administra­
tions of the last 20 years this idea has been destroyed. In 
the area of social security measures they observe:
Inflation has already cut in half the purchasing power 
of the retirement and other benefits under the Federal
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OASI system. Sixty million persons are covered under 
the system and four and one-half million are now 
receiving benefits.
The best assurance of preserving the benefits for 
which the worker has paid is to stop the inflation 
which causes the tragic loss of purchasing power, 
and that we propose to do.
We favor the amendment of the OASI system to pro­
vide coverage for those justly entitled to it but 
who are now excluded.
We shall work to achieve a simple, more effective 
and more economical method of administration.
We shall make a thorough study of universal pay- 
as-we-go pension plans.
. . .  we are opposed to Federal compulsory health 
insurance with its crushing cost, wasteful inef­
ficiency, bureaucratic dead weight, and debased 
standards of medical care (pp. 503-504).
Socialist Party platform of 1952: this party felt it was
under global attack to such an extent that socialism has
become a major political issue in the country (p. 506). It
is evident that militarism is their major target in this
platform:
American capitalism never recovered from the great 
collapse of the 301s when millions went hungry and 
homeless although the basic wealth of the country 
was great and unavailable for their use only because 
of the despotism of the private profit system.
There was no recovery in the sense of the devotion 
of the economy to human needs. Superficial pros­
perity returned with a war economy and the brutal and 
wanton destructiveness of war (p. 510).
The Socialist Party offered an internal development program
as a substitute for war. For example, the social security
plank calls for benefit increases to catch up with inflation,*
coverage should be expanded to end discrimination against
any group of workers? the age limit for old-age pension
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should be reduced to 60; finally, family allowances must be
added (p. 512). This is a much milder plank than in previous
platforms we have examined above.
Socialist-Labor Party platform: the Capitalist system
rose on the ruins of Feudalism and has fulfilled its mission
of establishing mass production, according to the framers of
this platform. Now this system's downfall is certain because
it is now based on an arms economy:
One and all (Republicans, Democrats, etc.) preach 
reforms and promise improvements of conditions that 
are past improving. To propose reform when a 
fundamental social change is called for is to help 
prolong the Capitalist cause of war, Fascism and 
working-class exploitation. "To reform is to 
preserve" (p. 516).
Socialist Workers Party platforms statements, like 
the others under the Socialist banner, are against the mili­
tary machine which devours American wealth and resources. 
Generally:
The Second World War pulled us out of the depression.
Now preparations for World War III are keeping us out 
of a depression. Big Business likes this war profife- 
teering. It prefers to have the nation's wealth 
invested in the means of destruction instead of in a 
system of social security to provide medical care and 
security for everyone (p. 517) .
The security and welfare plank goes:
The so-called 'Fair Deal' welfare program promised by 
Truman in 1948 has been put in moth balls. It was 
only a campaign promise. Now it is being taken out 
of storage for the 1952 campaign. The Republicans and 
Democrats will never enact a genuine public welfare 
program (p. 521).
Their specific proposals call for building 20 million low-
cost housing units; a free national health service for all;
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and an adequate old-age pension and a college education for 
all youth (p. 521).
1956
There were six parties who put up candidates during 
this election: Republicans, Democrats, Prohibitionists,
Socialists, Socialist-Labor, and Socialist-Workers. (In mid- 
September 317 delegates from several splinter groups repre­
senting voters in approximately one-half of the States, 
formed a National Conservative Movement and published a 
declaration of principles (p. 523). There was no progres­
sive candidate.
The Democratic Party platform of 1956 was a long and
detailed one. A major point made was that the people
returned control of the legislative machinery of the Federal
government to the 84th Congress in 1954 on the wake of two
years of Republican misrule. Legislative history was made
by this Congress say the Democrats. For example in the
social security plank:
By lowering the retirement age for women and disabled 
persons, the Democratic 84th Congress pioneered two 
great advances in social security, over the bitter 
opposition of the Eisenhower administration. We shall 
continue our efforts to broaden and strengthen this 
program by increasing benefits to keep pace with 
improving standards of living; by raising the wage 
base upon which benefits depend; and by increasing 
benefits for each year of covered employment (p. 534).
In addition, the Party called for broader coverage and
increased benefits as well as the establishment of a floor
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to assure minimum level and duration of benefits and fair 
eligibility rules; calling also for an improved public 
assistance program even beyond those improvements made by 
the 84th Congress (p. 534).
The Prohibition Party platform had the same general 
tone as the one of four years previous. The social security 
plank had exactly the same wording.
The Republican Party platform for 1956 celebrating
its centennial as a party, cites Lincoln and Eisenhower as
being the preservers of the Nation. The major issue for
this party is whether government shall be the servant or
master of men (p. 547). They pointed with pride to the
accomplishments in social security:
Social security has been extended to an additional 
10 million workers and the benefits raised for 6^ 
million. The protection of unemployment insurance 
has brought to 4 million additional workers (p. 549).
The Socialist Party restated basic socialist princi­
ples. They point out that the American people have already 
adopted many socialist measures to serve their needs when 
Capitalism, with its profit motive, failed them:
Capitalism fails to guarantee basic security to the 
people. We would establish social insurance with 
adequate provision for unemployment compensation, 
old-age pensions and death benefits, and provide for 
medical care, family allotments and sickness 
insurance (p. 563).
Socialist Labor platforms statements reaffirm that 
Capitalism is doomed and that Socialism is_ the answer to all 
social problems. This party continues to make appeals to 
the working class of America. No mention is made of social 
security.
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The Socialist Workers continue to oppose the American 
"imperialistic" war program. They also focus on the danger 
of economic crisis as corporations record profit and con­
sumers record debt— suggesting that an economic crisis is the 
only alternative to war under Capitalism (p. 568). They 
leveled a specific attack on the Democratic Party:
Its New Deal reputation was forced upon it in the 
first place out of necessity to ward off the mass 
radicalization following the 1929 crash. Since the 
New Deal became transformed into the War Deal during 
the latter part of the thirties not one major social 
reform has been introduced (p. 571).
Their economic security and welfare plank called for adequate
old-age pensions; free medical care and hospitalization;
full disability benefits; and an escalator clause on all
wages, compensation and pensions, with taxes to be included
in computing living costs (p. 572).
1960
The Democratic Party in 1960 began their platform by 
drawing on some history. As in America's first contested 
election (1796), we look to Jefferson's principle on "The 
Rights of Man" as being the basic concern of our party.
They go on to say that with the possibility of nuclear holo­
caust, our national strength— military, political, economic, 
and moral— must be restored (p. 574). On the domestic scene, 
they reaffirm Roosevelt's Bill of Rights (p. 583) by sup­
porting full employment as the paramount objective of 
national policy. In specific pledges, they wish to bring
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migrant labor under many protections, including social
security provisions (p. 585). Before considering specific
social security promises they, in the platform, have a
Health plank:
Illness is expensive. Many Americans have neither 
incomes nor insurance protection to enable them to 
pay for modern medical care. The problem is par­
ticularly acute with the older citizens, among whom 
serious illness strikes most often.
We shall provide medical care benefits for the 
aged as part of the time-tested Social Security 
insurance system. We reject any proposal which 
would require such citizens to submit to the 
indignity of a means test— a “pauper's oath11 (pp. 557- 
58) .
Criticizing the Republican Administration, they say:
The Republican Administration refused to acknowledge 
any national responsibility for health care for 
elder citizens until forced to do so by an increas­
ingly outraged demand. Then, its belated proposal 
was a cynical sham built around a degrading test 
based on means or income— a “pauper's oath" (p. 588).
Then they discuss a comprehensive program for the aged
(later enacted as the Older Americans Act of 1964 plus the
Medicare Provisions in the Social Security Act emphasizing
services to aged rather than income):
We will amend the Social Security Act to increase the 
retirement benefit for each additional year of work 
after 65, thus encouraging workers to continue on the 
job full-time.
To encourage part-time work by others, we favor 
raising the $1200 a year ceiling on what a worker 
may earn while still drawing Social security 
benefits.
Retirement benefits must be increased generally, 
and minimum benefits raised from $33 to $50 (p. 589).
Under selected parts of the “Welfare" plank:
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Public Assistance.— Persons in need who are inade­
quately protected by social insurance are cared for 
by the States and local communities under public 
assistance programs.
The Federal government which now shares the cost 
of aid to some of these, should share in all, and 
benefits should be made available without regard to 
residence (refers to the "General” aid category).
Unemployment Benefits.— We will establish uniform 
minimum standards throughout the Nation for coverage, 
duration, and amount of unemployment insurance 
benefits.
Child Welfare.— The Child Welfare Program and other 
services already established under the Social 
Security Act should be expanded. Federal leadership 
is required in the nation wide campaign to prevent 
and control juvenile delinquency (p. 589).
The Prohibition Party platform of 1960 stressed 
loyalty to the Constitution, opposition to Communism, and 
economy as well as the liquor problem. This party makes the 
same statement about social security as in previous plat­
forms (pp. 600-604).
Republican Party platform of 1960: the Republicans
offer their program by looking to "The changeless principles
of our free Constitution" for strength and confidence in an
age of revolutionary turbulance (p. 605) . In the Labor
plank they continue to call for the strengthening of the
unemployment insurance system and the extension of its
benefits (p. 610). In the "Older Citizens" plank:
Expansion of coverage and liberalization of selected 
social security benefits on a basis which would main­
tain the fiscal integrity of the system (p. 616).
(Amazing how fiscal integrity of this part of the U. S. 
system has been emphasized for so many years— while the
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whole system of government spending has been fiscally dis­
integrating in other areas such as farm and public transpor­
tation and utility subsidies, etc.) The plank on "Health 
Aid" is worth quoting so as to contrast it with the Demo­
cratic Party statement above:
Development of a health program that will provide 
the aged needing it, on a sound fiscal basis and 
through a contributory system, protection against 
burdensome costs of health care. Such a program 
should:
Provide the beneficiaries with the option of 
purchasing private health insurance— a vital distinc­
tion between our approach and Democratic proposals 
in that it would encourage commercial carriers and 
voluntary insurance organizations to continue their 
efforts to develop sound coverage plans for the 
senior population (p. 616).
In addition to this type of health program, they pledge to 
protect the personal relationship of patient and physician; 
include State participation in health aid; remove the 50 
year old age requirement for disability insurance and amend 
the law to provide incentives; set up a single, Federal 
assistance grant to each State for aid to needy persons 
rather than dividing such grants into specific categories; 
and a strengthening of the Federal-State program of rehabil­
itation (p. 617). The platform Conclusion sheds light on 
the discussion:
We have no wish to exaggerate differences between 
ourselves and the Democratic Party; nor can we, in 
conscience, obscure the differences that do exist.
We believe that a Republican program is based upon a 
sounder understanding of the action and scope of 
government. There are many things a free government 
cannot do for its people as well as they can do them 
for themselves. There are some things government 
should promise or attempt to do. The functions of
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government are so great as to bear no needless 
enlargement. We limit our proposals and our 
pledges to those areas for which the government 
of a great republic can reasonably be made 
responsible (p. 620).
The Socialist Party offered a platform for 1960 but 
no candidate. According to this document: the most funda­
mental Socialist goal is that man must master society 
instead of being mastered by it. This was amplified by 
statements as follows:
Since the 1930's the two old parties have produced 
virtually no progressive social legislation. As 
productivity has grown, so have slums; as medical 
research has advanced, the ability of ordinary people 
to pay for medical care has regressed; as our 
standard of living has risen, fifty million Americans 
have continued to dwell in poverty (p. 621).
Our society is deadlocked and frustration is our 
predominant feeling in every area of life; and the 
predominant source of our political frustration is 
a party alignment that cannot reflect the will of 
the people. A coalition of Northern Republicans 
and Southern Democrats thwart the wishes of the 
majority, and will continue to do so until there is 
a political realignment in this country (p. 621).
It is interesting and revealing to note that in this Social­
ist platform they had a heading the War on Poverty which was 
picked up later by the Johnson Administration. In this 
particular instance, the Socialists were referring to the 
international poverty situation (e.g., 70% of the world's 
population is in a state of poverty).
1964
The Democratic Party, led by Lyndon B. Johnson, 
polled 61.4% (60 millions) of the vote— the largest plurality
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in American history. Republicans took Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Arizona. (Minor 
platforms not included in the analysis— National States 
Rights, Universal, American, Poor Mans', and Theocratic 
parties.) Minor parties received fewer than 150,000 votes 
in 1964.
The Democrats. calling themselves the Party of 
Jefferson, rested on the ONE NATION, ONE PEOPLE idea. They 
said that the welfare, progress, security, and survival of 
each of us reside in the common good. They offer their plat­
form as a covenant of unity (p. 641). The task is to make 
the national purpose serve the human, individual purpose 
(p. 644). Within the framework of the Democracy of Oppor­
tunity plank, they discuss social security:
The Social Security program, initiated and developed 
under the iiational leadership of the Democratic Party 
and in the face of ceaseless party opposition, con­
tributes greatly to the strength of the nation. We 
must insure that those who have contributed to the 
system shall share in the steady increase in our 
standard of living by adjusting benefit levels (p. 645).
This platform has considerable detail because the Democrats 
feel that their accomplishments are many. Under two head­
ings: "Accounting of Stewardship: 1961-1953" and "The
Record" they measure the last three and one-half years of 
performance against their 1960 platform point for point 
(pp. 649-72) which reinforces the notion that, at least the 
Democratic Party takes its rhetoric serious in these years. 
For example, in the health area in 1960 they proposed to 
provide medical care benefits for the aged under social
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security: "More health legislation has been enacted during
the past 3% years than during any other period in American 
history" (p. 661) . In 1960 they proposed to end the neglect 
of older citizens— their performance on the program for the 
aged:
The Social Security Act Amendments of 1961 broadened 
benefits to 5.3 million people, including minimum 
benefits for retired workers from $33 to $40 per month, 
permitting men as well as women to begin collecting 
reduced benefits at age 62.
The Social Security program now provides 1.3 billion 
in benefits each month to 19.5 million persons. One 
out of every ten Americans receives a Social Security 
check every month (p. 662).
They further proposed back in 1960: (1) to remove age limi­
tations for disabled people; (2) to increase benefits for 
the needy; (3) to bring more uniform standards in unemploy­
ment insurance benefits; and (4) to expand the child welfare 
program. Their performance:
The 1961 Public Assistance Amendments, extending aid 
for the first time to families with dependent children 
in which the parent is unemployed . . . the 1962 Public 
Welfare amendments provide the authority and financial 
resources for a new approach to the problems of pro­
longed dependency and some of the special needs of 
children . . . (p. 663) the Temporary Extended Unemploy­
ment Compensation Act of 1961 provided 13 additional 
weeks of benefits to the long-term unemployed. 2.8 
million jobless workers received 800 million dollars in 
assistance (p. 664).
The Prohibition Party platform for 1964 was similar 
to past ones in content, including the social security plank 
which is worded the same as in years past.
The Republican Party, calling themselves the Party of 
Lincoln— much like the Democrats called themselves the Party
217
of Jefferson— offered a platform "For the People." They 
decry the Federal extremists who are impulsive in the use of 
national power— the Democratic Party stands accused of weak­
ening the Republic both at home and abroad (pp. 677-68). On 
the attack, Republicans say the Democrats have failed the 
poor:
This Administration has refused to take practical 
free enterprise measures to help the poor. Under 
the last Republican Administration, the percentage 
of poor in the country dropped encouragingly from 
28% to 21%. By contrast, the present Administration, 
despite a massive increase in the Federal bureaucracy, 
has managed a mere 2 percentage point reduction.
This Administration proposed a so-called war on 
poverty which characteristically overlaps, and often 
contradicts, the 42 existing Federal poverty pro­
grams. It would dangerously centralize Federal 
control and bypass effective State, local, and pri­
vate programs (p. 680).
In the area of fiscal responsibility the Democrats are
further criticized:
This Administration has continued to endanger retire­
ment under Social Security for millions of citizens; 
it has attempted to overload the System with costly, 
unrelated programs which ignore the dangers of overly 
regressive taxation and the unfairness of forcing the 
poor to finance such programs for the rich (p. 681).
Claiming that they offer no extravagent proposals like the
Democrats, they offer the following counter-proposals on
social security:
Tax credits and other methods of assistance to help 
needy senior citizens meet the costs of medical and 
hospital insurance; a strong sound system of Social 
Security, with improved benefits to all of our 
people; . . . revision of the Social Security laws to 
allow higher earnings, without loss of benefits, by 
our elderly people; full coverage of all medical and 
hospital costs for the needy elderly people, financed 
by general revenue through broader implementation of
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Federal-State plans, rather than the compulsory 
Democratic scheme covering only a small percentage 
of such costs, for everyone regardless of need 
(p. 683).
Socialist Labor Party platform of 1964.— Humanity is 
still standing on the threshold of a new social order—  
Capitalism is doomed because it is charged with fatal contra­
dictions. Against this bleak background, say the Socialist- 
Laborites, politicians of both major parties are declaring 
phony antipoverty "wars" (p. 690). In this platform they 
want to:
Repudiate the Republican and Democratic parties, 
the political Siamese twins of capitalism— and 
reject also the self-styled "radicals'1 and 
"liberals" whose platforms consist of measures 
to reform and patchup the poverty-breeding 
capitalist system, which is past reforming and 
patching (p. 692).
There is no mention of social security programs.
Socialist Workers.— This platform directs itself to
the one-fifth of the American population in poverty which
President Johnson refers to in his State of the Union message
(1964); that is, those millions who live in depression
pockets (p. 692). In the area of social security:
Provide the millions of aged people with full dis­
ability benefits, free medical care and hospitaliza­
tion, and adequate pensions. Nationalize the entire 
medical system. As an immediate measure, pass the 
King-Anderson Medicare Bill now bottled up in 
Congress (p. 698).
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APPENDIX H
THE AVERAGE AND WEIGHTED RICE INDEX OF COHESION*
Given the context of rigor surrounding the indicators 
used in this study, analysis was limited to the most basic 
of quantitative methods. The computation of the Average Rice 
Index of Cohesion in this study was done according to the 
source cited below. That is, the Rice Indices of the 
individual roll calls were averaged without weighting the 
different number of legislators participating in each roll
call. What follows are the results of weighting each roll
call (computationally, this weighted Rice index for the five 
periods of the study is derived by getting a grand total 
number of votes for the period as well as the grand total
number of votes for and against, for the period, and computing
the Rice index on these totals rather than averaging the 
individual Rice Indices).
These comparative data reveal vastly different results 
between the weighted and non-weighted index except for the 
House Democrats in the New Deal-War Deal, Fair Deal and New 
Frontier historical periods. This is so because not all
*Source: Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr.,
and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-call Analysis (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 29-58.
TABLE XXXI
COMPARISON OF THE WEIGHTED RICE INDEX WITH THE AVERAGE RICE INDEX
IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE BY PARTY
House Senate
Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans
Average Weighted Average Weighted Average Weighted Average Weighted
New Deal 
War Deal 86.6 85.5 84.6 33.5 65.5 52.1 58.5 1.3
Fair Deal 63.9 64.7 72.9 -30.4 64.0 7.0 79.9 -57.0
Cold War 60.1 68.6 88.0 69.9 59.8 48,0 68.6 -11.0
New Frontier 97.1 97.1 66.6 42.9 68.5 29.9 79.8 4.2
Great
Society 83.7 42.1 70.2 51.2 52.9 11.4 53.4 - 8.3
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members vote on all the bills presented to them, thus there 
are different proportions of legislators voting in each roll 
call. The Weighted index accounts for this as well as 
revealing the direction of cohesion (in this case, the 
negative cohesion of the House and Senate Fair Deal Repub­
licans and the Cold War and Great Society Republican Senators).
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